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ABSTRACT 
The twentieth century has been characterized by rapid urbanization accompanied by enormous 
urban growth and massive rural-to-urban migration around the world. The state-led urban 
expansion model of economic development that shapes China’s contemporary economy, 
systematically excludes farmers in general, and left-behind female farmers in particular, from its 
urbanization processes. Without integrating its large rural population into urban development, 
China is limiting its capacity for sustainable economic growth. Hence, if China aspires to become 
a high-income country by rebalancing its development strategies in more inclusive, equitable and 
sustainable directions, moving toward a more farmer-oriented urbanization pathway is vital. 
Given that male out-migration and females being left behind are the outcomes of gender 
inequalities within and beyond rural households, left-behind women, who are even more left out 
of policy discourses than men, need to be integrated into more inclusive approaches to 
urbanization planning. However, China’s land-driven, top-down model of urban development 
may systematically prevent the emergence of bottom-up approaches that would allow farmers to 
participate more fully in and to benefit from urbanization. To tackle these problems, this 
dissertation incorporates Friedmann’s alternative development framework, which is centered on 
inclusion, empowerment, gender equity and sustainability, to guide a holistic and systematic 
analysis. Through a case study of Chongqing, this dissertation first examines how one local state 
utilizes land resources to facilitate more people-oriented urbanization, rather than merely 
extracting land revenue. Subsequently, it also examines opportunities for left-behind women to 
develop self-empowerment through a comparison between left-behind and non-left-behind 
women’s empowerment status, using the Women’s Empowerment in Agriculture Index. Finally, 
integrated urbanization practices, centered on inclusion, sustainable development, and gender 
equity, are examined for their relevance to possible alternative urbanization pathways in China.  
The results of the two studies confirm that such pathways could evolve from China’s current 
practices in ways that are compatible with its present model of state capitalism, while fulfilling its 
aspirations for securing a socialist market economy. With an exclusive focus on the agency of 
farmers overall and then female farmers, specifically, this dissertation fills an existing research 
gap by providing a ground-up analysis of integrated alternative urbanization pathways in China, 
which depart from current economy-maximizing approaches. 
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CHAPTER 1                                                                                
INTRODUCTION 
This introductory chapter describes the historical background and theoretical 
considerations informing the dissertation; it identifies the problems, defines the research 
questions, and provides a rationale for using a holistic alternative development framework to 
guide the investigation of urbanization patterns in China, based on a selective literature review. 
Then, it explains the methodologies adopted and outlines the structure of the dissertation.  
Unlike a conventional PhD thesis, this is a manuscript-style dissertation that contains two 
independent, but linked papers, as chapters 2 and 3. Under the general theme of exploring 
alternative pathways for urbanization in China, each chapter also focuses on one aspect of 
designing revised approaches to current patterns, practices, and policies. More specifically, 
chapter 2 explores how to draw upon initiatives already available in China to move toward more 
inclusive and sustainable development through policies that facilitate farming families to 
integrate more fully into urbanization processes, while chapter 3 examines gender equity in rural 
regions by analyzing left-behind women’s self-empowerment in agriculture. Chapter 4 concludes 
and presents the theoretical and policy implications of the dissertation. 
 Background 1.1
For nearly four decades, China’s economic development has grown at a remarkable pace. 
China’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate has remained in the double digits for nearly 
20 years (World Bank, 2015).  By 2010, China had become the second largest economy in the 
World, measured by GDP (Hua, 2014). It is estimated that Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in 
China averaged 42 billion USD from 1997 until 2016, reaching an all-time high of 126 billion 
USD in 2015 (Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China, 2016). In the same year, 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) officially included Yuan as one of the few currencies 
with Special Drawing Rights (SDR), which means that it has become one of the dominant world 
currencies, similar to US Dollars, Japanese Yen, and Euros. 
Although China has gained an international reputation for its outstanding economic 
performance, it has also faced great global and domestic challenges in order to sustain such high 
growth. China has responded to these challenges with a number of policy initiatives in its efforts 
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to pass over the “middle-income” trap,1 a form of stagnation in economic growth that prevents 
many developing nations from sustaining their high-income rankings.  
Following WWII, only five Newly Industrialized Economies (NIEs), including Japan, 
Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong (China) and Taiwan (China), managed to avoid falling into the 
middle-income trap. According to the Commission on Growth and Development (2008), 
inclusive development and sustained economic growth were considered to be two key elements 
contributing to the success stories of these five nations or regions in attaining and retaining their 
high-income status. A country is considered to have sustainable growth if it can achieve a 
minimum 7% increase in GDP annually and keep that up for 25 years or more, while inclusive 
development assures people and their children share fully in the benefits associated with growth 
(Commission on Growth and Development, 2008). The interaction between inclusive 
development and sustainable growth is well illustrated in the development histories of Korea and 
Taiwan (China). Both nations (areas) first accomplished democratic transition in the late1980s, 
which provided them with inclusive development mechanisms that supported their fast economic 
growth. To gauge the outcome of inclusion, the Gini Coefficient,2 which measures the inequality 
of income distribution within a nation, is used as an approximate instrument. A score of 1 
represents absolute inequality of income distribution, while a lower score shows a more favorable 
inclusion condition. As shown by United Nations University World Institute for Development 
Economics Research [UNU-WIDER] (2015), during 1978 and 2014, the Gini coefficients of both 
Korea and Taiwan (China) remained almost flat between 0.28 and 0.37, while Gini coefficients of 
Argentina, Brazil and Chile have fluctuated between 0.36 and 0.61, reflecting their greater 
domestic income inequality as compared with the two Asian economies. Inclusion is one part of 
the story; growth is the other. In the case of Korea and Chinese Taiwan, both have sustained high 
rates of growth for the last few decades and reached a stable urbanization level of 80% at the 
																																																								
1 The middle-income trap refers to a phenomenon where, in the postwar era, many countries managed to reach 
middle-income status, but few have continued on to become high-income economies and have thus experienced a 
sharp slowdown in growth. According to the World Bank (2014), middle-income economies are those with a Gross 
National Income (GNI) per capita falling between $1045 and $12736.   
2 Gini coefficient is a measure of the income distribution of a nation's residents and is often used to measure income 
2 Gini coefficient is a measure of the income distribution of a nation's residents and is often used to measure income 
inequality. It is defined as a ratio with values between 0 and 1, where 0 corresponds to perfect income equality and 1 
corresponds to extreme income inequality. For calculation method, see Lerman and Yitzhaki (1984). 				
	 3	
beginning of the 1990s, maintaining their sustainable and inclusive growth profiles ever since 
(Hua, 2014; Wen, 2014).  
In the case of China, the shrinking global market, due to the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, 
has placed great pressure on China’s exporting sectors, which are major drivers of its economic 
growth. As a result, China’s growth rate has fallen to less than 10% annually and sank to 6.9% in 
2015 (World Bank, 2015). Thus, China is confronted with great international challenges to 
maintaining its continuous high growth. 
Domestically, the rise in socioeconomic inequality that has accompanied national market 
reform and economic growth poses a great threat to China’s social stability, which may further 
slow its economic development, as not all members of the population have enjoyed similar 
opportunities to thrive, and thereby contribute to overall prosperity (Hua, 2014). The national 
Gini coefficient was 0.38 in 1988 (Griffin & Zhao, 1988) and 0.49 in 2002 (Li, 2002), reaching a 
peak value of 0.52 in 2011 (UNU-WIDER, 2015). Unlike the pre-reform era, where absolute 
poverty was extensive and evenly distributed among regions, China’s marketization and 
urbanization have generated new forms of poverty and created visibly marginalized groups, 
including migrant workers, farmers, and female farmers, in particular (Fan, 2003; 2008; Zhang, 
Wang & Sander, 2007). Given that rural migrants and farmers represent nearly 70% of the total 
population, and are absorbing the brunt of increasing rural-urban income disparity (Wang & Cai, 
2010), their relative poverty status compared to urban citizens further limits the growth of 
domestic consumption, which is considered one of the key drivers necessary for China to 
maintain its growth during global recession (Hua, 2014, Huang, 2011). Furthermore, rapid 
urbanization and economic growth have also spawned more prominent environmental issues for 
China. According to Liu & Diamond (2005), China ranked 129th of the 142 countries in measures 
of environmental sustainability. Most recently, China became the world’s deadliest country for 
outdoor air pollution, which killed nearly one million people in 2012 (Department of Public 
Health, Environmental and Social Determinants of Health [PHE], 2016). Given China’s extreme 
social inequities, limited domestic demand, and environmental degradation, its past development 
patterns are unsustainable.  
There are many attempts underway to tackle the challenges facing China, emerging from 
diverse disciplines. Drawing lessons from developing countries and NIEs, Lin (2009) concludes 
that China’s rapid development has been following a dual-track pathway, where the state plays a 
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strong role in promoting economic growth while capital accumulation in private sectors also 
increases. For China to overcome the challenges outlined above, it may need to consider 
completing the transition from a dual-track development to a well-functioning market economy, 
to reduce the effects of market distortions (Lin, 2009). While China may continue marketization 
for the sake of promoting its economic growth, the market system alone may not address all the 
issues it faces. Even though a market economy has been built up in most socialist countries that 
are in transition toward greater participation in economic globalization, the right to distribute 
many key elements of the market system still remains in the hands of their governments 
(Szelenyi, 2011). Furthermore, social inequality may be reinforced by the market transition to 
generate even worse conditions, as has been the case in China and other transitional countries 
(Huang, 2012). This is due to the fact that the monopoly of the state in most former socialist 
countries created or exacerbated social inequalities by squeezing the living space for civil society 
or any other organized social activities during the process of marketization (Sun, 2008). When 
there is no effective regulation of market transition, the market tends to work for efficiency at the 
expense of equity, resulting in further social disparities, as is certainly the case in Russia and 
Eastern Europe (Szelenyi, 2008; 2011).  
While international paradigms, discourses or practices may have an impact on a nation's 
growth and development policies, the desired outcomes may be more likely to occur when the 
national authority approves them and can integrate them into local systems (Hayami & Godo, 
2005). Focusing on China’s political economy, two different phrases have been widely used to 
describe its economic development pattern during the reform era; these are: “state capitalism” 
and “socialist market economy” (Huang, 2012; Qian & Wu, 2008). The term “state capitalism” 
highlights the significant role of the state in managing a nation’s economy with capitalist 
characteristics. Unlike other socialist countries that adopted capitalist systems and partially or 
entirely completed their democratic transformation at an earlier stage, China has attempted to 
engage all attributes of a capitalist economy without moving toward democratic institutions 
(Coarse & Wang, 2012; Tsai, 2007). Even though political transformation occurs slowly at all 
levels of government where the state intervenes in the economy using capitalist logics, the 
Communist Party of China (CPC) still maintains its absolute power in China’s multi-level 
political settings (Nee & Opper, 2012). The so-called “socialist market economy,” which is 
advocated for and claimed by Chinese officials, is centered on the idea that economic growth 
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with capitalist characteristics is allowed, as long as it supports socialist purposes and operates 
under the control of the CPC (Coarse & Wang, 2012). However, a retrospective review of 
China’s development path indicates that its political economy is more like “state capitalism,” 
rather than a “socialist market economy” (Huang, 2012). Consequently, whether China is going 
to continue its current version of state capitalism, move toward a more authentically socialist 
market economy, or transform itself toward a more inclusive democracy, is still the subject of 
heated debate (Coarse & Wang, 2012; Qian & Wu, 2008; Wong, 2007).  
Unlike most of the available literature, which investigates the issue of China’s 
development from the perspective of its political economy, or through the lens of new 
institutional economics (Huang, 2012; Tsai, 2007), this study attempts to contribute to on-going 
policy discussions through a close examination of urbanization processes in China. As indicated, 
China’s increasing integration into the global economy, its continuous economic liberalism, and 
its policies designed to support economic development have favored rapid urbanization and 
economic growth (McGranahan & Tacoli, 2006; Wen, 2014). Consequently, China’s 
urbanization is not only a reflection of its political economy and the dynamic relationship among 
key players involved in its land tenure system; its model of urbanization is also a significant 
contributor to China’s current challenges, which includes over-investment in state assets, weak 
domestic consumption and persistent social inequality (Zhou, 2014).  
Globally, urbanization is a worldwide trend as well as a strategic national development 
pathway for attaining high-income rankings. The world population has reached 6.97 billion, and 
52 percent of the total lived in the urban areas by 2011 (Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs of United Nations [UNDESA], 2011). China is no exception. Since 1978, its economic 
development has featured rapid urbanization characterized by enormous rural-urban migration. 
By 2011, the official urban population of China reached 51 percent of the total population 
(Development Research Center of the State Council [DRC], 2011), including migrant residents 
living in cities for more than half the year. Comparatively, as shown during the take-off phases of 
economic growth in Chinese Taiwan and South Korea, each of them started urbanization at the 
levels of 28% and 40%, respectively, in the 1950s. Attaining stable urbanization at nearly 80% in 
the 1980s, the two countries (areas) also achieved high-income rankings and established 
democratic institutions during the same period (Perkins, 2010). 
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Domestically, promoting urbanization is widely considered to be one of the major drivers 
for China’s rapid economic growth and continues to be a key instrument used to address China’s 
imbalanced development pattern. Urbanization was first stated as an objective in China’s 10th 
Five-Year Plan for Social and Economic Development (2001-2005) and has been emphasized 
and carried through until the most recent 13th Five-Year Plan (2016-2020). Despite this emphasis 
on urbanization, however, unchecked social polarization constrains domestic consumption power, 
which could otherwise provide a buffer against shocks in global capital systems. In effect, China 
cannot realize its ambitions for full modernization and industrialization while leaving large rural 
populations engaged in the agricultural economy as small peasant farmers (Hua, 2014). 
Constrained by many factors, such as great regional as well as rural-urban disparities, and 
institutional obstacles arising from its previous planned economy, China’s population remains 
systemically under-urbanized, as measured against Western and other developing countries’ 
experiences (Au & Henderson, 2002; Zhang, 2004). More specifically, China’s distorted 
urbanization model features an under-urbanization of farmers, caused by historical institutions 
left over from its centralized planning regime, while an over-urbanization of land has been 
enhanced by states’ investments in urban infrastructure (Hua, 2014; Ong, 2014).  
The hukou and land tenure systems are widely accepted as the two critical institutional 
barriers contributing to China’s distorted urbanization patterns (Au & Henderson, 2002; Tao & 
Xu, 2007). The hukou system has been established in China since the 1950s, aiming to prevent 
free movement of farmers out of rural areas in order to establish and maintain an exclusive 
employment system located in urban sectors (Cai, 2011). Under this system, individuals are 
entitled to an official hukou identity based on their geographic origin of birth, with farmers 
having rural hukou and urban citizens owning urban hukou. Hukou identity determines, among 
other privileges and exclusions, access to social services in any specific geographic area. Thus, 
the hukou system artificially produces a rural-urban divide within China, where urban citizens 
can fully enjoy urban social welfare programs while rural villagers are normally excluded from, 
or enjoy only parts of, these benefits.  
While the hukou system creates hardships for farmers seeking to settle in cities, the land 
tenure system ties villagers to their rural land base and further marginalizes farmers when the 
state requisitions rural land for development purposes. Due to China’s socialist regime, rural 
farmland is collectively owned, which means that individual farmers do not own the land they 
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cultivate privately, although their fates are associated with their hukou status. Thus, farmers 
cannot claim any property rights over land when negotiating its sale for urbanization purposes 
with the state (Rozelle & Li, 1998). Consequently, farmers are further marginalized from policy-
making processes and become invisible during land conversion for urban development. Due to 
the state’s monopoly over the rural land conversion and their authority to claim revenue from 
rural-urban land conversions, local states are motivated to engage in increasing land-based urban 
expansion, in hopes of continuously extracting land revenue, without due consideration to the 
impact on affected rural populations (Ong, 2014).  
Thus, due to both the hukou and land tenure systems, China’s current urbanization 
process is characterized by over-urbanization of farmland, while under-urbanizing farmers (Hua, 
2014; Wen, 2014). Between 1990 and 2008, China’s urban construction area increased from 
12,900 km2 to 36,300 km2 representing an expansion of 181%. Meanwhile, urban real estate areas 
have grown from 2 billion m2 to 11.9 billion m2, indicating a total growth of 600% (Department 
of Comprehensive Statistics of the National Economy [CSNE], 2009; NBS, 2009). However, 
during the same period, the actual human urbanization rate, excluding rural populations living in 
cities, but without hukou, only rose from 26.4% to 32.9%, an increase of only 25%, overall. Thus, 
the significant gap between the increased urban land base and a total population of urban hukou 
holders confirms a land-biased rather than a people-oriented urbanization pattern. 
 As the gap between China’s overall urban population and percentage of urban hukou 
holders widens, the negative impacts of the hukou system on national socioeconomic 
development are becoming increasingly serious and pervasive. In addition to increasing 
inequality between rural and urban regions (Li, 1999; Wu & Treiman, 2004), the hukou system 
has resulted in widespread social discrimination against migrant workers living in cities as well 
as farmers remaining in rural areas (Solinger, 1999; Alexander & Chan, 2004). Hukou also 
contributes to the poor total economic performance by restricting the free movement of laborers 
(Cai, 2001; Au & Henderson, 2002). To address these issues, adjustments have been made to the 
hukou system in efforts to sustain China’s economic growth. However, after years of heated 
debates and constant adjustments, the hukou system still remains in effect and is not likely to be 
abandoned in the near future (Chan & Buckingham, 2008). 
Due to the state’s monopoly on land requisition and the lack of private ownership of rural 
land, local states play dominant roles in land conversion from rural to urban purposes, extracting 
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high land-lease revenue from developers (Ong, 2014). The land conversion income, in turn, 
motivates local states to engage increasingly in developing sprawling urban-built areas through 
massive rural land requisition. As a result, peasant farmers, who are in subordinate positions 
relative to the state, are still being left out of much of the policy and research discourse on 
development in China (Zhou, 2014). During state-led land requisition from 1987 to 2010, more 
than 52 million displaced peasants, without proper compensation from the government, 
represented one of the key manifestations of this institutional socio-political power imbalance 
(Ong, 2014). Furthermore, since 2000, peasant protests have become the main expression of 
social unease in China. For example, land disputes accounted for 65 percent of the 180,000 mass 
disturbances in 2010 (Yu, 2005). On the side of the state, the increased demand for local 
infrastructure development also places an increasing debt burden on local governments. The total 
amount of local borrowing was estimated to range from 5 to 14 trillion Yuan, accounting for 
between 13 and 36 percent of the national GDP (Shih, 2010), which is significant. Thus, China’s 
under-urbanization of its human population does not only systemically excludes farming families 
from sharing in and contributing to its economic development; it also deters China’s capacity for 
sustaining high economic growth, increases municipal debts, and causes social instability within 
the nation.  
Owing mainly to hukou and land tenure systems, rural-urban circular migration also has a 
significant impact on the socioeconomic landscape of rural China (Fan, 2004). While farmers, as 
well as migrant workers, are generally left out of the policy discussions that inform China’s 
urbanization, female farmers, who are normally invisible in public policy platforms and 
discussions, may be even further left behind during China’s urbanization processes. Labor 
migration and being left-behind are actually two sides of the same coin (Jacka, 2012; Toyato, 
Yeoh & Nguyen, 2007). While men are most likely to engage in temporary migration, most 
women, the elderly and children are strategically left behind to cope in rural areas (Jacka, 2014).  
Due to its patriarchal culture and the Confucian ethics embedded in Chinese society, it is the left-
behind women who end up taking care of the family and operating agricultural production under 
China’s current model of urbanization (Fan, 2003; 2008). However, relative to the substantive 
available research on rural-urban migration, very limited numbers of studies focus on left-behind 
women’s issues (Jacka & Sargeson, 2011). Among the available studies on women, most have 
tended toward a negative conceptualization of the experiences of left-behind women in Chinese 
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society (Jacka, 2014). While portraying left-behind women as a marginalized group may be 
helpful in raising public awareness in order to improve their living conditions, merely providing 
left-behind women with a public profile and limited social aids may also exacerbate their 
situations, and trap them in the current rural poverty loop (Murphy, 2004; Jacka, 2014). As a 
result, left-behind women are further marginalized and rendered invisible in policy planning, and 
opportunities to enhance their participation in economic growth are foregone.  
 Problem definition and research questions 1.2
For the last three decades, China’s rapid urbanization, accompanied by local states’ 
investments in infrastructure and a constant cycling of rural-urban migration, have fuelled its 
high economic growth (Huang, 2012). However, China’s overall transfer of rural populations to 
the status of urban citizens is systemically undersized due to the socioeconomic systems 
developed during its central planning period (Au & Henderson, 2002; Zhang, 2004). The state-
led urban growth model of economic development that characterizes China’s economy has 
gradually led the urbanization process to a place where its land-biased approaches, which limit 
investments in human development, systematically exclude farmers in general, and female 
farmers in particular, from the process. By excluding such a large proportion of its rural 
population from integrating into urban life and substantive rural development, China is also 
limiting capacity for economic growth in the largest proportion of its labor force. Given the 
declining global market and rapidly growing social inequality, it is imperative for China to 
rebalance its development strategies in more inclusive, equitable and sustainable directions, re-
imagining a farmer-friendly, people-oriented urbanization model that taps the potential creative 
and consumptive power of the large rural population.  
Even though, since 1978, the central government has continuously decentralized its 
control in hukou and land tenure systems in order to promote urbanization, it is not likely to give 
up its absolute ruling power in the near future. In this sense, China’s land-biased urbanization, 
induced by a top-down approach, may inherently prevent the emergence of bottom-up approaches 
that might be initiated by the large rural population, which would allow farmers to participate 
fully in and benefit from urbanization. Furthermore, given the enormous land revenue and the 
strong role of local states in both hukou and land tenure reforms, it remains extremely 
challenging for China to switch from land-biased to people-oriented urbanization patterns 
completely. Nevertheless, in order for China to move toward a more people-oriented approach to 
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development, policy solutions should originate from its own experience and remain compatible 
with its evolving political economy, as well.  
As China increasingly integrates into the global economy, its socioeconomic challenges 
cannot be examined in isolation. Based on the experiences of the five NIEs that have escaped the 
middle-income trap, it has been demonstrated that high levels of urbanization, the adoption of 
democratic institutions, and continuous economic growth at a high pace are all key factors 
contributing to their sustained and inclusive economic development. While establishing 
democracy may create stronger mechanisms for social inclusion within a nation, whether they 
lead definitively to inclusive and equitable development may be in question (Wong, 2007). Based 
on China’s previous development trajectory and its unique political economy, it is very unlikely 
that China will transform to democracy shortly. Due to the considerable political obstacles that 
Chinese policy-makers face in rebalancing the political economy, a more state-centric approach 
remains necessary (McNally, 2013; Sun, 2008). If China aspires to become one of the high-
income countries, speeding up the urbanization of farmers and migrant workers, while 
rebalancing its state-led urbanization to create a more inclusive and equitable model, appears to 
be the right move.   
This argument leads to the research question: What are some of the promising alternative 
options available for China to move towards a more people-oriented model of urbanization, given 
its mainstream political and economic structures? More specifically, two primary sets of 
questions informing the present research are:  
• Given China’s current land-biased urbanization, how can it best utilize and re-construct 
land resources, creating new opportunity structures and access so that farmers excluded 
from full participation in urbanization, may come to fully participate in and influence 
decisions that affect them, in order to integrate more effectively into better, more 
inclusive and people-oriented sustainable urbanization processes?  
• For those left-behind in rural areas, especially women, how does the current state of being 
away from their husbands affect their empowerment or disempowerment? What 
conditions contribute to left-behind women’s (dis) empowerment and what can be done to 
facilitate their greater empowerment in the process of urbanization?  How might being left 
behind serve as a source of empowerment for Chinese women, if they can take advantage 
of new opportunities, thereby obtaining greater access to decision-making and income in 
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agriculture than before? What quantifiable evidence might be gathered to clarify whether 
left-behind women are more empowered in agriculture than non-left-behind women in 
rural China, relative to their male partners? 
The answers to these questions may suggest steering China’s urbanization in a direction 
that is centered on promoting farmers’ participation in, and greater gender equity during, 
urbanization processes. Given that China’s recent development has been following a capitalist 
paradigm of marketization, an alternative development approach, which originated from the 
failure of capitalist development in addressing social exclusion and poverty in the late 1960s, 
may provide a useful guide for possible policy development, featuring people-oriented 
urbanization in China.  
Alternative development discourse identifies and advocates alternative practices and 
redefines the goals of development to focus on people’s socioeconomic well-being rather than 
merely promoting national economic growth (Brun, Blaikie & Jones, 2014; Watts, 2003). Despite 
changing geopolitics, and shifting developmental priorities and discourses, alternative 
development still keeps up with current socioeconomic injustices and is relevant in evolving 
development discourses and policy practices. While alternative development discourse plays a 
key role in balancing between growth-maximizing approaches and more people-oriented methods, 
it also faces critiques from professional practitioners and academics (Pieterse, 1998). Most of the 
critical commentary on alternative development focuses on its limited attention to the diversity 
within civil society, the economic dimensions of proposed alternatives, the potential importance 
of the local state in shaping conditions for development, and a lack of theoretical cohesion, 
arising from the diverse geopolitical conditions under which economic development occurs 
(Bebbington & Bebbington, 2001; Pieterse, 1998). However, given that alternative development 
enables the formation of alternative visions and pathways toward participatory collaboration with 
marginalized populations – a consideration often missing in China’s policy development 
structures – adopting such an approach may help unravel the socioeconomic barriers faced by 
socially excluded farmers, thus promoting more people-oriented urbanization processes in China.  
For this dissertation, Friedmann’s (1992) alternative development framework, which is 
centered on inclusion, empowerment, gender equity and sustainability, is incorporated as a guide 
to the analysis. Friedmann’s (1992) work has been influential in key areas of alternative 
development, such as ‘social practice,’ ‘participation’ and ‘empowerment’ (Brun, Blaikie & 
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Jones, 2014; Islam, 2015). Furthermore, as a distinguished planning theorist in sustainable 
development, his contributions to critical discussions in the field moving from overly-
instrumentalized models of efficiency in policy design toward more communicative and 
connective rationales for fostering socioeconomic inclusion in development (Amdam, 2010; 
Friedmann, 1973; 1985). In particular, Friedmann’s (1985) focus on transactive planning, which 
incorporates people’s lived experiences into policy development and social practice, is of interest 
for the present study. This is because policies that facilitate the social agency of marginalized 
groups are more likely to lead to desired results when people obtain a strong internalized sense of 
their own capacities for exercising agency (Friedmann, 1985; 1987).  
According to Friedmann (1992), social practice could be seen to take place in four 
overlapping domains: the state, civil society, market economy and the political community. 
Consequently, alternative development can be realized through the social, economic, political and 
intergenerational participation of marginalized populations in the “whole economy” (Friedmann, 
1992). While pursuing alternative visions and solutions to mainstream growth-maximizing 
models, alternative development requires the state to play a strong role, without necessarily 
replacing the dominant political-economic structure (Amdam, 2010). Therefore, Friedmann’s 
(1992) alternative approaches are compatible with China’s current political economy and 
associated urbanization practices.  
Particularly, Friedmann (1992) adopted a holistic approach to describe how 
empowerment operated in modernization processes, when instrumental top-down policies 
dominated communicative bottom-up strategies, thereby systematically excluding a large part of 
the population from economic and political power. Thus, drawing on Friedmann’s (1992) 
alternative framework enables a systemic exploration of the motives, behavior and interaction 
among all participants, including the state, market, private corporations, and rural laborers during 
China’s urbanization. Moreover, Friedmann’s (1992) solutions emerge from aiming toward a 
better balance between mainstream development approaches and the growth of a civil society, via 
empowerment of the disempowered. Thus, Friedmann’s (1992) alternative framework offers 
critical guidance and helpful approaches to the task of rebalancing China’s land-biased 
urbanization, since it shares similar analytical reasoning with China’s urbanization processes and 
is compatible with the predominant political economy in China.  
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According to Friedmann (1992), empowerment, as a gathering of power in a combination 
of external supports and internal mobilization, is the necessary pathway for marginalized people 
to integrate into, and thereby transform, mainstream development platforms (Amdam, 2010; 
Torri & Martinez, 2014). On the one hand, power can be transferred from the powerful to the 
powerless, indicating a top-down version of empowerment. On the other hand, power may be 
created internally within the people, who previously perceived themselves as powerless, showing 
a bottom-up form of empowerment. In line with Friedmann’s (1992) alternative development 
framework, which is centered on empowerment, this study examines how the state can utilize 
land resources to supply policy support for farmer-oriented urbanization in one essay, while 
investigating opportunities for rural left-behind women to develop internalized empowerment and 
greater social agency by taking up newly available leadership roles in their households and 
communities, in another. Consequently, alternative urbanization practices centered on inclusion, 
empowerment, and sustainability are proposed for China, and carefully examined in these two 
essays. 
 Alternative perspectives of development and urbanization in China 1.3
Recognizing that alternative development may offer a constructive way to redirect land-
driven urbanization in China toward a more inclusive model, it is necessary to have a better 
understanding of the historical and current trends in alternative theories of development. To this 
end, this section first reviews the origin, key ideas and the evolution of alternative development 
literature following an explanation of Friedmann’s (1992) alternative framework. Then, taking 
into account broader international experience and China’s socioeconomic environment and 
political regime, the implications for alternative urbanization in China are explored and presented. 
1.3.1 Origin, key ideas, and trending of alternative development 
In the late 1960s, international development paradigms shifted from a growth-
maximization doctrine toward alternative frameworks, more committed to people-oriented 
development, and policies designed to operate in harmony with the social dimensions of 
economic growth and environmental sustainability (Friedmann, 1992; Watts, 2003). Alternative 
development ideas originated from the failures of mainstream development paradigms to alleviate 
worldwide poverty, which focused too narrowly on maximizing national economic performance 
(Brun, Blaikie & Jones, 2014; Savini, 2011). The establishment of United Nations Environment 
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Program (UNEP) in 1972 is considered a milestone event in this shift (Friedmann, 1992). Since 
then, alternative development models, focusing on inclusion, empowerment, balanced 
development, gender equity and sustainability, have been accepted as a more sustainable pathway 
for development than the mainstream development approaches, and are gaining in popularity 
(Pieterse, 1988; Islam, 2015).  
Challenging the increasing marginalization and exploitation induced by capital 
accumulation, alternative development frameworks concern themselves with finding alternatives 
to mainstream development thinking and practice, and understanding how these alternatives may 
affect local as well as global processes of human marginalization (Amdam, 2010). The main 
target of alternative development is to improve the livelihood3 of marginalized people, thereby 
contributing to overall prosperity. According to Brun, Blaikie, and Jones (2014), marginalization 
referred to exclusion from resources, decision-making and rights that limited people’s capacity 
for making strategic decisions that were important to their livelihoods. Thus, alternative 
approaches are intended to challenge the status quo that reproduces marginalization, by affirming 
the moral claims of, and justice for, the disempowered (Torri & Martinez, 2013). 
Whether alternative development can keep up with the current socioeconomic injustices, 
thereby reducing marginalization and exploitation, determines its relevance in development 
discourses and practices. In this sense, it is necessary to consider its legacy and founding themes 
and how these have evolved and been extended in more recent discussions. The foundational 
themes of alternative development include: engaging local communities through participation, 
finding solutions to poverty and gender inequalities, preserving the environment, and promoting 
economic sustainability (Friedmann, 1992; Lie & Lund, 1995; Torri & Martinez, 201). Emergent 
areas address globalization, rights-based approaches to development, conflict-resolution, forced 
migration and climate change (Brun, Blaikie & Jones, 2014; Islam, 2015; Lund, 1993).  
Feminism, post-colonialism, and post-development theories also shape current 
development discourses and generate alternative perspectives of local, regional, national and 
global economic development (Brun, Blaikie & Jones, 2014; Simon, 2007). In the past three 
decades, feminist perspectives on development have emerged to offer critical engagements with 
the aspirations of alternative development models, leading to a pluralist field of inquiry and 																																																								3	According	to	Ellis	(2000),	livelihood	comprised	“the	assets,	the	activities,	and	the	access	to	these	that	together	determine	the	living	gained	by	the	individual	or	household”	(p.	10).	
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practice (Eide, 2014). According to Moser (1993) and Rowlands (1988), since the 1970s, 
feminist responses to the persistent marginalization of women under globalization has largely 
been formulated through emerging approaches to women’s participation in decision-making 
processes, such as ‘women in development’ (WID), ‘women and development’ (WAD) and 
‘gender and development’ (GAD). These frameworks have been elaborated and integrated into 
development discourses and a wide range of academic fields, generating transformative impacts 
on theories of alternative development and advocating for the full participation of marginalized 
peoples, especially women, in changing national contexts (Attanapola, 2014; Mohanty, 1988). 
Post-colonialist critiques, arising from national struggles for independence from imperialist 
regimes, have also contributed to theories of alternative development, through analysis of 
persistent patterns of global domination and the transformative power of bottom-up resistance 
(Pieterse, 1998). Drawing upon critiques arising from feminism and post-colonialism, post-
development theory takes a more radical departure from the prevailing conceptualizations and 
practices of neoliberal development (Simon, 2007). It advocates complete rejection of 
development, as it is rooted in Anglo-American global dominance and guided by logics arising 
from the dominant developed countries.  
Despite shifting socioeconomic contexts, changing geopolitics and evolving 
developmental priorities and paradigms, alternative development has been promoting a continued 
focus on inclusion, reducing marginalization, and making moral adjustments to economic 
planning and policy making (Amdam, 2010; Simon, 2007). According to Hickey and Mohan 
(2005), alternative development enabled the formation of alternative visions and pathways 
toward participatory forms of state-individual interaction, which could be applied to many 
jurisdictions where marginalization and exploitation were present. However, given the increasing 
importance of alternative development discourses in critical engagements with neoliberal 
globalization, very few comprehensive analytical frameworks are available to examine and guide 
the development of policy approaches. Among available studies, Friedmann’s (1992) alternative 
development framework, which seeks to achieve social, political, economic and intergenerational 
integration through growing a civil society that is primarily built and sustained by the interests of 
marginalized people, may be a good option.  
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1.3.2 Friedmann’s framework and its relevance to urbanization in developing countries 
Based on extensive experience in Latin America, Friedmann (1992) described a general 
transformation of the peasantry in capitalist development regimes that was different from the 
mainstream economic development models. Most neoclassic economists depict urbanization as 
continuous, imagining complete absorption of the rural surplus labor force through capital 
accumulation in urban economies (Harris & Todaro, 1970; Lewis, 1954; Ranis & Fei, 1961). 
Friedmann (1992) argued that most rural laborers became redundant under capital accumulation 
paradigms through reviewing the socioeconomic outcomes of economic development and 
urbanization in most Latin American countries. Consequently, rural peasants are systemically 
excluded from policy-making at all levels, and the social support required for them to survive is 
adopted primarily on a moral basis. Most of the urban slums in impoverished countries are the 
result of continuous marginalization and exclusion of peasants with small land holdings, landless 
peasants, and peasant farmers, resulting from policy-making platforms that could potentially 
improve their disadvantaged status if re-imagined for greater inclusion. The exclusion of rural 
laborers from both economics and politics may improve total productivity in the relatively short 
term while appearing to demonstrate state conformity to contemporary measures of economic 
growth. However, sustaining high economic growth can never be realized by leaving the majority 
of the population behind in sectors that cannot keep up with current economic growth. 
This is especially true for most developing countries that hope to increase their economic 
growth to catch up with the developed countries through rapid urbanization. While moving rural 
villagers to urban areas is necessary for capital accumulation to occur and to support an economy 
of scale for growing consumer production, the growth-maximizing approach alone tends to create 
increasing social inequalities, political unrest, and over-consumption of natural resources 
(Friedmann, 1992). Coupled with increasing environmental deterioration, the development of 
these countries cannot be sustained. In this sense, alternative development theory remains 
relevant to understanding how to promote balanced urbanization processes and to generate more 
viable ways to get there.  
 To address what he considered as a major deficiency of the conventional economic 
growth model, Friedmann (1992) proposed a whole-economy model that incorporated the 
mainstream pattern of economic growth and non-market relations in the production of life and 
livelihood. The household is the basic unit in this model, conceived as the level at which human 
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life is lived. Meanwhile, a civil society that takes household livelihood as priority may emerge to 
compete and balance with the market economy (Amdam, 2010).  Integrating civil society into the 
whole-economy model, Friedmann (1992) proposed an alternative development framework 
centered on empowerment of the disempowered to achieve social, economic, political and 
intergenerational inclusion in the whole economy. More specifically, this foundational alternative 
development approach identifies four claims as to the top priorities for any nation that is willing 
to achieve qualitative, inclusive and sustainable growth (Amdam, 2010). The four claims are as 
follows: 
• Inclusive Democracy 
Democracy, in this context, means that people are able to organize in their political 
communities as well as maintaining self-sovereignty as individuals. Thus, continuous 
empowerment involves all poor and marginalized populations, who are generally 
excluded in class-dominated societies. Friedmann (1992) further argued that democracy 
was the fundamental requirement of an alternative form of development: “without a 
genuine and inclusive politic, the claims of the disempowered will not be heard” (p. 135). 
• Appropriate Economic Growth  
This principle includes a major shift in policies to prioritize the common interests of 
excluded populations. This approach requires qualitative, inclusive and balanced 
economic growth between rural and urban sectors, between social elites and marginalized 
populations.  
• Gender Equality 
With the household as the basic unit of civil society, equity among household members 
and across households is necessary. Thus, this model is committed to interpersonal and 
communal justice, and must also incorporate gender equality within and beyond 
household levels.  
• Sustainability  
Sustainability is not only an ultimate goal but also a necessary pathway for all nations to 
achieve long-lasting, accountable, qualitative and just development for all human beings. 
According to Friedmann (1992), sustainability could be achieved through the social, 
economic and political integration of all members of society into a whole economy model.  
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Friedman’s (1992) alternative framework, featuring the four dimensions of integration of 
communities as well as individuals, may provide valuable insights for countries attempting to 
realize inclusive and sustained development as well as gender equality. However, practices and 
experiences in other regions informed by Friedmann’s (1992) framework should also be 
examined to make it more valid and convincing, since the framework is mainly built on case 
studies in Latin American regions.  
1.3.3 East Asian experience and China’s market economy 
Following World War II, only five Asian countries (or regions), including Japan, Korea, 
Singapore, Hong Kong (China) and Taiwan (China), have avoided the so-called middle-income 
trap, transforming into, and remaining categorized as, high-income countries. By examining the 
historical trajectory of these most prosperous Asian countries (regions), the Commission on 
Growth and Development (2008) argued that sustained growth and inclusive development were 
the two key factors contributing to their success. The interaction between the two factors of 
inclusion and sustainability is well illustrated in the development history of South Korea and 
Taiwan (China). During the international democratization movement in the 1970s, most Asian 
countries were encouraged to realize political democracy in order to “catch up” with Western 
developed countries in economic terms. The two countries (regions) successfully established 
democracy within the contexts of their primarily authoritarian governments, which provided them 
with inclusive development mechanism (Perkins, 2010). Other previously designated fast-
growing countries, such as Thailand, Malaysia, and Philippines, also set up democracy regimes. 
However, they failed to integrate inclusive institutions into their political economy. Thus, when 
the Asian Financial Crisis occurred in 1997, these countries were trapped in the recession. 
Whereas, the two countries (regions) achieved continuous high growth in GDP for almost three 
decades, reached relatively stable urbanization levels (around 80%), maintaining a relatively low 
Gini coefficient around 0.34, representing relatively equitable development (Commission on 
Growth and Development, 2008; World Income Inequality Database, 2015).  
Given the similarity between the take-off phases of Chinese Taiwan and South Korea and 
China’s current development, which features rapid urbanization and high economic growth, 
China may learn lessons from its East Asian neighbors to inform its future development 
directions (Hua, 2014). Meanwhile, the political economy in China has similar general 
characteristics to those of newly industrialized countries, but it also has its unique attributes that 
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shape its social, economic and political structures (Coase & Wang, 2012; Naughton, 2007; Tsai, 
2007).  
By the end of the 1970s, strong evidence had accumulated indicating that the central 
planning approach adopted in China had failed miserably as a mainstream development model 
(Young, 2013). Since then, China has been transforming its economy from a command regime 
toward a more market-oriented capitalist approach. However, many institutions and practices 
developed under the planning economy remain (Cai, 2011), where the state continues to dominate 
most of the socioeconomic lives of Chinese citizens. Unlike other centralized countries, China 
had a long history of economic growth without the monopoly of the central government (Qian & 
Wang, 2008; Nee & Opper, 2012). This embedded doctrine has been inherited and re-articulated 
by designating increasing responsibility to local governments as part of China’s fiscal 
decentralization (Zhou, 2006). Given the present promotional incentives governing local officials, 
which are heavily based on economic performance, local corporation-like governments are 
strongly encouraged to promote their local economies (Huang, 2011, 2012; Jin, Qian & Weingast, 
2005). This implies that each local state may initiate institutional or policy innovation, as long as 
it drives local economic growth. As a result, any effort to rebalance the policy environment 
informing China’s land-driven urbanization toward more farmer-friendly, people-oriented 
approaches, must be undertaken with a strong understanding of how to match local governments’ 
economic incentives. 
 Another feature of China’s market system is that maximizing economic growth is subject 
to the dominance of CPC’s political control (Qian & Wu, 2008). In this sense, any level of 
institutional change or reform in China has to be consistent with this form of rule. Even though 
the central government has continuously loosened its control in many fields by expanding 
individual freedoms, it will not give up its absolute ruling power. As China continues to integrate 
into the global economy and to deepen its institutional reforms, this ruling structure may evolve, 
but major change is not likely in the near future.  
1.3.4 Alternative approaches to urbanization in China  
By examining the development experiences of Latin America and East Asia as compared 
with what has been happening recently in China’s political economy, it becomes clear that 
Friedmann’s (1992) alternative framework may also be applied to inform approaches to 
rebalancing land-biased urbanization toward more farmer-friendly, people-oriented urbanization 
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in China. Because both support modernization featuring redistribution of rural peasant farmers, 
the framework shares similar analytical reasoning with China’s approach to urbanization, and 
therefore, remains compatible with the predominant urbanization pattern in China. Furthermore, 
Friedmann’s (1992) framework provides a holistic and people-oriented approach that could be 
used as a guide to enable inclusive and sustainable urbanization processes in China, while also 
addressing gender equity through the empowerment of farmer households in general, and left-
behind women in particular. 
According to Friedmann (1992), ‘inclusive democracy,’ ‘appropriate economic growth,’ 
and ‘environmental as well as economic sustainability,’ represent opportunities for political, 
economic and intergenerational integration of farmers into mainstream development. However, 
given that democracy is politically in conflict with China’s socialist regime, it is important to 
develop measures of participation and equity that are in line with, and achievable in, local 
political settings. As understood through successful East Asian development experiences, 
‘inclusive development’ and ‘sustained growth’ have overlapping meanings with Friedmann’s 
(1992) claims of ‘appropriate economic growth’ and ‘sustainability.’ Both paired phrases focus 
on balancing the social and economic dimensions of development in the present, and 
environmental sustainability in the long run. Thus, inclusion remains an important dimension in 
promoting more farmer-oriented urbanization in China. Furthermore, since ‘inclusive 
development and sustainable growth’ underlie the economic and material conditions necessary 
for implementing alternative models of urbanization, sustainability is also kept as another 
dimension of the proposed urbanization pattern in this dissertation. Sustainability, as used in 
Friedmann’s (1992) discussion, refers to a critical dimension of development models that meet 
the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own 
needs (World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987). Therefore, drawing upon 
regional and international experience as well as Friedmann’s (1992) framework, inclusive and 
sustainable urbanization, which represents social, economic and environmental domains of 
urbanization, is a primary term of analysis in this dissertation.  
In addition, gender equity and women’s empowerment represent a critical aspect of the 
social integration of women in development and urbanization. Promoting women’s 
empowerment and gender parity are two important principles informing the third Millennium 
Development Goals (MDG3), as declared by United Nations in 2000. Because gender relations 
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reflect the most fundamental social relations within a society, women’s empowerment has the 
potential to bring gender equity to both women and men in social development (Kabeer, 2001). 
The mutual reinforcement of gender equality and women’s self-empowerment has the potential to 
enable women to adapt to the new situations and become proactive agents in their own lives, and 
in the lives of their families and communities, with positive impacts on economic development 
(Kabeer, 2001). In the context of China’s current processes of urbanization – due partly to the 
combination of institutions, patriarchal cultures, and state policies – rural-urban migration is 
primarily characterized by men wandering between rural and urban areas while leaving female 
farmers behind in rural regions. Ultimately, it is critical to integrate farming families into current 
urbanization processes. More specifically, left-behind women also need to be included in any 
viable alternative urbanization framework. An inclusive and sustainable urbanization pathway 
cannot be considered complete if female family members are left behind in the rural areas, 
constrained by gender inequalities in the agricultural sector, or in family transitions between rural 
and urban livelihoods. Thus, female farmers, who are left behind due to gendered divisions of 
labor within and outside farmer households, are another main subject of analysis in this 
dissertation, providing a gendered perspective on urbanization processes.  
In sum, moving toward inclusive and sustainable urbanization through promoting farming 
families’ integration into urbanization processes in China in general, and improving gender 
equity in rural regions through promoting left-behind women’s self-empowerment in agriculture, 
in particular, are two critical considerations for developing alternative policy approaches to 
urbanization in China.  
 The rationale and methodology for the dissertation 1.4
This study draws on theories and practices of empowerment to examine how alternative 
development frameworks may be useful as a guide for China to pursue its goals for sustainable 
development and economic growth. More specifically, Friedmann’s (1992) alternative 
development approach, which is centered on empowering the disempowered, may help navigate 
policies moving from a state-dominated process towards more participatory urbanization. 
 Empowerment approaches toward alternative development, which focus on promoting 
self-governance among local communities, households, and individuals, works from the micro-
level of individual lives to macro socioeconomic contexts. This bottom-up approach could 
provide China with a more people-oriented practice of integrating farmer households and female 
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family members into its on-going urbanization practices, thus balancing land-centered and 
people-oriented pathways to urbanization. As one of Friedmann’s (1992) four levels of 
integration, social integration focuses on promoting gender equity within and beyond households. 
This focus not only makes it possible to investigate the impact of gender inequality on women’s 
empowerment and disempowerment but also enhances the full inclusion of grassroots households 
comprised of both male and female farmers. Friedmann’s (1992) alternative development 
framework advocates building a civil society that enlarges individual life choices and livelihoods 
rather than promoting economic growth in the costs of socioeconomic equity. Thus, the 
empowerment approaches advocated by Friedmann (1992) could be a starting point for an 
alternative urbanization framework in China.  
By integrating analyses arising from the development experiences of Latin America and 
East Asia into China’s socialist market regime, an alternative pathway for China’s urbanization, 
comprising inclusive development and sustainable growth, as well as gender equity and women’s 
empowerment, are considered in this dissertation. China is more likely to steer its current 
economy-oriented urbanization toward alternative approaches if these objectives gain importance 
in public discourses within China. While institutions and policies that expand farmers’ agency 
during urbanization may be the first step toward alternative urbanization policies and practices in 
China, successful empowerment of left-behind women could also have a profound impact on 
lifting women’s self-recognition of agency, which could, in turn, have a positive impact on 
improving gender equity. If left-behind women could be empowered by taking advantage of the 
managerial opportunities available to them in agriculture, then farmer households might be 
expected to do at least as well, should China move toward a more people-oriented model of 
urbanization. The alternative urbanization model proposed here may ultimately improve the 
overall well-being and gender parity of both male and female farmers through inclusive and 
sustained urbanization.  
As such, this dissertation is designed to investigate the issues in sequence through two 
chapters. Each of them addresses one key field of the research questions in depth. The first of 
these examines how the state can utilize land resources to promote inclusive and sustainable 
development by featuring more farmer-oriented urbanization planning. The second focuses on 
how being left behind may provide a context in which women in agriculture may be empowered, 
and an examination of policy implications for improving gender equity. 
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1.4.1 Moving toward inclusive and sustainable urbanization in China 
This study explores answers to the policy dilemmas arising in China as it aspires to 
balance land-driven urban growth toward more people-oriented urbanization patterns that reflect 
best practices in international development trends, while also addressing structural domestic 
challenges at micro and macro levels. Building on the World Bank’s framework (Narayan, 2005), 
the project of engaging rural-urban communities in the development of more farmer-oriented 
approaches to integrating state and market policies could be undertaken in China.  
Given the vast diversity of geographic and socio-economic conditions, and the strong 
uneven rural-urban development patterns within China, it is impractical to expect any single 
alternative framework to operate as a panacea in responding to structural issues. Rather, a 
detailed case study, analyzing a specific example of integrated alternative institutional 
frameworks for hukou and land tenure reform, may provide practical insights into China’s on-
going and future urbanization policy directions in relation to farmers. In this sense, Chongqing, 
which is one of the four central municipalities and the first national pilot zone of integrated rural-
urban reform, is a good candidate for this purpose. Given its unique position, Chongqing is not 
only able to initiate a series of pilot reforms that have not been undertaken elsewhere in China; it 
also provides insights into the relationship between the institutional requirements of the Chinese 
economic system and local urbanization patterns. 
Based on the results of the case study, the second chapter demonstrates that 
‘empowerment’ principles have been integrated into the rationale informing Chongqing’s policy 
design and implementation. Furthermore, the inclusive and sustainable urbanization pattern 
evident in Chongqing is compatible with China’s current and historical socialist regime, which 
means key insights from Chongqing’s case may be applicable in other jurisdictions. Chongqing’s 
case shows that more careful balancing between land-driven and farmer-oriented urbanization 
provides an affordable and sustainable pathway toward equitable socioeconomic development. 
1.4.2 China’s left-behind women and their possible empowerment in agriculture 
Targeting China’s left-behind women, the third chapter applies an international 
empowerment index to measure and quantify their empowerment status, using a pilot sample 
drawn from three Northeastern provinces in China. Based on fieldwork conducted in rural 
Northeast China, and applying the Women’s Empowerment in Agriculture Index (WEAI) to the 
data gathered, this study examines opportunities for women’s empowerment, even under 
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conditions of being left-behind by current approaches to urbanization in China.  For this study, 
women in participating villages are categorized as left-behind when their husbands are away for 
at least six months of the year, and non-left-behind, when their husbands are present for six 
months of the year or more. The idea is to compare the empowerment status between left-behind 
and non-left-behind women, rather than tracking changes in the familial status of left-behind 
women over time, since this study is the first attempt to apply the WEAI in the context of China 
and no time-series data is available.  
In total, 151 of 200 households were selected from the regional surveys conducted,4 as 
fitting the two categories of left-behind and non-left-behind women. After matching the two 
groups on both external and internal factors, a comparison was made between 58 left-behind and 
93 non-left-behind households. The results show that left-behind women are more empowered in 
agriculture than the non-left-behind women, holding all other factors constant. By further 
decomposing the sub-indexes of WEAI, domains and indicators that can inform policies to 
increase women’s empowerment are also identified.  
 Organization of the dissertation 1.5
 The study is organized into four chapters.  
The first Chapter describes the historical background and theoretical considerations 
informing the current analysis, defines the problems and research questions, and provides an 
overview of important theoretical trends that support further investigation of alternative 
urbanization planning patterns in China, based on a selective literature review.  
Chapter 2 explores the possibilities for a more farmer-oriented urbanization pattern by 
building on a combination of Friedmann’s (1992) alternative approaches and the World Bank’s 
development framework, both of which are centered on socioeconomic empowerment. Then, the 
elaborated framework is compared with China’s dominant urbanization model, identifying gaps 
between the two approaches. The case study of Chongqing provides an important and locally 
grounded test of an alternative approach to urbanization from within China, demonstrating that 
capacity for promoting a farmer-friendly, people-oriented approach to urbanization is evident in 
local practices and is affordable if all participants’ interests are matched properly. 																																																								
4 The survey was conducted in the Northeastern region of China, including Jilin, Liaoning and Heilongjiang 
provinces, in February 2015. The Northeast area is China’s key agricultural zone with a relatively large rural 
population engaging in the agricultural sector, which makes the region very suitable for the purposes of the study. 
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Chapter 3 begins to explore how left-behind women adapt to their husbands’ absences, by 
focusing on their relative experiences of agency during the change, compared with women whose 
husbands remain in the village. By undertaking a pilot application of the Women’s 
Empowerment in Agriculture Index (WEAI), this chapter provides an empirically richer 
understanding of left-behind women’s conditions for empowerment. Based on results showing 
that economic independence increases left-behind women’s empowerment, this study sheds light 
on policy measures that may facilitate women’s self-recognition of agency and internal 
empowerment in the urbanization processes. 
Chapter 4 summarizes and concludes the study by drawing lessons from each of the two 
independent essays. Policy implications for China’s capacity to undertake alternative 
urbanization approaches are then presented. Finally, future directions for studies that can advance 
beyond the limitations of the present study are also considered. 
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CHAPTER 2                                                                                                Moving 
toward Inclusive and Sustainable Urbanization in China: A Case Study of 
Chongqing 
This chapter first presents historical factors that contribute to China’s current land-driven 
urbanization and demonstrates how the current top-down approach inherently prevents the 
emergence of more inclusive and sustainable patterns of urbanization. Then, it explores the 
possibilities for a more farmer-oriented urbanization pattern, by building on the World Bank’s 
development framework, which is centered on socioeconomic empowerment. To better 
understand how China’s urbanization has evolved and continues to shift, a historical review of its 
urbanization trajectory is conducted. By comparing the proposed alternative framework, with 
China’s dominant urbanization model, gaps between the two approaches are identified. A case 
study of Chongqing’s hukou and land tenure reform is incorporated to further demonstrate that 
capacity for promoting an inclusive and sustainable approach to urbanization is evident in local 
practices and is affordable, if all participants’ interests are better aligned.  
 Introduction 2.1
The twentieth century was characterized by rapid urbanization, accompanied by massive 
rural-to-urban migration in China and around the world. In 2008, for the first time in human 
history, the world population was evenly divided among rural and urban regions (Population 
Reference Bureau [PRB] staff, 2009).  The urban population of China has also increased 
dramatically from 18% in 1978 to 51% of the total population in 2011 (Development Research 
Center of the State Council [DRC], 2011), when migrant residents without urban citizenship are 
factored in. The UN estimates that the world population will reach 9.31 billion, and that 67% of 
the total will live in cities by 2050 (Department of Economic and Social Affairs of United 
Nations [UNDESA], 2012). Most developing regions, including Latin America, Asia and Africa, 
have all experienced very rapid urbanization since the 1970s (Beall, Guha-Khasnobis & Kanbur, 
2012). Furthermore, current development doctrine, as dominated by a growth-maximizing model, 
encourages many developing countries to promote urbanization with the vision of achieving high 
economic growth (Chenery & Syrquin, 1975; Lin, 2009). Thus, urbanization and rural-urban 
migration have become and will continue to be a worldwide phenomenon.   
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Urbanization may be one pathway toward, but may not necessarily always result in, 
sustainable high economic growth and equitable development. As shown in the cases of most 
Latin American and Asian countries, urbanization and economic growth alone may not lead to 
sustainable development, in terms of continuous growth and overall well-being of the general 
population. On the contrary, after years of rapid urbanization, most Latin American and some 
African countries have fallen back into low-income5 status, particularly during the international 
Debt Crisis in the 1980s. In Asia, only five countries (regions) remain designated as high-income 
nations (areas), including Japan, Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong (China) and Taiwan (China), 
while other previously designated fast-growing countries, such as Thailand, Malaysia, and 
Philippines, were trapped in the recession arising from the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997. There 
must have been other factors involved that enabled the five newly industrialized economies 
(NIEs) to overcome the so-called middle-income6 trap, which allowed them to transform 
themselves into high-income countries (Gill et al., 2007).  
In examining the historical trajectory of the five NIEs and other fast-growing countries in 
Africa, Latin America and Asia, the Commission on Growth and Development (2008) found that 
sustained growth and inclusive development were mutually reinforcing factors and two key 
objectives for the five high-income nations to enlarge the scope for individuals and the society to 
be productive and prosper. Even though any nation’s prosperity cannot be measured merely in 
economic terms, sustainable growth is a necessary, if not sufficient, condition for the 
socioeconomic prosperity of individuals as well as societies (Commission on Growth and 
Development, 2008). As shown in the introductory chapter, South Korea and Chinese Taiwan 
have achieved relatively sustainable growth and inclusive development, thus providing important 
lessons for other countries attempting to catch up and reach high income rankings. 
While international paradigms, discourses or practices may have a substantial impact on a 
nation's growth and development policies, the desired outcomes may be more likely to occur 
when the national authority approves and integrates the international paradigm or experience into 
local systems (Hayami & Godo, 2005). As shown in the experience of several developing 																																																								
5 Low-income is one of the income categories defined by the World Bank, since 1987. Based on a country’s GDP per 
capita, the country falls into one of four categories, including low-income, low-middle-income, high-middle-income 
and high-income. Based on the 2012 rankings, a GDP per capita under $1000 USD is low-income, from $1000-
$4000 is low-middle-income, from $4000 to $12500 is high-middle-income, and beyond $12500 falls into the high-
income category.  
6 The middle-income trap is the situation in which a country’s growth slows down after reaching middle-income 
levels.  
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countries in the 1970s and 1980s, following the hegemonic marketization discourse without 
taking their potential comparative advantages and disadvantages into account led to extensive and 
deep economic interruptions, rather than boosting economic growth, as expected (Lin, 2009; 
Szeleny, 2011). For any nation that hopes to follow the path of the five NIEs, inclusive 
development and sustained growth are recognized as necessary elements supporting high-speed 
growth with fewer such interruptions or shocks along the pathway toward high-income status 
(Commission on Growth and Development, 2008). Even when accounting for comparative 
advantages, such as cheap laborers and abundant natural resources, achieving high income status 
may still depend on a nation’s capacity to integrate inclusion and sustainable growth into its 
primary development objectives and to pursue them strategically, based on local needs.  
Even though China has accomplished remarkable growth and become the second largest 
economic entity in the world, it is facing great global and domestic challenges, including a 
shrinking global market, over-investment in urban assets, weak domestic consumption demand, 
and increasing social disparity, which have slowed down its high economic growth and resulted 
in increasing social unrest (Hua, 2014; Huang, 2011; Sun, 2008). These challenges impose great 
pressure on China’s ambition of achieving continuous growth and catching up with the high-
income countries. However, this situation may also provide China with the opportunity to 
rebalance its distorted development patterns toward more inclusive and sustainable approaches, 
by engaging localized versions of the development patterns of the five East Asian economies, at 
least to some degree, initiating necessary changes in accordance with its dominant political 
economy. 
Given that China’s current economic structure is very similar to the starting-off phase of 
South Korea and Chinese Taiwan (Hua, 2014), continuous urbanization, inclusive democracy, 
and further marketization appear to be viable solutions for addressing China’s socioeconomic 
challenges, if it follows the path of the five NIEs. While further marketization for efficiency at 
the expense of equity will only deepen China’s existing socioeconomic problems (Huang, 2011; 
Zhou, 2014), any possible transformation from a socialist toward a more democratic regime is 
still a matter of heated debate and may not be resolved any time soon (Nee & Opper, 2012; Tsai, 
2007). Unlike divergent opinions on marketization and democratic solutions, however, it is 
widely recognized that China’s under-scaled urbanization, as measured by its large rural 
population and limited degree of industrialization relative to other countries (Au & Henderson, 
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2002; Li, 1999), are among the main causes leading to most of China’s domestic challenges (Cai, 
2011; Hua, 2014). Consequently, promoting urbanization aimed at accelerating agricultural 
modernization and enhancing domestic consumption power are included and claimed as key 
objectives in China’s Five-Year Plans for Social and Economic Development, since 2011. 
However, China’s current under-urbanization pattern leaves the majority of the population as 
farmers with limited buying power, while over-urbanizing farmland, owing to heavy state-led 
investment in urban infrastructure (Jin, Qian & Weingast, 2005; Huang, 2012). This distorted 
urbanization pattern is the combined outcome of China’s historical institutions, as developed 
under the practices of a planning economy, and a by-product of corporatist-state development 
strategies (Huang, 2011; Wen, 2014). 
The hukou7 and land tenure systems are considered to be the two major institutional 
barriers contributing to China’s land-driven urbanization approach. This is mainly because the 
hukou system acts to ensure that new urban residents remain unregistered as urban citizens, 
thereby preventing them from gaining permanent hukou status in their destination areas (Chan & 
Buckingham, 2008). This semi-permanent outsider status for China’s rural migrants makes them 
more susceptible to social discrimination and exploitation, thus constraining the benefits of 
China’s human urbanization in general (Fan, 2008; Knight, Song & Jia, 1999; Rozelle, 1999). On 
the other hand, due to the state’s monopoly on land requisition and the lack of private ownership 
of rural land, local states play predominant roles in land conversion from rural to urban purposes, 
extracting high land-lease revenue (Ong, 2014). Land-lease income motivates local states to 
engage in increasingly sprawling urban built areas, which leads to rapid growth of urban land use 
without simultaneously transforming farmers into urban citizens, accordingly.  
Even though the hukou and land tenure systems may have profound negative impacts on 
China’s socioeconomic transformation, current policy approaches still seek to reform the existing 
system rather than abolishing it (Chan & Buckingham, 2008; Tao & Xu, 2007). This is mainly 
due to the fact that, even though China’s socialist market economy prioritizes economic growth 
as its primary goal, it is still subject to maintaining the Communist Party of China’s (CPC) 
political control in the society (Qian & Wu, 2008). Since hukou and the land tenure system 
provide the government with opportunities to control rural-urban labor distribution and a 																																																								
7 The Hukou system has been established in China since the 1950s, aiming to balance the population between rural 
and urban areas. Under the system, individuals are entitled to Hukou identity upon their origin of birth. Local 
employment, and access to education and social security are exclusively based on one’s Hukou status. 
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monopoly in land conversion, to fully abandon the two systems will face great resistance from 
local states (Cai, 2011). As a result, China’s marketization is incomplete and states still manage 
the economy to a high degree. Even though China’s development trajectory in recent decades 
features capitalist characteristics (Huang, 2012), the political reforms only occur at the state level, 
without moving China’s political regime toward democracy (Tsai, 2007). It thus seems extremely 
difficult for China to make use of, and to integrate, international experiences in development or 
urbanization into its economic system, if the proposed change is in conflict with the political 
interests of those in power.  
While urbanization is considered the optimal pathway for China to transform itself from a 
middle to high-income country, most scholars and policy makers have continuously focused on 
promoting urbanization through increasing industrialization, marketization or structural 
adjustments, neglecting the role of farmers in China's urbanization and migration processes (Hua, 
2014). Since China’s current land-biased approaches to urbanization systematically exclude 
farmers from integrating into urban regions, the result is that China’s current land-driven 
urbanization leaves the majority of the population in rural areas and excludes them from sharing 
proportionally in and making optimal contributions to the prosperity of development. Therefore, 
it is critical to find a better balance between land-driven and people-oriented urbanization, with a 
focus on farming households. Even though there is increasing attention on this pressing issue and 
a “people-oriented” approach of urbanization has been officially identified and supported by the 
central government (National Development and Reform Commission [NDRC], 2014), no clear 
guidance or framework on how to achieve the re-balancing of approaches to China’s farmer-
urbanization exist. To steer China’s urbanization in a more people-oriented direction, an 
alternative methodology, focusing primarily on farming households, and enabling their 
integration into mainstream development and policy-making process, is required. This leads to 
the primary research question informing this chapter: given China’s current land-biased 
urbanization, how can the nation move to utilize and re-construct land resources, creating new 
opportunity structures and access so that the farmers excluded from full participation in 
urbanization, may come to fully participate in and influence the decisions that affect them, in 
order to integrate more effectively into better, more inclusive and people-oriented sustainable 
urbanization processes?  
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To better understand the dynamics shaping China’s current land-biased urbanization and 
to propose possible alternative pathways for achieving a more people-oriented approach, this 
study examines a particular instance of policy dilemmas that may arise when official policy 
constrains benefit-sharing among the majority population and thereby limits sustained growth.  
The key idea informing China’s capacity to move toward a people-oriented framework is 
centered on collective and individual empowerment of the disempowered, as advocated through 
historical and contemporary international development discourses.  Drawing on Kabeer’s (2001) 
and Narayan’s (2005) definitions of empowerment, this study defines the term as an increase or 
expansion in farming families’ assets and capacities to negotiate with, influence, and hold 
accountable government policies and institutions, through which they not only choose between 
rural and urban hukou registrations but also settle down accordingly in the area they ultimately 
choose. To describe and understand farmers’ ability for conceptualizing, using and achieving 
strategic life choices during urbanization, their choices as to whether they can pursue their 
livelihood in either rural or urban areas, as constrained by their rural hukou identity, are 
documented. 
In the late 1960s, the international development community began questioning the still 
dominant growth-maximization doctrine in efforts to consider alternative frameworks committed 
to human empowerment and sustainability, with constructive intergenerational impact on overall 
prosperity (Friedmann, 1992). Since then, empowerment has become increasingly popular as a 
mantra in shaping the international democratization movement that began to dominate 
development discourses in 1970s (Friedmann, 1992). The inclusive politics movement was 
promoted by Western developed countries as well as by international organizations, hoping to 
spread democracy and liberal economic models all over the world. However, “top-down” 
political movements that did not reflect local contexts did not necessarily bring economic growth 
or social development. The previous success and current struggles of most Latin American 
countries are considered to be the result of these movements, which confuse social 
democratization with neoliberal marketization (Hua, 2014). In recent years, there has been 
growing attention to sustainability and empowerment frameworks, which echo the empowerment 
initiatives made popular in the 1960s (Islam, 2015). Since the 1990s, empowerment, as a 
grounded approach, has regained its international reputation and has been recognized as an 
effective measure for sustainable and inclusive development (Brun, Blaikie & Jones, 2014). 
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Increasingly, international organizations, such as the World Bank, the International Food Policy 
Research Institute (IFPRI), and the Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative (OPHI), 
have integrated empowerment into their agendas and redefined their missions with a greater focus 
on human development (Alkire et al., 2013).  
International empowerment methodologies may provide China with a possible “bottom-
up” framework for engaging both the state and farmers to initiate more inclusive urbanization 
policies and practices. China’s transition, from a centralized planning to a decentralized market 
economy, has also been characterized as “empowering” local states and individual farmers 
through continuous policy decentralization and the theoretical expansion of farmers’ life choices 
(Liu, Carter & Yao, 1998; Huang, 2011). In reviewing China’s socioeconomic transformation, 
there were certainly times when the nation state was willing to, and successful in, extending 
power to the people, such as acknowledging the “bottom-up” institutional interventions of 
Household Contract Responsibility System (HCRS) in 1982, and allowing villagers to transfer to 
urban hukou since 1984. The HCRS, which provided incentives for farmers to invest in 
agriculture and resulted in significant increases in agricultural production, was initially invented 
by groups of farmers and admitted by the central state as national policy. Thus, its enactment as a 
policy means the government was willing to decentralize its policy to the local level. While 
hukou transfer was more strictly controlled previously, the policy implemented in 1984 enabled 
farmers to make their own decisions on whether or not to change their hukou status from rural to 
urban, under designated conditions. However, there have also been times when the central 
authority has failed to promote decentralized or people-empowered policies, such as when it has 
enforced policy initiatives directing rural migrants to settle down in small and medium sized cites, 
while strictly limiting migration to mega cities, beginning in 2010. Research indicates that 
medium-sized or big cities are the most popular destinations for migrant workers, while less than 
10% of all migrant workers had settled in small towns by 2015 (Cai, 2011).  
Three implications can be derived from the above examples, which were guided by a mix 
of state-led and bottom-up approaches: first, the central state, representing the interests of the 
Communist Party of China, plays a dominant role in generating and approving any 
decentralization or institutional changes; second, policy decentralization can be effective in 
managing local affairs, but it needs to be further devolved toward local people in design and 
implementation to be successful; third, decentralization policies, reflecting local context and 
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engaging the grassroots, are more likely to lead to desired policy outcomes, based on the 
documented success of the HCRS in improving agricultural productivity. In this sense, more 
farmer-oriented urbanization, from the perspective of empowering the disempowered, implies 
utilization of available opportunities and further devolution of decision-making to farmers, while 
complying with China’s predominant socioeconomic structure. 
Advocacy for the development of a state-supported empowerment machinery, achieved 
by providing a suite of policy instruments for individuals to use in negotiating their communal 
rights, emerges from the inevitable tensions between individualist claims to rights-based 
citizenship and communitarian approaches that stress identity-based communities (Elliott, 2008).  
Empowerment-centered approaches to development can be found within both international and 
China’s domestic experiences, because empowerment strategies share some common ground 
across capitalist and socialist ideologies. There is an aspiration in both political systems to 
improve overall prosperity of the nation, by making the most of the talents of the people. In this 
sense, empowerment methodologies in policy development are compatible with and have 
important foundations and precedents in China’s socialist context.  
After a selective review of empowerment frameworks for development, the World Bank’s 
empowerment framework of development, centered on empowering poor people through 
mainstreaming them in the development process, can be applied well to describe and guide 
China’s urbanization processes. Under this framework, farmers and migrant workers may be 
empowered in their interactions with the state, as well as with the institutions that affect their 
lives (Narayan, 2005). Thus, building on the World Bank’s framework, China could pursue a 
more farmer-oriented urbanization policy, engaging rural-urban communities with the state and 
market. Unlike the World Bank’s framework, which stresses the general development outcomes 
toward empowerment, the present study focuses exclusively on policies and strategies that 
support farmers’ agency to make strategic choices on whether to pursue their livelihood in rural 
or urban areas. Supporting farmers’ empowerment in this way may, in turn, improve the 
accountability of the state and affect its policy and practices, further facilitating farmers’ 
empowerment and their potential contributions to state prosperity. Applying an alternative 
empowerment framework for development in China may also serve to identify and ameliorate the 
gap between China’s current “land-based” urbanization and more people-oriented urbanization of 
farmers and migrant workers.  
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Considering the great regional as well as rural-urban disparities within China, it is 
impractical to expect any single alternative framework to fully represent all of the structural 
issues in play. Rather, a case study, elaborating salient features of the World Bank’s framework 
and related analysis in a specific case model, may provide practical insights into China’s on-
going and future urbanization policy directions, especially in relation to farmers. Chongqing, one 
of the four central municipalities and the first national pilot zone of integrated rural-urban reform, 
is a good candidate for this purpose. Chongqing has been given a great deal of support and 
discretion in seeking innovative and feasible ways of reforming institutional barriers to farmers’ 
integration in urbanization, such as hukou and land tenure systems, which produce increasing 
rural-urban segregation (Huang, 2012). Given its direct connection with the national government, 
Chongqing is able to initiate a series of pilot reforms that have not been undertaken elsewhere in 
China. Meanwhile, this case study can also provide insights into the relationship between local 
policy dynamics and urbanization patterns thereby induced. Thus, Chongqing’s recent 
comprehensive hukou reform, linking farmers and rural land benefits through rural land exchange 
markets, is selected for this case study. 
Based on results from the case study, it can be seen that even though ‘empowerment’ is 
not generally a fully assimilated part of the state’s policy agenda, it has been integrated into the 
rationale informing Chongqing’s policy design and implementation. Farmers, as well as migrant 
workers, are not only empowered to make strategic choices between rural and urban destinations, 
but are also entitled to equal benefits and rights with local citizens, which helps them to integrate 
more fully into the local context of their choice. Furthermore, given Chongqing’s pioneering 
position in initiating its pilot hukou reform, the alternative urbanization framework evident in 
Chongqing is compatible with China’s current and historical socialist regime, which means key 
insights from Chongqing’s case may be applicable to other jurisdictions with adaptions that 
reflect local contexts. Empirical evidence from Chongqing also proves that more careful 
balancing between land-driven and people-oriented urbanization provides an affordable and 
sustainable pathway toward integrated rural-urban development. However, more farmer-friendly 
urbanization, predicated upon empowering farmers in the urbanization process, would be a first 
step towards China’s ultimate goal of achieving sustained economic growth and inclusive 
development. There may also be environmental benefits, which would support long-term 
economic sustainability and responsible natural resource management. 
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In addition to the introductory section, this chapter contains six other sections. Section 2 
provides a review of relevant literature to serve as a background for the case study. Section 3 
presents methodology and rationales for a retrospective look at China’s urbanization trajectory 
and a case study of Chongqing. Section 4 provides a historical review of China’s urbanization 
and associated institutional reforms, through which the gap between China’s current land-driven 
and proposed human-centered urbanization models are identified. Section 5 examines dynamics 
between the state and peasant farmers by identifying the salient features of the World Bank’s 
empowerment framework of development operating in and modified with a greater understanding 
arising from the case study of Chongqing. Section 6 provides concluding remarks and policy 
implications. 
 Building a framework for inclusive and sustainable urbanization in China 2.2
 As China’s urbanization continues, historical institutional settings that developed under 
the centralized planning regime still dominate and persist in most socioeconomic fields. Thus, 
institutionalized hukou and land tenure systems have been a continuous part of China’s 
urbanization process. This section first reviews relevant studies on China’s reform of hukou and 
land tenure systems, respectively, as well as the literature on integrated reform of the two systems. 
Then, it examines the international empowerment research on development, to consider its 
relevance for informing China’s urbanization policies and practices in the direction of more 
people-oriented development. The origin, meaning, and major empowerment frameworks of 
development are reviewed accordingly. Lastly, by integrating the World Bank’s empowerment 
framework into China’s urbanization contexts, a farmer-oriented framework centered on farmers’ 
choices between rural and urban hukou is advocated. 
2.2.1 State-led urbanization, institutional reforms and the missing voice of farmers 
The early stages of industrialization and urbanization, viewed from historical and 
international perspectives, have been paralleled by a geographic redistribution of the population, 
mainly through internal migration from rural to urban areas (Chenery & Syrquin, 1975; Ofer, 
1977; Polanyi, 1957). According to Lewis (1954), national urbanization was driven by capital 
accumulation in urban industries. Economic development is thus accomplished by transferring 
labor from traditional to modern capitalistic sectors. There are two underlying assumptions 
informing Lewis’ (1954) dual-economy model: An abundant rural labor force exists and rural-
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urban migration is frictionless; the urban labor market is perfectly competitive and there is no 
significant discrimination against migrants. In this model, urbanization occurs smoothly and there 
is no unemployment in urban labor market, which is the perfect situation of the real world.  
For most socialist countries, even though extensive unemployment and social 
discrimination exist in urban sectors, industrialization and urbanization happen almost 
simultaneously and are also mutually reinforcing (Ofer, 1977). However, this is not the case for 
China, where urbanization is occurring far ahead of its industrialization (Hua, 2014; Zhou, 1994). 
This is due to the fact that local governments increasingly rely on land revenues to promote local 
economic growth as an outcome of China’s fiscal recentralization, since 1994 (Kung, Xu & Zhou, 
2013). Consequently, local governments, which are driven by the land-leasing revenues, 
continuously expand urban boundaries beyond rural-urban fringe (Ong, 2014). Thus, China’s 
urbanization is mainly driven by the state with a view to market prominence, rather than being 
centered on socioeconomic development and environmental sustainability. This distorted 
urbanization pattern, which excludes most farmers from being urbanized, has gradually posed 
extensive negative impacts on almost every field in China’s socioeconomic context (Wang, 2005; 
Tao & Xu, 2007). To address the issue, continuous attempts at institutional and policy reforms 
are evident in China’s urbanization processes. Among others, hukou and land tenure systems are 
considered as the two most challenging policy fields requiring intervention (Wen, 2014). Even 
though some progress has been achieved, urbanization in China is still considered to be focused 
on urban land expansion rather than urbanizing the rural population, due to the persistent impact 
of the hukou and land tenure systems, which feature prominently within local states’ 
development strategies (Zhang, 2004). 
2.2.1.1 Hukou reforms accompanying economic development 
The hukou system has been widely considered to play an important historical role in the 
implementation of China’s planning economy, fostering rural-urban segregation, and 
constraining rapid urbanization (Wan, 2001). Most of the existing literature focuses on unfinished 
aspects of hukou system reform by investigating the consequential impacts of hukou on 
socioeconomic class and regional development patterns (Cai, 2011). On a macro-economic level, 
hukou has increased the long-term disparities between rural and urban regions (Wu & Treiman, 
2004). Furthermore, Cai (2001) and Au and Henderson (2002) argued that hukou limited China’s 
overall economic performance by preventing free rural-urban migration and integration. As rapid 
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rural-urban migration floods cities, migrant workers have faced specific structural forms of social 
exclusion and marginalization, due to their lack of local hukou (Alexander & Chan, 2004). More 
specifically, rural migrants have less opportunity of getting decent jobs than their urban 
counterparts (Knight et al., 1999; Wong, Fu, Chang & Song, 2007); they are also excluded from 
public rental housing and urban education (Wong, 2007; Wu, 2002; Zhao, 2005).    
Hukou is not only a policy but also an institution, because it is deeply rooted in China’s 
governance structures and policy settings and has influenced every individual and communal 
aspect of Chinese society (Fan, 2008). According to North (1990), the institutions present at any 
point in time can only be understood by tracing their incremental evolution over a lengthy period, 
as produced effects of historical processes. This approach enables scholars to study hukou reform 
from the perspective of incremental institutional change. Cheng & Selden (1994) offer an in-
depth discussion of the origins and social consequences of the hukou system.  
In a retrospective analysis of the historical path of hukou reform, China is neither moving 
to abolish the hukou system, nor does hukou’s importance in limiting migration to major cities 
appear to be diminishing in the near future (Chan & Buckingham, 2008). Nevertheless, the state 
continues to play a key role in advancing China’s hukou reform. With the experimental 
elimination of the agricultural and non-agricultural distinctions in certain provinces and cities in 
China, hukou classification is no longer as important as it once was (Chan & Buckingham, 2008). 
However, hukou location continues to determine access to services and to define one’s life 
chances (Fan, 2008; Solinger, 1999; Wang & Cai, 2010). The differences among cities in terms 
of the types and amount of services and welfare available to local hukou holders has widened, 
along with variation in administrative rankings and levels of economic development (Cai, 2011). 
Normally, big cities with more welfare values are also the popular destinations for rural migrants. 
As a result, places where there is more social welfare value associated with local hukou have 
found it more difficult to relax the hukou system (Fan, 2008).  
Another reason why local governments are not actively involved in hukou reform is 
because existing fiscal incentives have distorted their patterns of public expenditure, where 
promoting economic growth is given more priority than expenditures on basic public services (Fu 
& Zhang, 2007). As Cai (2011) points out, there is a tension between promotion of economic 
development and the need to provide social services within local governments. Since relaxing 
hukou for migrants is conceptualized as an increase in local states’ public expenditure, local 
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governments have very few incentives to make any improvement to current migrant hukou status 
(Jin, Qian & Weingast, 2005). More specifically, taking land tenure systems into account, it 
becomes clear that the revenue from land conversion encourages the local state to engage 
increasingly in urbanizing the city’s land base rather than urbanizing agricultural hukou holders 
(Miller, 2012; Ong, 2014). This may also explain why even though the estimated costs for 
civilianizing one migrant worker are affordable and have been well documented (Investigating 
group of Ministry of Construction, 2006; Zhang, 2009), the progress of transferring rural 
migrants to new urban citizens is still very limited (Hua, 2014).  
Cai (2011) offered a comprehensive examination of available documents and explained 
hukou reforms by exploring the motives, behavior and interactions of all key players, including 
rural migrants, urban citizens and central and local governments, in a political economy 
framework. Hukou reforms have to provide a comprehensive package to tackle all risks facing 
migrant workers, from inclusive social protection policies in urban areas to flexible relocation 
policies in relation to arable land (Cai, 2011), in order to be attractive for farmers. Meanwhile, 
providing sufficient land revenue to those who are forced to move when rural land is appropriated 
for urban use would also have a positive impact on the willingness of migrants and farmers to 
settle in urban areas (Huang, 2011; Mullan, Grosjean & Kontoleon, 2010).  
Given that the local state plays a key role in hukou reform and its behavior is driven by 
land revenue, land development may be one possible incentive for the local state to advance 
municipal hukou reform (Cai, 2011; Huang, 2012). Hence, hukou reform should be carried out 
with a much wider scope incorporating parallel changes to the land tenure system. 
2.2.1.2 Land tenure reforms toward realizing full land rights 
China has a distinct land tenure system, where rural land is nominally owned by the 
village collective, so individual households access only certain parts of their land rights, due to 
the principles informing the socialist political economy. Hence, individual farmers’ ownership of 
agricultural land is understood as a form of “quasi-private” property rights (Kung, 1995). Since 
China’s reform and opening up in 1978, China’s land tenure reforms are moving gradually 
towards strengthening overall “quasi” property rights.  
In 1978, China adopted its reform and opening policy, which created an open and 
innovative policy environment nationwide. This change in policy context enables China’s central 
government to shift its focus toward promoting material production incentives for farming 
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households. To do so, the central state has raised the purchasing prices of major agricultural 
commodities and lowered the threshold of compulsory production quotas required for rural 
families (Liu, Carter & Yao, 1998). Meanwhile, improvements in the policy environment also 
provide the ground for bottom-up innovations from farmers. The well-known HCRS is among a 
number of decentralized production organizations providing farmers with work incentives by 
linking labor efforts and income (Mullan, Grosjean & Kontoleon, 2010). It is through the HCRS 
that the first two aspects of land rights have been fully extended to farmers. Admittedly, HCRS 
profoundly improved total agricultural productivity during China’s initial transition from a 
planning economy to a market economy. However, due to its egalitarian nature, HCRS is 
currently considered one of the major institutional constraints preventing further land reforms 
towards agricultural modernization. Thus, most of the attention on HCRS has been focused on 
how to transform or eliminate it in order to realize larger scale agricultural production (Tao & Xu, 
2007), whereas the significance of HCRS as the first decentralized land policy acknowledged and 
implemented by the national government has often been overlooked.  
Liu, Carter and Yao (1998) are among the few scholars, who specifically examine the 
dynamics informing the origin and development processes of the HCRS. Before its formal 
adoption, four similar policy initiatives emerged and were turned down by the central 
government (Du, 1985). While the newly adopted Reform and Opening policy as well as a 
change in socialist ideology at the time contributed to the establishment of HCRS, its ultimate 
implementation might also be attributed to the fact that it fulfilled the common interests of the 
state, farmers, and other interest groups (Liu, Carter & Yao, 1998). Liu, Carter and Yao (1998) 
argued that the key reason why the decentralized HCRS policy could happen under an 
authoritarian regime was that the exclusive focus of HCRS was on enhancing agricultural 
production without challenging the absolute control of the state and collective authorities in many 
other areas. Through the HCRS, a “quasi” market for agricultural products has emerged in rural 
China, where the national state still sets a factor price for agricultural quotas and enacts its 
sovereignty through land reallocations. This revised model of marketization was really important 
in supporting China’s move forward at the early stages of its reform and opening, since the 
market, which is generally conceptualized as a form of capitalism, threatened China’s socialist 
regime. The “quasi” marketization coupled with the successful application of HCRS swept away 
dissenting voices, doubts and resistance in the society, thus leading China to further reforms in its 
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land tenure system as well as to further marketization, as seen today. Today, China has become 
the second biggest economy in the world and its socialist economic system has also evolved, 
while preserving the predominant position of the CPC in framing its socioeconomic regimes 
(Qian & Wu, 2008). Thus, even though the experience of the HCRS may not be fully suited to 
the current context, its integrated policy dynamics may shed light on what might be most 
effective in proposing further structural reforms in China. 
Centered on land transfer rights and rights to secure possession, studies on Chinese land 
tenure reforms have focused almost exclusively on the impact of the rural land tenure system on 
investment and productivity (Carter, Roth, Liu & Yao, 1999; Jacoby, Li, & Rozelle, 2002). 
Available empirical studies examine the impact of the land tenure security on investments, by 
strengthening claims to the distribution of assets and increasing access to capital, as relevant laws 
make it impossible to use land as collateral for obtaining loans (Ma, Heerink, van Ierland, van 
den Berg & Shi, 2013). The focus of these studies is mainly on land tenure insecurity caused by 
land use readjustments within villages. The types of investments examined in these studies tend 
to be relatively short-term and land-related, such as the purchase of fertilizers, or green and 
organic manure (Feng, Heerink, Ruben & Qu, 2010). The results indicate that a higher 
expropriation risk as a result of land readjustments has a significant but small negative effect on 
short-term investment in land (de Brauw & Rozelle, 2008).  
On the other hand, the lack of long-term planning on utilizing rural land, coupled with 
other factors, may lead to severe environmental issues, such as land degradation and deforestation 
(Liu, Wang, Gao & Deng, 2005). Weak law enforcement and limited land resources available for 
agriculture in rural China have led to increasing deforestation of farmland, soil and grassland (Xu, 
Yin, Li & Liu, 2006; Zhang et al., 2000), which in turn lead to soil erosion, flooding, landslides, 
droughts, and sandstorms (Liu et al., 2005). Attempts have been made to address the poor 
regulation of rural land use; however, without economic development to increase social welfare 
and economic productivity in rural areas, incentives for over-exploiting rural environments will 
remain unchanged (Mullan, Grosjean, & Kontoleon, 2011).  
As China continues moving toward a market economy, growing numbers of studies have 
stressed the impact of land tenure security on rural-urban migration (Rozelle, Brandt, Li & Huang, 
2002; Zhu, 2007). The current land system affects rural labor mobility decisions and associated 
rural-urban migration in many ways. First, besides the costs and risks of moving to urban areas, 
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migration in China is also associated with a probability for redistribution of some of the 
household land, which entails a net loss of land access (Rozelle & Li, 1998). This is due to the 
fact that HCRS entitles all villagers, both current and future, with equal access to farmland on a 
fairly egalitarian basis (Rozelle et al., 2002). Thus, the collectively owned farmland is reallocated 
as needed to reflect demographic changes within villages. Some scholars believe that land 
reallocation represents a way of ensuring that villagers comply with the implementation of state 
policies (Turner, Brandt & Rozelle, 2004). For example, villagers’ cooperation with state policies 
can be one criteria for future land reallocation. Second, migration is also encouraged by the 
development of land transfer rights. As Rozelle (1999) suggested, the ability both to rent out land 
and use it as collateral for credits might have positive impacts on migration. Third, rural labor 
mobility in China is more likely to occur on a more temporary basis than other countries due to 
the potential loss of land rights after permanent settlement in urban areas (Mullan, Grosjean, & 
Kontoleon, 2011). Furthermore, due partly to the hukou system, most migrant workers facing 
limited jobs, welfare coverage and extensive discrimination in urban areas, are reluctant to give 
up their rural land and their primary social supports in rural areas (Zhu, 2007).  
Another key issue in the rural land system is massive land requisitions led by states in the 
process of urbanization. Since the mid-1990s, China has witnessed rapid urbanization fuelled by 
dramatic expansion in large-scale infrastructure development. The high demand for rural land, in 
turn, has caused increasing land requisition in suburban areas (Ho & Lin, 2004). Between 1984 
and 2008, China’s urban areas dramatically expanded from 8,842 to 36,295 km2, or by 410 
percent (NBS, 2009). Although most land requisitions affect only a fraction of farmers that live 
on the rural-urban fringe, it is becoming the most controversial area of land tenure reforms. One 
reason is that the uneven distribution of land value, when transforming rural land for non-
agricultural usage, has resulted in increasing tensions among farmer groups and different 
economic interest groups (Hua, 2014). Another explanation is that while state-led compulsory 
land acquisition brings tremendous revenue to the local state (Chan, 2003), the compensation for 
dispossessed farmers is generally quite low (Guo, 2001). Ong (2014) indicated that, between 
2004 and 2007, land transfer fees accounted for nearly 25 percent of total urban financing 
sources; however, after 2007, that percentage rose significantly, reaching 50 percent of local 
states’ total financing in 2010. According to Tao and Xu (2007), if the average compensation for 
commercial land usage was between 300,000 to 450,000 Yuan, a displaced farmer was 
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compensated for approximately only 20,000 to 30,000 Yuan. In Zhejiang, while farmers normally 
get only 5-10 percent of the land revenue, local states may retain 20-30 percent, while 
commercial developers take away 40-50 percent of the benefits from land conversion (Tu, 2004). 
It is also estimated that from 2000 to 2010, the total built-up acreage in urban areas of China 
increased by 50% while the total urban population, including urban residents without local hukou, 
increased by only 26% (NBS, 2010). Thus, through local states’ monopolies in land requisition, 
China has witnessed rapid land-driven urbanization rather than people-centered urbanization 
(Hua, 2014; Ong, 2014). Furthermore, China’s land-biased urbanization is driven not only by 
local governments’ land transfer revenue; it is also fueled by their significant bank borrowing. 
Local states’ debts range from 5 to 14.4 trillion Yuan, accounting for between 13 and 36 percent 
of GDP in 2010 (Shih, 2010; Wong, 2012). 
While there is a strong consensus on the need for further reform in China’s land tenure 
system, especially the urban land requisition process, opinions diverge on how best to proceed 
across different disciplines. International scholarly attention has focused on the highly ambiguous 
definition of property rights in China and its impacts on the use and development of land (World 
Bank, 1993; Zhu, 2002; Hsing, 2010). The unclear definition of property rights offers no 
incentive for efficient land use and leads to competition for and over-exploitation of land. 
However, ambiguous land property rights may represent a necessary and desirable compromise in 
the Chinese case, allowing the state to have flexibility to respond to the many political, economic, 
and social problems that may arise on the risky and uncertain path of market transition (Zhu, 
2002). To address the unfair distribution of land value during urban expansion, Tao and Xu 
(2007) proposed an added-value tax on land requisition, through which the land-added revenue 
could be redistributed across the broader public sphere. However, this tax levy cannot be realized 
without national initiatives for further reforms of the existing tax system. Practices to artificially 
promote larger scale agricultural production and the efficiency of land development have been 
undertaken through high-density peasant resettlements, first adopted in Jiangsu province in 2001 
(Ong, 2014). Through the resulting “concentrated villages,” farmland has been released by 
relocating farmers. However, due to local states’ strong motivation to extract more land for urban 
development, the “additional” agricultural land is mainly exchanged for the quota of land to be 
used for commercial and industrial purposes in peri-urban areas (Ong, 2014). In this sense, the 
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“concentrated villages” model is a strengthened form of land requisition between the state and 
farmers without changing the states’ predominant role in the process.  
In 2008, with national approval, Chengdu and Chongqing successively set up the first two 
revised land voucher programs in China. The basic idea of each program is somewhat similar to 
the “concentrated villages” model, which is designed to exchange rural-urban land quota to 
support urban construction. However, the land voucher program does so through a “quasi” land 
market, which actually capitalizes farmers’ abandoned homesteads as well as collective 
construction land (Zhou, 2014). The land voucher program improves the efficiency of land 
development and also enables farmers to share the benefits from urbanization, by increasing their 
capacity to negotiate with local states, as will be discussed in greater detail later in this chapter. 
While the hukou system has been eased continuously, China’s urbanization will not 
advance if other institutional barriers remain intact. The rural land tenure system, which is the 
fundamental economic institutional setting in rural China, is considered a primary constraint on 
rural-urban migration as well as urbanization (Mullan, Grosjean, & Kontoleon, 2011). In the 
same sense, in coping constructively with China’s urbanization, land reform should go beyond 
the land system itself to coordinate with hukou reforms. 
2.2.1.3 Emerging studies on coordinated reforms of hukou and land tenure systems 
 Numerous studies focusing on coordinated reforms of hukou and land tenure systems 
have emerged to address most promising practices for realizing integrated rural-urban 
development, by overcoming institutional obstacles that segregate rural and urban regions. Chen 
and Lu (2009) argued that coordinated hukou and land reforms could provide new directions for 
China’s future development by linking mobile rural laborers with the transfer of land quota to 
urban regions. Other scholars have re-examined hukou reforms, claiming that their core task is to 
extend and realize equalized basic public services for urban residents, including migrant workers 
and new citizens. Clearly, a coordinated reform of hukou, land, and public finance institutions is 
needed (Tao & Wang, 2010). Yi (2013) proposed that urban employment systems should also be 
integrated into the coordinated hukou-land reform framework as a way to further strengthen the 
“pull-push” forces between rural and urban regions. Tao and Xu (2007) proposed an added-value 
tax on land requisition, through which the land-added revenue could be redistributed across the 
broader public sphere.  
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This strand of literature sheds new light into China’s current and future urbanization 
regimes by providing a systematic perspective on China’s institutional reforms. However, the 
literature does not provide clear guidance on how best to mainstream farmers into the 
urbanization process. A grounded approach that focuses on improving farmers’ livelihoods and 
economic well-being in order to cope with China’s mainstream development doctrine is missing 
in the literature. 
2.2.2 Empowerment as a bottom-up development approach 
Since the 1970s, empowerment as a grounded instrument for individuals to claim their 
freedom and to make strategic life choices has emerged and become increasingly popular in 
international economic and political discourses (Rowlands, 1998). However, divergent 
understandings and interpretations of ‘empowerment’ exist, due to its context-specific and, 
therefore, multi-dimensional nature. In this sense, it is critical to first examine the evolution of 
the term, so that it may be better understood before application in the case of China’s processes 
for reform.  
2.2.2.1 Freedom as the original idea behind empowerment 
The modern notion of freedom of the individual has become linked with fundamental 
ideas about the self and individualism (Bauman, 1988). To the extent that self-interest and 
individualism could endanger societal cohesion, societies have had to develop ways of keeping 
such anti-social forces in check. To do so, modern democratic societies established scattered 
authorities rather than one single unified authority (Traynor, 2003). This required a diverse range 
of authorities to exist within the society, which intensified public debates about the optimal 
balance between individualism and communitarianism. On one hand, even though individualists 
admitted the necessary existence of states, they preferred limited government and the fulfillment 
of individual rights. More specifically, they conceived of citizenship as supporting equality 
among members in a political community that guarantees political and civil rights against 
intrusion by the state (Taylor, 1986). On the other hand, the communitarians recognize social 
solidarity as the first priority. They endorse the high value of leadership in formulating common 
goals and shaping choices, even if this results in hierarchy and exclusion. In this sense, 
conservatives elevated the rights of some people, who could contribute to and sustain the 
community, over the rights of other people, to exercise choice. Thus, ‘empowerment’ as an 
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instrument for individuals to negotiate their communal rights, emerged from the inevitable 
tensions between individual freedoms and the utilitarian basis of state power.  
2.2.2.2 Meaning of empowerment 
Due to the multidimensional nature, empowerment may be defined problematically and 
how the word is used in organizations or among individuals may vary considerably. In practice, 
activist groups use the term to mobilize people to engage in social movements advocating human 
rights, while scholars constantly try to explore the underlying meaning of, and ways of 
conceptualizing the term in various practical contexts (Ibrahim & Alkire, 2007). The majority of 
studies have defined empowerment as an expansion of agency. Agency refers to “what a person 
is free to do and achieve in pursuit of whatever goals or values he or she regards as important” 
(Sen, 1985, p. 206). The expansion of both types of freedoms – processes and capabilities – 
defines economic development (Ibrahim & Alkire, 2007). From the perspective of individuals’ 
capabilities, Malhotra, Schuler and Boender (2002) stated that empowerment referred to their 
agency to increase and expand assets and capabilities of both diverse individuals and groups to 
engage, influence, and transform the institutions that affected them. Empowerment can also be 
seen as a dynamic process of the “expansion in people's ability to make strategic life choices in a 
context where this ability was previously denied to them” (Kabeer, 2001; p. 437). Some scholars 
define empowerment by emphasizing the preconditions required to expand agency. 
Empowerment defined in this way has practical force in the development of poverty reduction 
policies. For example, empowerment can be understood as “the expansion of assets and 
capabilities of poor people to participate in, negotiate with, influence, control, and hold 
accountable institutions that affect their lives” (Narayan, 2005; p. 5). For poor people to exert that 
much agency, significant institutional and informal obstacles, as well as the rules that were made 
by elite groups, have to be transformed (Alsop, Bertelsen & Holland, 2006). Friedmann (1992) 
defined poverty as a form of disempowerment. This conceptualization of “poverty” extends the 
application of empowerment theory to a broader communal scope.  
2.2.3 Frameworks of development centered on empowering the disempowered 
Marginalized and disadvantaged people are also disempowered due to reasons rooted in 
the ideologies of a given society. More specifically, it is the interaction between the histories of 
institutional settings and the affected people’s age, gender, social class and many other factors 
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that give rise to their existing socioeconomic status. Women and the poor are normally the main 
target populations in most empowerment studies. Since the two groups have substantive 
overlapping members and characteristics, they represent generally disempowered people that 
need empowerment in order to maximize social and economic development. Women are very 
often the poorest of the poor due to the fundamental gender inequality in most societies.  
Empowering poor people in economic, social and political spheres not only elevates them from 
poverty but could also bring greater social solidarity to the society, which is the basis for most 
empowerment frameworks of development. 
2.2.3.1 Friedmann’s alternative development framework 
 Most neoclassic economists depict urbanization as continuous and advocate the complete 
absorbability of any rural surplus labor force through capital accumulation in urban economies 
(Lewis, 1954; Harris & Todaro, 1970). Focusing on the social outcomes of urbanization, 
industrialization, and modernization in most Latin American countries, Friedmann (1992) 
claimed that most rural laborers were considered redundant under paradigms of capital 
accumulation; thus they were born marginalized under capitalist regimes. The exclusion of 
abundant rural laborers from both economic justice and state politics may improve short-term 
economic growth. However, sustainable development, both in terms of market growth and 
environmental resource management can never be realized by leaving the majority of the 
population trapped and therefore disempowered by poverty. 
 To address and correct the inherent faults of capitalist economic growth models, 
Friedmann (1992) proposed a whole-economy model that incorporated the mainstream pattern of 
economic growth and non-market relations in the production of life and livelihood, through the 
agency of the household, which is also the basic unit of a civil society. Integrating civil society 
into the whole-economy model provides new perspectives on development, through which an 
alternative development framework centered on empowerment of the disempowered is built 
(Friedmann, 1992). As previously indicated, his alternative empowerment framework requires 
four conditions, including inclusive democracy, appropriate economic growth, gender equality 
and sustainability, as the priorities for any nation that is willing to achieve qualitative, inclusive 
and sustainable growth. These four claims or conditions further represent accordingly, political, 
economic, social and intergenerational integration within any society. According to Friedmann 
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(1992), both economic and environmental sustainability could be achieved through social, 
economic and political integration of the poor into the whole economy as a collective entity. 
 Friedmann’s (1992) framework has practical implications for Latin American countries as 
well as most developing countries aspiring to socioeconomic transformation in the process of 
urbanization. Urbanization, based on the mainstream economic growth model, has tended to 
cause increasing numbers of displaced as well as marginalized peasant farmers, owing to farmers’ 
disadvantaged positions during capital accumulation (Friedmann, 1992). Thus, it requires a 
strong government to correct this inherent inclination for exploiting and neglecting farmers’ and 
therefore environmental well-being while promoting inclusive and sustained development. As 
Friedmann (1992) stated, “an alternative development is essentially a dialectical ideology and 
practice…. Its aim is to replace neither the one nor the other but to transform them both 
dramatically to make it possible for disempowered sectors to be included in political and 
economic processes and have their rights as citizens and human beings acknowledged” (p. VIII). 
This statement implies that the kind of alternative framework Friedmann proposes does not need 
to be totalized; rather, it can function in parallel to the mainstream model while transforming both 
of them toward realizing full integration of all citizens.  
2.2.3.2 World Bank’s empowerment framework of development 
The World Bank’s framework of empowerment draws heavily from multiple scholars’ 
conceptualizations and understandings of empowerment and development (Samman & Santos, 
2009). For example, Narayan’s work (2005) defines empowerment “as increasing poor people’s 
freedom of choice and action to shape their own lives” (p. 4). As Narayan (2002) stresses, 
empowerment can be realized through interactions between the agency of individuals and groups, 
and the opportunity structures in which individual and collective agency are potentially exercised. 
‘Agency’ refers to an individual or group’s ability to make purposeful choices (Narayan, 2002). 
There are two components of agency: individual assets and capabilities, and collective assets and 
capabilities. The asset in Narayan’s framework is the indicator of agency, which is different from 
Kabeer’s (1999) pre-condition of agency as a process. At the individual level, a lack of material 
assets means they have limited negotiation power, leading to their disadvantaged position within 
the society. Capability involves multiple types, including human social, psychological and 
political abilities. At the collective level, people’s assets and capabilities include their voices, 
organizations, and identities (Narayan, 2005). 
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An opportunity structure can be described as “the broader institutional, social, and 
political context of formal and informal rules and norms within which actors pursue their 
interests” (Alsop, Bertelsen & Hollan, 2006, p. 14). In turn, the institutional climate includes 
access to information, inclusive participation, accountability and local organizational capacity. 
The social and political structures referred to above point to the degree of openness that poor 
people have available to them to make use of opportunities and services. According to Alsop, 
Bertelsen and Holland (2006), “An opportunity structure that allows people to translate their asset 
base into effective agency, through more equitable rules and expanded entitlements, constitutes a 
prerequisite for empowerment” (p. 16).  An opportunity structure, then, enables the exercise of 
agency through an expanded range of meaningful choices that have the potential to empower 
individuals and groups. The World Bank’s model of empowering poor people is shown in Figure 
2.1. 
 
Figure 2.1 World Bank's empowerment framework for development 
 
Generally, the World Bank’s empowerment framework may be described as having three 
stages for promoting and evaluating opportunity structures: a) existence of choice (identifying 
whether any functional opportunity to make a choice exists), b) use of choice (whether a person 
or group actually uses the opportunity to choose), and c) achievement of choice (whether or not 
the choice brings about the desired result). It is noteworthy that even where individuals have the 
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chance to make a choice, their choice may not produce favorable results, since these choices may 
be constrained by formal and informal social structures (Narayan, 2002). The World Bank’s 
empowerment framework offers tools to evaluate whether poor people may be empowered by 
governmental policy, through practices that integrate both the state and poor people into policy 
and development processes.  
2.2.4 Possible inclusive and sustainable urbanization centered on farmer’s empowerment  
As described in Friedmann’s (1992) alternative development framework, most developing 
countries’ transitions into the globalized economy, in the form of urbanization, were based on 
capital accumulation. Capitalist development usually leads to the further exclusion and 
marginalization of poor farmers in the process. To correct this economy-biased development 
pattern, the growth of civil society mechanisms that may hold their governments accountable for 
the effects of policy choices are needed. Empowering individual households, which are the most 
basic component of a civil society, makes it possible for grassroots groups to negotiate 
collectively with the state, thus resulting in positive changes towards more inclusive development 
(Friedmann, 1992). Focusing on the household also makes it possible to examine gender relations 
at both domestic and community levels during migration, as well as in urbanization processes, 
since rural-urban migration is often a family strategy to diversify revenues (Stark, 1991), based 
on a gendered division of labor within the household (Jacka, 2014).  It is possible that family 
members may be physically separated while confronting transitional difficulties, but the 
household is still considered the basic decision-making unit, where family members make 
decisions together and collaborate with each other.   
In this sense, China’s capacity for more people-oriented urbanization lies in the core value 
of empowering and facilitating farming households to make effective choices during the 
urbanization process. For this reason, this case study defines empowerment as expansion in 
farmers’ assets and ability to participate in, negotiate with, influence, control, and hold 
accountable governments that affect their lives (Narayan, 2005), so that they can make strategic 
life choices in a context where this ability was previously denied to them (Kabeer, 2001).  
Informed by Friedmann’s and the World Bank’s empowerment frameworks, China’s 
potential for more people-oriented urbanization requires empowerment opportunities for farmers 
as well as migrant workers (existence of choices), integrated rural-urban development outcomes 
(usage of choices) and rural-urban migration and integration (achievement of choices), as shown 
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in Figure 2.2. Empowerment of farmers is the most promising possible outcome for the 
interaction between farmers’ agency and existing or revised opportunity structures. The World 
Bank’s empowerment framework, which integrates the state, market, community, and 
development outcomes, is incorporated here with Friedmann’s framework to demonstrate 
potentials for empowering farmers during China’s urbanization initiatives. The proposed 
urbanization framework makes it possible to track and examine the compound impacts of a 
state’s policies and the existing social and political structures in expanding the strategic choices 
available to rural populations between rural and urban destinations.  
 
Figure 2.2 Framework for farmer-oriented urbanization in China 
 
Source: adapted from World Bank’s empowerment framework by the author 
The farmer-oriented urbanization model under review here also features rural-urban 
migration while stressing full integration through unified rural-urban development outcomes. 
More specifically, through empowerment, farmers and migrant workers, who stay in rural areas, 
are able to contribute to and to benefit from rural development outcomes, while migrated workers 
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can affect and enjoy urban development outcomes. There may be cases where farmers may 
change their identity between that of farmer and migrant worker. However, this study focuses 
exclusively on the primary sites of residence between farmers and migrant workers, as actually 
practiced in contemporary China. As studies have shown, a decrease of migrant workers in the 
urban labor market may cause a labor shortage, which increases potential worker empowerment 
in negotiating the price of their labor in the market (Zhan & Huang, 2012). The higher labor price 
may attract more farmers to engage in urban labor sectors until the supply of labor surpasses the 
market demand. On the other hand, the decrease of rural laborers may also result in an increase of 
rural productivity or commodity prices. Thus, improved rural development outcomes may also 
attract migrant workers to the rural sector. Rural-urban migration may not cease until a relatively 
stable rural-urban integration equilibrium is reached, where no significant mobilization between 
rural-urban regions continues. 
Unlike the forces shaping rural-urban equilibrium in the current mainstream economy-
based models in China, which focus primarily on the rural-urban income gap, equilibrium of a 
more farmer-oriented model of urbanization would be based on developing rural-urban 
professional identities that represent the full extent of socioeconomic integration of farmers. The 
ultimate balance between rural and urban regions is centered on the full socioeconomic 
integration of farmers (migrants) to the local residential life they choose. More specifically, 
integrated development outcomes would enable farmers, as well as rural migrants, to make 
strategic decisions about whether to lead their life and earn their livelihoods in either rural or 
urban areas. Furthermore, their choices would imply that farmers, as well as circular migrants, 
could choose to stay in either rural or urban regions and should be able to fully integrate into their 
chosen local community. At an individual level, this means farmers may either become 
professional farm workers or transform themselves into urban citizens; migrant workers may thus 
become either urban citizens or farming workers. There may be cases where farmers engage in 
other occupations, but for the purposes and simplicity of this study, only farming workers 
engaged in agricultural activities are considered. Ultimately, the alternative urbanization model 
developed through this case study of Chongqing, and centered on empowering farmers, might 
reach a dynamic equilibrium where rural-urban migration may be still present, but its main 
features would focus on an exchange between professional farmers living in rural areas and urban 
citizens residing in urban regions.  
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 Methodology 2.3
 This section describes the rationale and methodology used to conduct a historical review 
of China’s urbanization, to complete a comparison between current and proposed frameworks of 
urbanization, and to elaborate on the results of a thorough case study of Chongqing, in order to 
advocate for more farmer-oriented rural-urban migration policy suites localized to conditions in 
other jurisdictions in China.  
2.3.1 China’s urbanization trajectory and its practical implications 
This chapter attempts to build its analysis based on a selective literature review of 
international as well as domestic Chinese studies on development, urbanization and 
empowerment. Whether the proposed framework actually reflects and reveals the domestic 
context and existing challenges must be taken into consideration. To do so, it is critical to 
understand how China’s urbanization initially originated and how it evolved gradually over time. 
After a historical review of China’s urbanization trajectory, the gap between the proposed farmer-
oriented urbanization framework and China’s historical urbanization practices is also revealed. 
Furthermore, the roles of the state, hukou, land system and farmers during both patterns of 
urbanization are identified and compared along the axis of existence of choice, use of choice, and 
outcome of choice.   
2.3.2 Case study of Chongqing 
Due to China’s uneven economic development strategies, it is impractical to propose one 
universal urbanization framework for the whole nation. However, to verify and make linkages 
between China’s current urbanization practices, and Chongqing’s proposed model for rural-urban 
migration, a thorough case study is conducted. Chongqing’s unique position, as a central-
municipality under the direct control of the central government and as a pioneer in experimenting 
with and adopting innovative ways of realizing integrated rural-urban development, makes it 
suitable for the purpose of this analysis. The case study incorporates three steps: 
 
Mapping Chongqing’s hukou reform based on selective policy event analysis 
Chongqing’s comprehensive hukou reform includes a series of policies in several fields, 
reflecting its holistic approach to hukou reform. The compound impacts of this policy package on 
farming households’ empowerment will be examined together with an investigation of the impact 
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of individual policies. To achieve this, the policy events leading toward comprehensive hukou 
reform are presented first, in a chronological order. Second, the dynamics of Chongqing’s 
comprehensive hukou reform are mapped. In this way, the total impact of Chongqing’s hukou 
practices on farmers can be revealed. Furthermore, whether Chongqing’s policy design and 
implementation reflects the underlying rationale for an alternative urbanization model can also be 
examined. 
 
Empirical evidence of the impact of Chongqing’s hukou reform on farmers 
To provide quantitative evidence for policy analysis, population and public spending data 
at both national and local levels is presented to show whether the empirical data coincides with 
the intended outcome of each policy approach tested. Furthermore, in order to address the 
imbalanced economic development currently operating within China and to show the unique 
attributes of Chongqing’s reform model, a comparative policy analysis at the level of the nation 
and Chongqing is conducted. More specifically, total urban populations before and after 
Chongqing’s hukou reform are compared with what is commonly occurring in the nation, to 
examine the actual outcomes of the reform; Chongqing’s public spending on livelihood is also 
presented to test whether mainstreaming farmers in hukou reform is financially feasible and 
affordable. 
 
Summary of Chongqing’s hukou reform based on the farmer-oriented framework 
This section provides a brief summary of the case study by integrating the conceptual and 
empirical outcomes from the previous two steps into a more people-oriented urbanization model. 
In this way, the roles of the state, hukou, land tenure system and farmers during Chongqing’s 
hukou reform can be presented alongside the three dimensions of empowerment advocated by the 
farmer-oriented urbanization framework, including existence of choice, use of choice and 
outcome of choice.  
 China’s urbanization trajectory and its practical implications  2.4
Possible ways of initiating inclusive and sustainable urbanization in China are guided by 
external experiences or lessons, but are also embedded in its own historical evolutionary path. 
Thus, this section first examines China’s historical urbanization patterns with a focus on the role 
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of the state, hukou and land tenure system reforms. Secondly, a comparison between China’s 
current urbanization practices and the proposed model is also conducted. 
2.4.1 China’s urbanization: between exclusion and inclusion of farmers 
 In order to understand China’s current urbanization practices and the various issues that 
arise from this process, it is critical to understand how it initially originated and has evolved 
gradually over time. Thus, a historical review of China’s urbanization course is provided. More 
specifically, the review begins by examining the role of local states in driving China’s 
urbanization. Then, a description of hukou and land tenure reform processes is offered. The 
experience of farm households is then integrated into an analysis of each stage of China’s 
urbanization. Finally, based on China’s current urbanization patterns, the gap between its current 
approach and the proposed alternative urbanization pattern is also presented. 
2.4.1.1 State’s role: from industrialization to urbanization 
     In market economies, industrialization and urbanization usually go hand in hand. 
However, due to urban-centered development policies, industrialization before 1978 was mostly 
concentrated in urban areas, while China’s post-reform industrial growth has been spatially 
concentrated in townships and villages, as induced by competition between central and local 
states. Current land urbanization models reflect local states’ monopolies on land requisition and 
their entitlement to collect business taxes. 
 
Rural industrialization: since the 1980s 
One unique attribute of China’s current political economy, as embedded in the 
decentralization of authoritarian governments is that the career incentives for regional officials 
are highly correlated with their economic performance (Tsui & Wang, 2004). Thus, the fiscal 
decentralization initiated in the 1980s drastically shifted the incentives for local governments to 
rely on local revenues generated by local economies. One of the most critical profits for local 
states was the tax revenue from local non-state owned enterprises (Oi, 1999). Among those, 
Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs) were the main contributors to local tax revenues. Thus, 
local governments were greatly motivated to promote the development of TVEs. As Oi (1991) 
pointed out, the tax generated by TVEs had increased from roughly 2 billion Yuan in 1978 to 
205.8 billion Yuan in 1995.  
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     While the tax revenue for local governments had increased dramatically, the central 
government’s share of total tax revenue had reduced significantly from 40.5% in 1984 to 22% in 
1993 (Kung, Xu & Zhou, 2013). The shrinking revenue for the central government led to the 
1994 fiscal recentralization, which redefined tax rights between the national and regional 
governments and tightened fiscal control over revenues. To compensate for local governments’ 
losses in tax revenue, the national government assigned other rights to local states, such as the 
business tax and revenues arising from a change in the ownership of land. While the 1994 fiscal 
reforms redefined local authorities’ rights over transaction or value-added taxes, they still 
retained exclusive claim to enterprise income, which shifted their focus to promoting enterprise 
efficiency (Oi, 1999). The outcome of this change was the increasing privatization of TVEs that 
aimed at improving the investments in corporate efficiency begun in 1995.   
 
From industrialization to urbanization: since 2002 
The key factor that moved local governments’ development strategies from fostering 
enterprise growth to that of urban growth was the reassignment of rights over the enterprise profit 
tax in 2002. This change reduced nearly 60% of the tax share for local governments, which 
further decreased the incentives of local states to promote privatization of TVEs, which had been 
aimed at enhancing enterprise productivity. The local governments were left with the business tax, 
which was to become an important source of revenue (Kung, Xu & Zhou, 2013). The business 
tax levied mainly upon the construction and real estate industries became the main activity that 
benefitted from future urbanization planning (Fu & Zhang, 2007). The changing relative 
importance of construction and real estate taxes in total budgetary revenues of local governments 
is reflected in the growing share of business tax from 20% in 1994 to 25% in 2003, while the 
share of transaction tax declined from 22% to 18% during the same period (Zhou, 2006). The 
recentralization of fiscal revenue since 1994, then, provided local governments with incentives to 
promote construction and infrastructure projects in China’s hastening urbanization.  
     However, it is the huge revenues generated from conversion of farmland to construction 
land that enabled local authorities to be more active in urbanizing China (Kung, Xu & Zhou, 
2013). By converting farmland for a variety of development projects, local governments were 
able to collect fees associated with rural-urban land conversion, as well as the income from 
leasing it, which were then classified as “extra-budgetary” revenues to be claimed by local 
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governments. This income accounts for a high proportion of local states’ revenues. For example, 
the income collected from “extra-budgetary revenues” totaled only 242 billion Yuan nationwide 
between 1987 and 1994, while the amount reached 901 billion Yuan between 2001 and 2003 
(NBS, 2007). On the other hand, local governments’ increasing engagement in auctioning land 
usufruct rights to commercial and real estate usages further squeezed spending on either 
industrial or public welfare projects (Lin & Ho, 2005). 
2.4.1.2 Hukou reforms: a mix of state-led and bottom-up approaches 
     The hukou system was first introduced in the 1950s with two primary purposes (Zhao, 
2005). First, it was initiated to prevent the rural labor force from moving too rapidly into urban 
regions by offering urban citizens the exclusive privilege to be employed in urban labor markets. 
Second, it was adopted to provide basic living and relevant welfare programs to urban residents, 
and, meanwhile, to entitle rural residents with farming rights over rural land. The rationale behind 
its establishment was to guarantee that the national government would be able to feed the nation, 
while promoting industrial development under the constraint of extremely limited food and 
resources. During the specific period of time during which hukou was introduced, the system 
achieved its initial goal; however, it has been showing a negative impact on China’s structural 
reform in transforming from a planned economy to a market economy. Thus, continuous hukou 
reform has accompanied China’s economic transition. Notably, the hukou system is an institution 
associated with a wide range of social functions since its introduction, and thus operates as more 
than a simple population registration policy. In this sense, any attempt to study and reform the 
hukou system needs to review its historical evolution in order to understand how to integrate any 
new reforms into China’s complex economic system (Cai, 2011). Historical hukou reform can be 
broken into three segments according to each important stage of China’s economic transition: the 
early 1980s and the mid-1990s, mid-1990s to 2003, and the post-2003 period.  
 
Incremental hukou reforms: the early 1980s and mid-1990s 
     Until the late 1980s the hukou system was very restrictive, making individual travel 
within China very difficult. People who wanted to travel anywhere else were required to have a 
permission letter issued by the local government. The initial hukou reform demand originated 
from the rural regions (Cheng & Selden, 1994). As one of the most successful bottom-up 
economic innovations in China’s economic reform, the Household Contract Responsibility 
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System (HCRS) increased agricultural productivity profoundly. Consequently, many farmers 
were freed from farming activities and began to seek off-farm work opportunities. The 
development of TVEs generated increasing labor demand for farmers, however, the capacity of 
TVEs for absorbing rural surplus labor was very limited (Oi, 1999). Thus, at this stage, most 
labor migration was from the agricultural sector to non-agricultural sectors, and from villages to 
nearby towns.  
The existing hukou system constrained the mobility of farmers and has therefore been 
challenged by China’s massive rural surplus labor force (Taylor, 1989). Both national and local 
governments had to compromise in order to reconsider the pattern of “leaving the land without 
leaving the countryside.” In 1983 the central government started to allow farmers to work outside 
their own towns, via long-distance transportation. In 1984, the government further deregulated 
institutional constraints to let farmers engage in regular work in nearby towns. In 1988, the hukou 
regulations were further relaxed to allow farmers to engage in enterprises or to run their own 
business in cities, if they could feed themselves (Goldstein, 1995). In the early 1990s, the 
centrally-planned rationing system8 had not yet been abandoned and hukou system reform was, 
therefore, still slow and limited.  
 
Accelerating but limited hukou reforms: from mid 1990s to 2003 
When a market economy was established as the goal of Chinese economic reforms and 
opening-up strategy, it was an important turning point for hukou reform. The major driving force 
for interprovincial labor migration is the combination of the emerging export-oriented sectors in 
the Eastern regions and increasing capital accumulation in urban private sectors (Chan, 1994). 
Accompanied by the growth of labor-intensive industries, female migration also increased 
dramatically. To address these changes in the labor market, a series of policy measures aiming to 
improve labor mobility was undertaken by local governments as a way of promoting economic 
growth. The rationing system, which was considered as one of the main obstacles limiting rural-
urban migration, was firstly eliminated (Bao, Bodvarsson, Hou & Zhao, 2011). In 1998, the 
Ministry of Public Security officially announced that migrant workers’ children could be 																																																								
8 The ration system was imposed in the 1950s to control the production of food and to boost industrialization. Urban 
families were given grain coupons with which they could buy a certain amount of grain at a low state-imposed price. 
Any quantity exceeding the coupon quota would have to be purchased at market price. Meanwhile, farmers could 
only sell their crop at the market price once they had fulfilled the state-imposed quotas. 
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registered under one of the parents’ urban hukou, and couples could change their hukou to reunite 
with urban families. 
However, hukou reform during the 1990s was still very limited, since the core function of 
the hukou system remained unchanged (Cai, 2011). Thus, hukou system continued to create 
social discrimination against migrant workers in the urban labor market and excluded them from 
enjoying local social welfare (Knight et al., 1999). Even when local governments announced that 
they would abandon the hukou system in small towns, these reforms were considered merely 
symbolic, given limited employment opportunities and unequal social welfare rights between 
urban citizens and rural migrants (Wang & Cai, 2010). 
 
New era of hukou reforms: after 2003 
     The year 2003 was a milestone for China’s hukou reform. Many socioeconomic changes 
occurred in the Chinese economy and society, such as the first appearance of a labor shortage in 
coastal export-oriented sectors, an increase in workers’ wages, the decrease of the agricultural 
population, and the governments’ efforts to improve migrant workers’ well-being, rather than 
merely promoting economic growth (Wang & Cai, 2010). The most challenging issue has 
involved the value-added social welfare programs associated with city sizes, where bigger cities 
were reluctant to relax hukou regulation of new residents, due to the perceived high costs of 
social programs (Fan, 2008). No significant reform policies were released to accelerate the 
process of hukou reform aimed at detaching social welfare benefits from local hukou until 2008, 
when the global financial crisis provided an opportunity to accelerate hukou reform (Cai, 2011).  
In 2008, the global financial crisis caused substantial labor shortages in regions where 
export-oriented industries are concentrated. During and after the crisis, most export-oriented 
sectors had difficulty utilizing production factors to re-boost their manufacturing capacity, which 
has exerted great pressure on local governments (Zhu, 2007). To address the labor demand of 
local industries, local governments have been motivated to further relax the hukou system with a 
vision of absorbing and restoring labor force capacity for local economic development (Cai, 
2011). With the same purpose, Guangdong, which was heavily affected by the financial crisis, 
initiated hukou to boost labor supply to its export-oriented sectors. However, for the interior 
regions and other underdeveloped places, land revenue is still the primary incentive for local 
governments to enhance economic development. Thus, hukou reforms are normally tied with 
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rural-urban land conversions in these regions. Chongqing, as an agrarian municipality, thus 
became one of the pioneer cities in hukou reform aiming at promoting integrated rural-urban 
development.  
Given the vast diversity of rural-urban development within China, the degree of hukou 
reform varies from place to place. Since 2003, the central as well as local governments have 
carried out many pilot programs on hukou system reforms. During this stage, governments’ 
incentives for hukou reform were more endogenous and stronger; thus, policy measures became 
more pragmatic and farmer friendly. Hukou reform in some places, such as Chongqing and 
Guangdong, has led to radical changes and achieved great progress; however, the focus is still to 
further relax the hukou system, rather than eliminating it.  
2.4.1.3 Evolution of land tenure system and associated reforms 
Unlike China’s reform in other areas, land tenure practices stand out as an area where 
reforms have been left behind. Aligned with China’s urbanization and hukou reforms presented 
above, changes related to the rural land tenure system are reviewed according to three phrases: 
between 1978 and 1984; from 1985 to 2002; since 2003.  
 
Household Contract Responsibility System: from 1978 to 1984 
After China’s failure to collectivize agriculture through the People’s Commune initiative,9 
there was an imperative need to provide farmers with incentives to produce as well as to increase 
agricultural productivity. China’s reform and opening-up policy, which also generated new 
socioeconomic and political opportunities within the society, enabled farmers to try and find 
effective ways to increase agricultural production. Consequently, in 1979, the early form of the 
HCRS was launched in a village called Xiaogang. The basic idea was to contract plots of land to 
individual farm households by empowering them with some, but not complete rights to the 
contracted land. The excluded land rights were held by collective entities above the household 
level. However, collective ownership was not clearly defined, as who could act as members of 
the collective are not clear. This may be due to path dependency on the preceding People’s 
																																																								
9 The People's Commune, as a large collective unit that consists of smaller farmer collectives, was officially 
launched in 1958. Besides organizing productions, it was also a governmental and political authority before replaced 
by townships in 1983. 
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Commune system and a desire to preserve the socialist characteristics of China’s rural land tenure 
system.  
It is widely accepted that by extending usufruct rights and providing direct incentives to 
farm households for increasing productivity, the HCRS led to significant increases in agricultural 
production and productivity in the initial years. The adoption of HCRS contributed nearly 47% to 
total agricultural growth, while reducing substantially the income gap between rural and urban 
areas between 1978 and 1984 (Wang, 2005).  
In 1982, China’s Constitution (4th edition) further strengthened the public ownership of 
land. It clearly stipulated that all farmland should be owned by rural collectives and all urban and 
non-farmland would be owned by the state. While the state can take farmland from rural 
collectives in the name of the public interest by paying certain articulated forms of compensation, 
rural collectives are not allowed to sell, transfer or change the usage of the land. Since then, the 
ownership and use rights of rural farmlands have been separated. Farmers are allowed to operate 
on the land assigned to them for a specified period of time, but they cannot own the land. 
Although China established a national Land Contracting Law in 1984, which is the cornerstone 
of the development of HCRS, the exact bundle of rights extended to farm households remained 
unclearly defined. Even when farm households were restored as the primary production unit in 
agriculture, they had to confront a new form of tenure insecurity.  
The HCRS is a “bottom-up” institutional change initiated by farmers during China’s early 
transition from a planning economy to a market economy. Since the system was invented by 
farmers and is based on farmers’ interests, it promoted efficiency, which leads directly to the 
dramatic increase of agricultural production between 1979 and 1984.  
 
Slowing down of land tenure reforms: from 1985 to 2002 
After 1985, rural land tenure reform slowed down due to the government’s new focus on 
cities and the diminishing effects of the HCRS on agricultural productivity. Admittedly, by 
providing operational rights to farmers and guaranteeing that they would have complete control 
of their products during its initial period, the HCRS had advantages in increasing agricultural 
production. It did help to elevate the majority of farmers out of poverty. However, due to 
predominant egalitarian principles, farmland was allocated on a per capita basis. This created a 
very fragmented farming environment, with each household managing several plots that 
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altogether added up to only a fraction of a hectare. Due to the dispersive distribution of small 
plots of land and lack of venues for rural-urban and collaborative land transfer, HCRS failed to 
increase total agricultural production consistently, and gradually became a barrier to China’s 
modernization of agriculture, by preventing economies of scale in that sector. 
Meanwhile, China’s rural-urban migration was accelerated by HCRS, releasing abundant 
numbers of people in the rural labor force from farming activities. The out-migration of rural 
laborers resulted in low efficiency in making use of the farmland. Furthermore, the transfer of 
rural homestead and collective construction land was constrained, which caused a huge waste of 
land. To tackle the problem, in 1986, the Land Management Law was adopted, stipulating that 
the use rights of land owned by the state and collectives could be transferrable. In 1988, China’s 
revised Constitution also stated that land could be transferred legally; however, the transfer of 
rural land was still limited. On the other hand, accompanying fast urban economic growth, the so-
called urban land market emerged and began to develop.  
Rapid urban expansion caused the depletion of farmland at an unprecedented rate, 
particularly on the urban fringes where the most productive land was located. As a result, the 
Bureau of Land Administration was established in 1986. The bureau was responsible for and in 
charge of land policy reform, land allocation and acquisition, monitoring of land development, 
comprehensive land-use plans, and implementation of land laws.  
 During this period, HCRS, which was designed under very specific conditions, gradually 
failed to further improve agricultural production. Even though policy responses and relevant laws 
explicitly and continuously extended farm householders’ rights to transfer their land-use rights to 
other families, they failed to provide concrete details on how, and under what circumstances, 
rental transactions could take place. Collective ownership was still not clearly defined. 
 
State-led land conversion: after 2003  
In 2003, the Rural Land Contract Law came into effect, to legally protect farmers’ land-
use rights and to regulate their transfer. It first extended farmers’ contract period from 15 to 30 
years. It further stated that land reallocations at the village level were absolutely prohibited and 
that partial reallocations could only be done under regulated conditions. One of the conditions is 
that partial-land reallocation can be feasible only when two-thirds of individual villagers agree to 
it. Thus, the Law not only increases the security of rural land tenure but also extends decision-
making power to individual farmers, which was denied to all villagers before.  
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In 2007, the party and state passed China’s first Property Law to legalize the ownership of 
private property, which further increased land tenure security in both rural and urban areas. 
Under the Law, farmers can retain and inherit their rights when the 30-year lease period expires. 
Furthermore, for the first time, the Property Law defined China’s farmers’ land use rights as 
usufruct rights, which legally permits better protection of farmers’ interests.   
In 2008, the Central Party Committee passed its Decision on Major Issues Concerning the 
Advancement of Rural Reform and Development, responding to further calls for farmland 
transfer, lease, and exchange options based on market mechanisms. It attempts to give the green 
light to trading off collectively-owned construction land without state acquisition, while 
simultaneously enhancing peasants’ engagement in land transactions. In 2010, Central Party 
Committee Opinions on Scaling Up Integrated Urban-Rural Development (No. 1 File) further 
strengthened land centralized management through registration of contracted land use rights and 
promoting exchange of farmland use rights.  
While all relevant Laws and policies mentioned above were designed to increase farmers’ 
land tenure security in general, the actual effects on protecting and improving farm households’ 
land rights are still quite limited. This result is mainly due to the vague definition of collective 
ownership on rural land and local governments’ monopolies on land requisition, which denies 
farm households’ participation in most policy-making processes. As local states have a monopoly 
over the requisition of collectively owned agricultural land, they are highly motivated to transfer 
state-owned land to private developers in order to take advantage of high land-leasing revenue. 
Thus, it is not surprising to see land-leasing revenue credits accounting for a large proportion of 
the fiscal income for local governments. The revenue from land conversion, in turn, has fueled 
China’s land urbanization and produced a dramatic reduction of farmland in recent years, and the 
dissolution of thousands of rural villages. 
The rapid reduction of farmland has alarmed top officials who believe that national food 
security is very important to maintaining not only sovereignty, but also social stability. The state 
council responded to the fast depletion of agricultural land by initiating the Decision of the State 
Council on Deepening Reform and Strengthening Land Administration in 2004. To ensure that 
construction land in urban and rural areas does not increase to the extent that it has detrimental 
effects on the total arable land necessary for national food security, the central government 
implemented a policy that links rural and urban “construction land” quotas in 2005. Under this 
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policy, the only way for local governments to extract land revenue is to use the available quota of 
rural reclamation land in exchange for an equal amount of urban construction land quota. 
Although the state has officially set quotas on land conversion, local governments have strong 
incentives to circumvent the law (Ong, 2014). In 2008, Measures for the Administration of the 
Trial Work of Linking the Increase in Land Used for Urban Construction with the Decrease in 
Land Used for Rural Construction were initiated to further constrain local governments from 
transferring agricultural land to non-agricultural usage.  
Besides implementing a series of policies to prevent depletion of arable land, since 2003, 
the central government has also conducted several pilot programs to find effective ways of 
reserving national agricultural land while promoting economic growth. Due to China’s uneven 
economic development levels, with coastal provinces at a more advanced, and inland provinces at 
a less developed level, motivations informing rural land reforms in each region are different. For 
coastal provinces, local governments are more motivated to convert agricultural land to non-
agricultural usage, due to the high value of urban construction land. For inner provinces, an 
imbalanced rural-urban development model featuring under-developed urban industrialization 
and a large rural labor surplus is still present. 
The land voucher program initiated in Chongqing involves reallocating plots of land 
vacated by urbanized rural families. The motivation for Chongqing’s municipal government to do 
so is the unified utilization of the quota of land vacated by rural-urban migrants. With the 
application of the land voucher system, land use and development are unified on a citywide basis, 
by linking rural and urban construction quotas to promote development in both areas. Sale of 
publically managed land vouchers, obtained through hukou transfer, generates revenues to be 
invested in housing and social programs, thereby ensuring that farmers who transfer to urban 
hukou have access to social welfare.  
2.4.2 Disconnection between China’s current and proposed urbanization models 
 Through this brief retrospective of China’s historical urbanization processes, it is clear 
that local governments have been playing key roles in shaping China’s current urbanization status. 
In most cases, farmers, who are the subject of urbanization, are excluded from decision-making 
processes at all levels. This distorted urbanization pattern can be addressed by engaging the 
state’s role, hukou and land tenure reforms in light of the alternative urbanization framework 
modeled by Chongqing.  
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 Since 1978, economic development has been at the top of the agenda for China. 
Promoting economic growth is the predominant motivation behind China’s rural industrialization 
and its continuing transition from rural industrialization to urbanization. During the period of 
rural industrialization, gradually increasing rural-urban migration was the by-product of both the 
development of Town and Village Enterprises (TVEs) and the Household Contract 
Responsibility System (HCRS). As indicated, local officials were motivated to promote the 
development of TVEs in efforts to improve local economic performance. In this context, farmers 
were treated as the labor supply for the TVEs, while their mobilization was very limited, due to 
the hukou system.  
 The initial application of HCRS improved total agricultural productivity, which in turn 
released farmers from farming activities. When the increased number of migrants exceeds the 
labor demand of TVEs, local authorities are forced to relax the hukou system to some extent in 
order to accommodate migrating farmers. Under this regulatory regime, farmers are neither de 
jure nor de facto empowered to migrate permanently between rural and urban areas.  
Since 1994, fiscal recentralization has gradually directed local governments to engage in 
promoting construction and infrastructure projects, which has resulted in the current urbanization 
of rural land. This urbanization pattern distinguishes China from the rest of the world, where 
urbanization is about transferring rural populations to urban sites. In the context of China, 
farmers, whose land rights are not clearly defined, are considered attached to the land. The direct 
result is that China’s farmers are further marginalized and excluded from policy-making 
processes and from sharing the benefits of on-going urbanization. Even though continuous moral 
justifications have led to modifications of the hukou and land tenure systems, a key incentive for 
the central government is still based on economic growth, while retaining CPC power. Since 
local states have a monopoly on land requisition and the enormous revenue from converting 
agricultural land to urban construction usage, they are not easily persuaded to transfer urban 
hukou identity and associated benefits to farmers. One possible explanation is that land 
conversion is beneficial to local states while transforming farmers to urban citizens is seen as a 
financial burden.  
Thus, the interaction between the state and farmers is unilateral, where the state has 
absolute power over farmers. Unless farmers can hold the government accountable to some 
extent, inclusive development with mutual benefits may not be generated. Under the current 
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political environment in China, it is only possible for local states to begin to extend hukou 
franchise to farmers when their mutual benefit is fulfilled. In this sense, use of rural land that 
connects the economic and social interests of both the state and farmers is a potential option. This 
perspective is confirmed by land conversion that happens in most urban fringes where the state is 
motivated by high land revenue to transform local farmers to urban citizens. In some cases, the 
value-added land enables farmers to negotiate with the local state for terms that favor both parties. 
A similar but radical mechanism applies to the majority of farmers that live far away from urban 
centers. An integrated rural-urban land market that connects rural land with urban market prices 
may have empowering effects on farmers’ roles in negotiating with the state, even when they live 
at a distance from urban centers.  
Furthermore, to identify the different degree of possible empowerment of farmers 
between the two patterns of urbanization, a comparison between the current land-driven and 
farmer-oriented urbanization is conducted. As shown in Table 2.1, the role of the state, hukou 
system, land tenure system and farmers are presented, according to the three stages of 
empowerment: existence of choice, use of choice, and outcome of choice. In the case of China’s 
current urbanization model, even when there are opportunities through which farmers may make 
strategic life decisions between rural and urban destinations, the existing institutions and state 
authorities act to prevent farmers from actually making use of those opportunities. This may be 
due mainly to the fact that farmers’ well-being is neither the first priority for the local state, nor is 
their inclusion valued in national policy processes. Thus, it is not surprising to note that diverse 
outcomes of choice exist, due to farmers’ different capacities for making use of the available 
opportunities.  
As to the people-oriented urbanization framework operating in Chongqing, the state’s 
policy, centered on farmers, is designed to facilitate farmers’ empowerment during the 
urbanization process. Furthermore, policy decentralization allows the state to adjust policy 
practices to reflect farmers’ needs. In this sense, the government not only provides farmers with 
the opportunity to choose but also makes sure that farmers are able to make use of the available 
choices. This may still lead to different outcomes due to farmers’ different levels of assets and 
capability. However, the equal opportunity for farmers to identify and use the choice to shift the 
site of their livelihood in order to achieve the goals they want is the key difference between the 
two patterns of urbanization.  
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Table 2.1 Comparison between China's current and proposed urbanization 
 China's Current Urbanization China's People-Oriented Urbanization 
Existence of Choice  
State Commit to integrated rural-urban 
development; policy centered on itself  
Commit to integrated rural-urban 
development; policy centered on farmers 
Hukou system Moving from exclusion to partial 
integration of farmers in urban areas 
Full integration of farmers in urban areas 
Land tenure system Leading to unequal land revenue sharing 
between the state and farmers  
Extending farmers' land rights and 
improving land benefits sharing 
Farmer (migrant) Opportunity to freely migrate between 
rural and urban destinations but with 
limited access to urban welfare  
Opportunity to freely migrate and settle 
down between rural and urban 
destinations 
Use of Choice   
State Further exclusion; piecemeal policy 
responses  
Further inclusion; a holistic policy 
approach  
Hukou system Hukou transfer with costs (i.e. land 
rights); unequal opportunity and welfare 
as local citizens 
Hukou transfer without costs; Equal 
opportunity and welfare as local citizens 
Land tenure system State is supreme to farmers' rights; 
administrative measures discourage rural 
land market 
Return land rights to farmers; integrated 
rural-urban land market 
Farmer (migrant) Cannot make effective decisions between 
rural and urban destinations constrained 
by resources and institutional structure; 
try to obtain comparative advantages 
between rural and urban regions 
Can utilize available resources to make 
their strategic decisions between rural 
and urban destinations 
Outcome of Choice  
State Compelling, self-interest maximizing and 
inclusion 
Facilitating, accountability and inclusion  
Hukou system State-led reforms excluding farmers Farmer-oriented reforms coordinated 
with land tenure system 
Land tenure system State-led reforms strengthening the 
unequal positions between the state and 
farmers 
Farmer-oriented reforms coordinated 
with hukou system 
Farmer (migrant) Urban citizens (very few); circular 
migrant workers (substantial); mix of 
peasant farmers (large)* 
Urban citizens and professional farmers 
*In the case of land requisition and high-density resettlement, farmers are forced to become citizens and "farming 
workers" with no choice. Thus, farmers in these situations are not included in the table. Notably, due to individual 
farmers' different level of assets and capabilities their ability to use their choices is also diverse. While admitting 
there are other possibilities, only three general outcomes are presented here. 
Source: Compiled by the author  
 Case Study of Chongqing 2.5
 Chongqing city plays an important role in China’s current and future reform and 
restructuring. It is one of the central municipalities with a big rural population and has been a 
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pioneer in experimenting with and adopting innovative ways of realizing integrated rural-urban 
development, while providing new insights into national practices. Admitting its efforts and 
success in some key fields, there are divergent opinions on Chongqing’s practices. Some scholars 
argue that Chongqing’s practice relies heavily on the strong role of the government and may not 
sustain itself in the long run (Miller, 2012; Wen, 2014), while others consider Chongqing’s 
experience to have break-through significance for China’s balanced growth (Huang, 2011; Zhou, 
2014). Rather than evaluating specific aspects of Chongqing’s pilot practices, this study tries to 
extract key insights from Chongqing’s series of coordinated institutional reform policies. Thus, 
the case study’s objective is first to show the rationale behind Chongqing’s policy design and 
implementation as related to its comprehensive hukou reform; then, the study attempts to 
describe the interaction between the local policy dynamics and current urbanization practices, 
through which the logic behind Chongqing’s comprehensive hukou reform is shown.  
2.5.1 General information on Chongqing 
Chongqing is located in Southwestern China, as shown in Figure 2.3. It is one of the four 
central municipalities in China that are directly under the central government's administration as 
well as having local autonomy. Unlike its national counterparts, Chongqing is a city-province 
with a metropolitan core of 648 km2 and a vast rural area of nearly 81,000km2, which is more 
than two times the total area of the other three centrally-managed municipalities. In 2015, 
Chongqing’s total population was 33 million, with 20 million agricultural and 13 million non-
agricultural citizens, respectively. 
Due to its important geographical location, Chongqing has long been the economic and 
political center that bridges Western and Eastern regions of China.  In recent years, Chongqing 
has gained an international as well as domestic reputation due to the so-called “Chongqing 
model.” The model refers to a series of policies addressing complexities in the social, economic 
and political systems through flexible policy designs and reforms, which promotes local 
economic growth and also brings equitable development to the city.  
In 2007, Chongqing was selected as one of the pilot regions for experimenting with 
national integrated rural-urban development. This outcome motivates Chongqing to spend more 
efforts on furthering hukou reform, both to balance rural-urban development and specifically to 
improve the overall well-being of farmers, while promoting the local economy. Through the 
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years, Chongqing has been given much discretion and support from the central government, 
which allows it to try new ideas without too much constraint.  
 
Figure 2.3 Chongqing's geographic location in China 
 
Source: Derived from Hua (2014) 
Later in 2007, Chongqing initiated its pilot hukou reform in Jiulongpo district, wishing to 
hasten rural-urban hukou transfer. However, the reform did not achieve the expected outcome, 
due to its requirement that farmers give up land rights when transferring to urban hukou status. 
To improve land use efficiency in rural areas, Chongqing set up the nation’s first land exchange 
market to facilitate land voucher transactions in 2008. Through the exchange of rural-urban land 
quota at competitive market prices, rural collectives and farmers obtained much higher land 
revenue than before. The increased land profit motivates farmers to engage increasingly in the 
trade of abandoned collective construction land and homesteads for land quotas.  
In 2010, Chongqing implemented the first public housing project in China. The project 
was designed to accommodate low-income groups of people, disregarding their hukou status. By 
2013, nearly 52% of the residents were migrant workers, and 36% of the total was local urbanites.  
In August 2010, Chongqing also adopted comprehensive hukou reform, wishing to 
facilitate migrant workers’ hukou transfer. Unlike any other hukou reforms in China, 
Chongqing’s reform adopted a holistic approach that went beyond the standard hukou system, 
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integrating land, housing, and social security systems into the policy design. The plan for the first 
phase was to transfer 3 million migrant rural workers to urban citizenship during 2010 to 2011. 
By the end of 2011, more than 3.1 million new urban citizens lived in Chongqing. In 2015, 
Chongqing’s nominal urbanization rate reached 61%, representing 30 million urban residents. In 
the same year, the built-up urban area increased 50-60 km2, which was at a compatible rate with 
the increase of new urban dwellers, now around 500,000-600,000 for the year.  
2.5.2 Key policy events in Chongqing’s comprehensive hukou reform 
 In this section, historical policy events related to Chongqing’s comprehensive hukou 
reform are shown as follows: Chongqing’s pilot hukou reform in Jiulongpo district in 2007; the 
establishment of the land voucher system in 2008; the public rental housing project in 2010; and 
Chongqing’s Comprehensive Planning for Rural-Urban Hukou Reform in 2010. Each policy 
event is presented below, highlighting the objectives and outcomes of policy models.  
2.5.2.1 Pilot hukou reform in Jiulongpo 
 
Background 
In 2007, urban citizens with hukou only constituted 27% of the total 32 million 
population of Chongqing. The income gap between the surrounding rural and urban regions was 
1:4. In May 2007, Jiulongpo district was selected as the first demonstration area for Chongqing’s 
comprehensive plan of balancing urban and rural development. In June, the central government 
approved Chongqing Municipality as the pilot region for comprehensive reform of rural-urban 
integration. The purpose was to enable Chongqing to take the lead in exploring ways of 
establishing an institutional model that promotes integrated rural-urban development.  
 
Objectives 
Jiulongpo’s hukou reform objective was designed to seek possible ways of enhancing 
Chongqing’s urbanization through experimental reforms in hukou policy and exchange practices 
within the region. The goal was to improve rural-urban livelihood through integrated reforms of 
hukou, land tenure, public finance, rural credit, public administration and social security systems. 
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Highlights of the policy 
• Farmers, who earn stable non-agricultural revenue and would like to give up their 
farmland and homesteads, are allowed to become newly registered urban citizens.  
• The village is the basic unit for hukou transfer; all who live in the same villages have 
the chance to become new citizens and live in concentrated settlement zones in urban 
areas  
• New urbanites can enjoy equal basic public services with local citizens 
 
Outcome 
The hukou reform in Jiulongpo was limited in both magnitude and area. The expected 
outcome was not achieved due partly to the unmatched motivations between the government and 
farmers’ needs and interests, where farmers are reluctant to exchange land for their urban hukou 
identity. Other reasons may include the high threshold for hukou transfer, mandated 
abandonment of land rights after getting urban hukou, unaffordable housing prices, and 
discrimination against rural citizens newly transferred to urban hukou. 
2.5.2.2 Chongqing’s land voucher program 
 
Background 
Due to local governments’ monopoly position in land conversion, it is possible for local 
states to appropriate rural land freely. To ensure the total arable land necessary for national grain 
security, the central government implemented a policy that links rural and urban “construction 
land” quotas since 2005 (Ministry of Land and Resources, 2005). With strict central control over 
arable land use, the only way that local governments can exploit land is to reclaim plots of 
contracted arable land or abandoned housing sites as urban land, and use urban land quotas to 
balance the reclamation and exploitation of rural lands. This policy does limit the local state’s 
motivation for infinite land acquisition. However, it does not provide strong incentives for the 
state to pay attention to the quality of reclaimed land. Furthermore, due to the lack of a land 
exchange market for rural land, the benefits from rural-urban land conversion are not evenly 
distributed between rural and urban regions.  
Chongqing city is located in a mountainous area, which means it has very limited land for 
either urban usage or rural agriculture. On the other hand, as farmers migrate or settle down in 
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urban areas, they leave behind or abandon their residential units in rural areas. To mitigate the 
conflict between increasing land demand for urban development and unused rural land resources, 
Chongqing began to seek an alternative solution to linking rural and urban land quotas in an 
effective way. In 2008, Chongqing’s Rural Land Exchange was set up to facilitate land voucher 
transactions between rural and urban regions. One year later, the State Council issued Opinions 
on Accelerating Chongqing’s Integrated Rural-Urban Reform and Development in order to 
officially recognize Chongqing’s Land Voucher program. 
 
Objectives 
To improve the land use efficiency in both rural and urban areas while reserving arable land 
 
Highlights of the policy 
• Local governments compensate for plots of contracted arable land and housing sites 
based on land expropriation regulations and the current price of urban land vouchers.  
• As converting housing sites to arable land must be reclaimed in their original 
localities, their land use quota is traded within the municipality, and the quota may be 
used as construction land in other parts of the municipality.  
• Transferred households can reserve their claiming rights of land for 3 years, so that 
they can return to their previous status if they want.  
 
Outcome 
By 2014, the total transaction of land vouchers reached 24,000 acres, generating 30 
billion Yuan (4.6 billion dollars) of capital, from which 75% of the total goes to rural collectives 
and individual farmers. The land voucher program improves land use efficiency between rural 
and urban Chongqing, and improves farmers’ share of land benefits through the land market.  
2.5.2.3 Public rental housing in Chongqing 
 
Background 
As Chongqing’s hukou reform deepens, how to accommodate increasing urban residents, 
including migrant workers, new university graduates and other low-income people, become 
pressing issues for the government. To reconcile and accommodate the enormous amount of 
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population transfer, the city has undertaken extensive research on possible ways to move forward 
since late 2009. In July 2010, guided by Interim Measures on Management of public rental 
housing in Chongqing, Chongqing established its first Bureau of Public Housing Administration, 
especially to manage public housing projects. In later July, the Ministry of Housing and Urban-
Rural Development of PRC (MOHURD) issued Guiding Opinions on Accelerating the 
Development of Public Rental Housing, which set up a national plan to build 36 million units of 
subsidized housing by 2015.  
 
Objectives: 
Public rental housing is used to accommodate local citizens as well as existing migrant 
workers. More specifically, Chongqing finished 30 million m2 of subsidized public rental housing 
during the first period from 2010 to 2012, while continuing to provide another 10 million m2 until 
2020. 
 
Highlights of the policy: 
• Rental units are open to any low-income individuals or family regardless of their 
hukou status 
• With units at 40-60 m2, the project can provide housing for nearly 800,000 
households or 2.4 million people 
• Rent is normally 60% of the market price 
• After living there for 5 years, a unit can be purchased by the individual; however, the 
housing cannot be sold to the market 
 
Outcome 
By 2013, Chongqing had completed 40 million m2 of public rental housing, which 
accommodates 630,000 people in 240,000 units (Chongqing Bureau of Public Housing 
Administration, 2012). Through the public housing program, Chongqing established a two-track 
system of housing supply between the government and market. While some of the benefits may 
have accrued to those with influence in the society, the fact remains that substantial improvement 
in conditions for rural to urban migration was achieved. 
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2.5.2.4 Chongqing’s comprehensive hukou reform 
 
Background 
Since Chongqing was chosen as the Experimental Zone of Integrated Rural-Urban 
Development, it has been testing and initiating a series of institutional and policy changes, in 
such areas as hukou, land tenure system, social security and public housing. The accumulated 
experience in these fields enables Chongqing to further reform the hukou system, which is 
considered as key barriers of enhancing integrated rural-urban development. Consequently, in 
2010, the Chongqing government issued Recommendations Regarding Comprehensive Planning 
for Rural-Urban Hukou Reform.  
 
Objectives 
 The project is designed to address the various inequalities that farmers face in the process 
of hukou transfer and to improve the living standards of rural people by reducing the massive 
labor surplus in rural Chongqing. 
 
Highlights of the policy 
• A policy package that integrates previous and current policy reforms in hukou, land 
tenure, social security, rural credit market, public finance and public administration 
systems 
• Migrant workers who have worked and undertaken business for a certain period of 
time, bought a house, invested, or who pay taxes of a certain amount in the 
destination cities are eligible to obtain local hukou status and to receive equal access 
to social welfare programs, such as social insurance, public rental housing, education 
and medical care 
• New citizens can keep rights to their farmland and rural homestead for at least 3 years 
 
Outcome 
 During 2010 and 2011, 3 million migrant workers transferred to urban hukou. By 2014, 4 
million farmers as well as migrant workers had registered as urban citizens. The rural-urban 
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migration and integration to urban areas continues to increase without pressing Chongqing’s 
public finances (Chongqing Bureau of Statistics, 2009-2012). 
2.5.2.5 Mapping the dynamics of Chongqing’s hukou reform 
Chongqing’s comprehensive hukou reform takes a holistic approach, focusing on the 
coordination among hukou, land tenure, social security, financing and public housing reforms. 
More specifically, the outcome of Chongqing’s hukou reform is based on the joint forces of its 
existing land voucher program, public housing policy and newly adopted hukou policy.  
The land voucher program initiated in 2008 was a starting point for Chongqing’s hukou 
reform. In Figure 2.4, “Linkage of rural-urban land quota” and “Linkage of rural-urban land 
quota through the market” together describe the land voucher program. The exchange of rural-
urban land quota through a land exchange market expanded individual farmers’ assets and 
capability to make strategic life choices, and also provided the state with sufficient land reserves 
and financing measures for later policy initiatives aiming at improving farmers’ welfare. Through 
the land exchange market, collective construction land - including farmers’ old homesteads and 
other abandoned land - can be capitalized at a price equivalent to an urban market price. In this 
way, farmers not only enjoy additional arable land, but also share in the increased land revenue. 
Admittedly, the land exchange market is not a fully functional market, as it is still strictly 
controlled by the local government. However, the state is not competing with farmers for the land 
benefits. Rather, Chongqing’s government enacts its sovereignty to protect farmers’ land rights 
and guarantee that land reclamation procedures are strictly carried out. Furthermore, the frequent 
engagement of the state-owned corporations in the bidding process, which is normally criticized 
as presenting extensive administrative influence on public affairs, actually enables Chongqing to 
have sufficient land reserves for public usage.  
Abundant land reserves have allowed Chongqing to implement the biggest public housing 
project in China, building 30 million m2 of subsidized public rental housing from 2010 to 2012. 
The land reserves also enabled Chongqing to extend public housing to all low-income groups of 
people, disregarding their hukou status. According to DRC’s (2011) report, affordable housing 
was a critical factor for migrant workers seeking to settle down in destination cities. Thus, 
Chongqing’s public housing project provides migrant workers as well as farmers with a strong 
“pulling” force to move their livelihood to urban Chongqing. Moreover, the coexistence of public 
and commercial housing also creates a “two-track housing system” in Chongqing, which enables 
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the government to manage the price of real estate through the balancing provision of public 
housing. Hence, even though Chongqing’s government still plays a critical role in land 
requisition and holds massive land reserves, local farmers as well as migrants do not face rapidly 
rising housing costs. Rather, they can either purchase commercial space or rent public housing in 
order to settle down in cites.  
 
Figure 2.4 Mapping Chongqing's comprehensive hukou reform 
Source: Adapted from Chongqing’s Comprehensive Hukou Reform Plan (2010) 
Consequently, the land voucher and public housing program became the foundation for 
Chongqing’s comprehensive hukou reform in 2010. Unlike hukou reforms in other regions of 
China, Chongqing offers equal public services to migrant workers as well as farmers, as 
compared with local citizens. Furthermore, Chongqing allows farmers to transfer their hukou 
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without giving up their rural land entitlement for at least three years. These two measures expand 
farmers’ agency to some extent so that they can choose to settle down in either urban or rural 
regions, a choice which was not available to farmers during China’s previous hukou reforms.  
In retrospect, Chongqing’s hukou reform has become a dynamic process engaging the 
local state, farmers and market forces to continuously expand the agency of individual farmers as 
well as migrant workers, so that they are able to make decisions on whether to lead their life and 
livelihood in rural or urban areas. The underlying motivation for the Chongqing government to 
initiate these policies on land and hukou reforms is gradually “returning rights and endowing land 
with rights.” (Huang, 2011) What is more important is that Chongqing’s government is not only 
willing to decentralize its authority to engage farmers, but is also committed to implementing 
policies that address farmers’ needs. 
2.5.3 Empirical evidence on Chongqing’s comprehensive hukou reforms 
After examining the dynamics of Chongqing’s comprehensive hukou reform, it is 
necessary to link the policy conceptualization with practice by seeking empirical evidence 
regarding the relationship between each policy and its impact on ordinary farmers, as well as on 
migrant households’ decisions regarding best pathways to pursuing their private life in either 
urban or rural regions. Instead of measuring de facto decision-outcomes of individual households, 
historical data about urban populations, non-agricultural populations,10 public spending on 
livelihood11 and public rental housing at different levels of the territory are used as an 
approximate measurement.  
2.5.3.1 Impacts of hukou policies on Chongqing’s urban population 
To better capture urban population trends in Chongqing, a comparison of urban 
population levels is first conducted between Chongqing and the nation. Urbanization level is 
normally calculated based on the proportion of urban residents to the total population (NBS, 
2010). Urban residents are defined as those who live in cities for at least 6 months of the year 
(NBS, 2005a). In this sense, the urbanization level measures the total amount of people who live 
																																																								
10 Non-agricultural population refers to urban residents who have urban hukou and engage in non-agricultural 
production.  
11 Public spending on livelihood includes public expenditure on education, income, social security, and public health 
(NBS, 200).		
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in the city for at least six months within a year rather than representing the real urbanized rate of 
people who obtain a local hukou identity.  
As shown in Figure 2.5, Chongqing presents a much steeper increase in urban population 
than the nation from 2007 to 2014. One possible explanation could be the local relaxation of the 
hukou system, since it is widely accepted that hukou poses hardships for those migrants who 
want to settle in destination cities (Chan & Buckingham, 2008). Through the years, Chongqing 
focused on promoting the local economy while continuously relaxing the hukou system to extend 
social services to local urban residents, disregarding their hukou identity. For example, one of 
Chongqing’s policies on public housing is to charge 1 Yuan (about 0.15 USD) for each migrant 
worker’s monthly rent. The extension of basic public services, like public housing, to urban 
residents is definitely attractive to potential migrant workers and enables them to secure a better 
livelihood in Chongqing. Hukou reforms in other provinces do not have the same magnitude as in 
Chongqing. As a result, Chongqing is becoming increasingly attractive to rural migrants, both 
socially and economically. 
 
Figure 2.5 Percentage of urban and non-agricultural of total population 
 
Source: China Year Book (2008-2015), Chongqing Year Book (2008-2015) 
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The impact of Chongqing’s hukou reform on its urban population becomes more clear 
and significant, when comparing the trends of urban non-agricultural population and urban 
residential levels between it and the nation. It is believed that the increase of the non-agricultural 
population in China is mainly due to the hukou transfer of migrant workers as well as farmers 
(Cai, 2011). By differentiating the non-agricultural population and urban residents, Cai (2011) 
found that the national growth of urban populations was generally faster than of non-agricultural 
populations from 1990 to 2009. More specifically, the gap between the two rates has been 
widening dramatically since 1995.  
As Figure 5 shows, Chongqing’s urban population growth presents a steeper increase than 
the national average level but its non-agricultural population also demonstrates sharper growth 
than for the nation. Furthermore, unlike the widening gap between the rate of urban and 
registered populations at the national level, Chongqing shows a slight convergence between the 
two rates. This trend reflects some unique features of Chongqing’s hukou reform.  
 In the case of Chongqing, there was a big leap in the non-agricultural population rate 
between 2009 and 2011, which was right after Chongqing’s adoption of its comprehensive hukou 
reform in 2010. Notably, since 2012, the growth of registered urban residents now increases 
flatly. The sharp contrast in growth rates before and after 2012 may be due to the fact that 
Chongqing’s hukou relaxation successfully attracted the targeted population to transfer their rural 
to urban hukou, and the remaining farmers and migrant workers were able to make their own 
decisions on whether to transfer their hukou, since Chongqing’s hukou reform promises to entitle 
newcomers with equal benefits, as for local citizens. More specifically, Chongqing’s hukou 
reform aims at transferring those who already live in the urban areas and are most likely to settle 
down in the city, including students, small business owners and migrant workers. Thus, the sharp 
increase of registered local residents from 2010 to 2011 marks the outcome of the targeted 
population transferring their hukou to cities. This result also shows that Chongqing’s hukou 
reform, at this stage, is very effective in facilitating and transforming people’s intentions into 
actual actions. 
After the initial hukou transfer of the majority, there may be two additional contributors 
to the flatter increase in the non-agricultural population since 2012. One is that the rest of the 
targeted population may be below the threshold of quick hukou transfer, or they are uncertain 
about their future urban lives due to their relatively insufficient resources and skills. Thus, the 
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growth of registered urbanites presents a slow but nevertheless steady increase. Another case may 
be that most farmers staying behind are cautious about their decisions on whether to transfer their 
rural to urban hukou, or are staying in rural areas to maintain their daily livelihoods and local 
connections. Even though urban hukou provides much more than they used to have, it is still 
difficult for them to quit the life style they have been used to for years. Furthermore, there may 
be a continuous struggle for farm households that have more need for dependents, resources, 
skills and laborers on the farm.  
Unlike hukou reforms in other regions, the Chongqing government provides new citizens 
with equal and extended public services, without strong enforcement of rural-urban boundaries. 
Given that there is no significant cost associated with farmers’ decisions, farmers either take time 
to make their final choices or to change their decisions afterward. Thus, a modest and dynamic 
redistribution between rural and urban regions is obtained. 
2.5.3.2 Changes in public spending on livelihood  
Studies have shown that one of the reasons that local states are not willing to make 
substantial improvements to the hukou system is the associated costs of transferring migrants as 
well as farmers to urban citizenship (DRC, 2011). Based on DRC’s (2011) calculation, the short-
term cost for urbanizing one migrant worker was around 24,000 Yuan while the long-term cost 
for the state was 80,000 Yuan, based on data available from 2009. In this sense, public spending 
on livelihood, which is the key component of the short-term cost, should have increased as 
Chongqing initiated hukou relaxation in 2010.  
However, according to Figure 6, the public spending on livelihood at the end of 2010 was 
less than 2009 and it kept falling through 2011. Chongqing’s public spending on livelihood is 
higher than the average level in China between 2008 and 2010, while its spending is now lower 
than the national level, using data from 2011 to 2014. This may be because the core function of 
the 2010 comprehensive hukou reform was to create a positive policy environment for farmers by 
synthesizing existing policy innovations in the field of land tenure, social security, and education. 
What this means is that up-front spending may be higher, but the cost gradually decreases when 
the majority of migrant workers become new urban citizens, since the increased tax revenue and 
consumption power from these new citizens offset the total costs of governments’ spending on 
livelihood. In this sense, the fluctuation of Chongqing’s spending on livelihood between 2007 
and 2014 reflects the different stages of Chongqing’s hukou reform process.  
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While Chongqing’s non-agricultural population has increased dramatically from 29% in 
2009 to 40.63% in 2014, the spending of Chongqing on citizen livelihood does not increase 
dramatically, given the relatively flat curve of its spending on livelihood. As shown in Figure 2.6, 
in 2014, while Chongqing’s spending on livelihood surpassed the national level, both show an 
increase since 2013. The convergence of increasing livelihood spending may demonstrate that 
there may be an agreement on the importance of improving people’s welfare among governments. 
If this is the case, it may be due to the shift of policy and public discourse from economy-focused 
to people-oriented development.  
 
Figure 2.6 Percentage of livelihood spending of total public spending 
 
Source: China Year Book (2008-2015), Chongqing Year Book (2008-2015) 
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accommodate nearly 2 million residents in 3 years. As shown in Figure 2.7, Chongqing’s public 
spending rate for affordable housing jumped from 4.5% to 6% between 2010 and 2011, then 
decreased gradually to about 5.8% in 2012 and dropped sharply to 2.5% in 2013.  
According to Chongqing Bureau of Statistics (2014), the sharp decrease in spending was 
due to the completion of most of the public housing projects at the end of 2013. Chongqing 
witnessed a dramatic increase in its non-agricultural population as well as its urban population 
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during the same period. It can also be seen that Chongqing’s spending on affordable housing 
combined is nearly 2% higher than the national level. This is mainly due to Chongqing’s 
commitment to spending on public housing projects. In this sense, the public housing program, as 
a key component of Chongqing’s hukou reform, may be effective in relocating new citizens to 
urban areas. Admittedly, from 2010 to 2012, Chongqing’s spending on public housing was quite 
high compared to its counterparts in other regions. However, it is not significantly higher, taking 
its total spending on livelihood into account as shown in Figure 2.7. This further confirms that 
although the up-front costs of setting the initial stage for engaging farmers in hukou reform may 
be high, the long-term costs may be absorbed and shared among key players, when policy 
programs are pushed forward in a coordinated way.  
 
Figure 2.7 Percentage of total public spending on affordable housing 
 
Source: China Year Book (2008-2015), Chongqing Year Book (2008-2015) 
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government is willing to return land rights and associated revenue to farmers (migrants), when 
most local states are motivated to extract land revenue by displacing farmers.  
 Chongqing’s policy package fully utilizes the leverage of the existing institutional 
arrangements of the hukou and land tenure systems together with innovative housing programs to 
facilitate social welfare, while expanding farmers’ choices, thereby inducing farmers to reveal 
their capacities and interests, such as their ability to earn a living in cities and their residential 
preferences. Chongqing’s policy package has also proven to be financially affordable, based on 
historical data on livelihood spending from 2007 to 2014. This clears past concerns about 
providing farmers with full hukou status and sharing land revenue as a cost that exceeds what 
local states can afford, which have limited the extent of reforms in hukou and land systems 
elsewhere. Chongqing’s case also confirms that further policy decentralization to expand farmers’ 
agency does not necessarily result in chaos or social instability; rather, it can ultimately reduce 
the local government’s administrative costs as well as enhance the reform process. The case study 
of Chongqing’s comprehensive hukou reform is shown in details in Table 2.2. 
 
Table 2.2 Summary of Chongqing’s farmer-oriented hukou reform 
 Chongqing's Hukou Reform Supporting Evidence 
Existence of Choice  
State Selected as the experimental zone of 
integrated rural-urban reform in 2008 
Pilot hukou reform in Jiulongpo to seek 
innovative way of integrated rural-urban 
development 
Hukou system Comprehensive hukou reform in 2010 By 2011, 3 million farmers should be 
transferred to urban citizens 
Land tenure system Land voucher program in 2008 To improve land efficiency through land 
"market" 
Farmer (migrant) Migrant workers can transfer to urban 
citizens while receiving revenue through 
land voucher program 
Migrants are the targeted population of 
the first phase of hukou reform in 2010 
Use of Choice   
State Public housing project in 2010 Migrants occupy 52% of the total 
residents 
Hukou system Transfer hukou without giving up land 
rights; equal public services 
Continuously higher urban population 
rate than national level 
Land tenure system Clarification of land use, transfer rights & 
capitalize farmers' land through land 
market 
In total, 9,200 ha land has been traded 
and the total transaction value reaches 28 
billion Yuan from 2008 to 2014 
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Farmer (migrant) Transfer hukou identity and engage in 
land voucher transaction 
Increase of urban and non-agricultural 
population by 10% and 11% from 2010 
to 2014; 21 billion Yuan of land value 
goes back to rural collectives as well as 
individual farmers 
Outcome of Choice  
State Taking control in land requisition, 
reclamation and conversion while land 
revenue sharing 
Spending on livelihood remains 
consistent around 40% of the total budget 
Hukou system Merely identity registration system Annual increase of 500,000-600,000 
urban population 
Land tenure system "Quasi" land exchange market Annual increase of 500,000-600,000 km2 
urban built-up area 
Farmer (migrant) Self-determination between rural and 
urban destinations 
By 2011, 3.1 million farmers (migrants) 
have become urban citizens; land and 
human urbanization both grow at a 
compatible rate 
Source: Compiled by the author  
 Conclusion and policy implications  2.6
This chapter addresses one aspect of the question of whether and how China may pass 
over the middle-income trap to become a high-income country, through economic policy reforms 
that promote urbanization with a view to wider sharing of prosperity. Then, it goes beyond that 
question to identify how inclusion and sustainability might be approached in urbanization 
processes, by focusing on a case study of Chongqing as compared to the wider national context. 
As previously argued, inclusion and sustainability are considered key factors for China’s 
transformation from land-centered urbanization toward more people-oriented urbanization. 
Borrowing lessons from international and domestic contexts, characteristics of people-oriented 
urbanization in China are sketched, focusing on the empowerment of farmer households. The 
resulting policy framework is first evaluated in comparison with China’s historical and current 
urbanization patterns. It is revealed that adopting a farmer-oriented model has some common 
ground in China’s overall historical experience. Meanwhile, it also becomes apparent that the 
fundamental difference between the current and proposed alternative urbanization model is the 
degree of empowerment of farmers and their families during the urbanization process.  
Furthermore, this study performs a case study of Chongqing to identify how inclusive 
development and sustainable growth might be approached in urbanization processes, noting key 
factors that could support China’s transformation from land-centered urbanization to people-
oriented urbanization. Chongqing’s close relationship with the national government and its 
pioneer position in advancing China’s people-oriented urbanization pilot project makes it the 
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most appropriate candidate for a case study on comprehensive urbanization reform. Based on the 
case study of Chongqing, government policies centered on farmers’ benefits and rights are shown 
to create new opportunity structures that expand farmers’ agency to make strategic choices 
between rural and urban integration. The full integration of farmers (migrant workers) into urban 
life may, in turn, nurture consumption demand and help rebalance the regional economy. 
Moreover, it can be seen that even though ‘empowerment’ is not formally presented in 
Chongqing’s state agenda, the concept has been integrated into the institutional logic of its policy 
design and implementation practices. People who once were structurally subordinated have more 
viable choices. Notably, the inclusive practice demonstrated in Chongqing is approved and 
supported by the central government, which means that the people-oriented urbanization model 
proposed by this study is compatible with China’s current socialist regime, and may be 
considered for application in other jurisdictions with adaptations reflecting local needs and 
interests.  
 Due to the available dataset for this chapter, some limitations are present. First, 
Chongqing’s case is unique and cannot be applied directly to other places. Chongqing is the 
chosen experimental zone for integrated rural-urban development as well as a central 
municipality that operates under the direct administration of the national government. The great 
discretion and support from the central government contributes to Chongqing’s success in 
advancing certain inclusive institutional reforms. Moreover, the case study method, which 
produces context-specific lessons, also limits the general application of Chongqing’s model to 
other regions. Secondly, due to the lack of empirical data on farm families’ decisions and 
associated outcomes, farmers’ empowerment is measured indirectly. Thus, the degree of 
empowerment of farmer households is an approximate measurement that needs to be interpreted 
accordingly. Thirdly, due to the lack of data on gendered perspectives within the households of 
those who transfer hukou, female farmers’ empowerment status in Chongqing’s case cannot be 
fully investigated.  
Considering that this study is a first attempt to propose an empowerment approach to 
urbanization and market development through the creation of new opportunity structures for 
farmers, more studies are needed to fill in the research gaps identified above. For example, case 
studies exploring the feasibility of people-oriented models of urbanization in other cities may 
clarify the validity of the proposed model. In addition, a study designed to measure directly both 
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female and male farmers’ decisions and actions may provide new insights into the gender 
dynamics informing the outcomes observed in this case study. 
Admittedly, the scope and findings of the case study may be limited; however, the 
rationale behind Chongqing’s policy design and its holistic approach do have significant policy 
implications for China’s future development through people-oriented urbanization. First, the 
agreement of national and local governments is needed to play a substantial role in advancing 
related institutional reforms by providing farmers with extended empowerment options, rather 
than by administrative orders and enforcements. Secondly, the pilot program of land vouchers in 
Chongqing may not be fully applicable to other regions; however, the idea of enabling farmers to 
benefit from urbanization while preserving arable land is compatible with current national policy 
directions. Thirdly, to move toward a more people-oriented model of urbanization, the first step 
for local governments is to guarantee that new hukou “owners” are treated equally as compared 
to local citizens, since eliminating any form of discrimination may increase the possibility for 
people to settle down permanently, and contribute to more lasting regional prosperity. Lastly, this 
case study demonstrates the value in seeking the matching point of interests between urban 
development and farmers. As evident in both China’s historical urbanization experience and 
Chongqing’s hukou reform, the fulfillment of mutual interests among stakeholders does help 
guarantee greater consistency and accountability in defining policy practices. Furthermore, it also 
encourages more farmers to engage in the course of urbanization. Consequently, this matching-
of-interest strategy brings inclusive development as well as sustained growth to the local 
municipal context, with implications for social stability and harmony as well. 
If local governments keep moving forward and transforming themselves from self-
centered bodies into more farmer-oriented states, China could produce a more people-oriented 
urbanization process and have a better chance of achieving its ambitions for inclusive growth and 
sustainable development in the long run. Furthermore, the proposed integrated policy framework, 
in support of more equitable rural-urban empowerment, may also shed light for other socialist 
countries in transition wishing to achieve inclusive development and sustained growth, while 
maintaining the central control of their authoritarian governments. However, as inclusive 
urbanization means that all people should have equal access to benefits associated with economic 
development, female farmers, who are further left behind due to the gendered division of labor 
within households, should be also integrated into the urbanization process so that the proposed 
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inclusive and sustainable urbanization is complete and not leaving anyone behind, which will 
improve capacity for prosperity in the nation. The next chapter addresses specifically the issue of 
left-behind women in relation to urbanization in more detail.  
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CHAPTER 3                                                                                               China’s 
Left-Behind Women and Their Possible Empowerment in Agriculture 
This chapter first shows the research gap that characterizes current approaches to left-
behind women and their possible empowerment in agriculture, and the reasons behind it. To 
examine rural women’s empowerment status in agriculture, as well as within their households, 
the Women’s Empowerment in Agriculture Index (WEAI) is applied and informed by a 
framework for understanding the dynamics of the “migration-left-behind” nexus created by 
circular migration between rural and urban spaces in China. The next section describes the data 
collection process, general features of the data, and the empirical methodology. By further 
decomposing the sub-indexes of WEAI, domains and indicators that can inform policies to 
increase women’s empowerment are also identified. The last section concludes the study and 
provides implications for current and future research and policy. 
 Introduction 3.1
Rapid rural-urban migration has had a significant impact on the socioeconomic landscape 
of rural China, attracting primarily men of all ages out of rural agriculture. In most cases women, 
the elderly, and children stay behind in the countryside (Biao, 2007; Fan, 2008; Ye & Wu, 2008). 
The numbers of left-behind women,12 as the main caretakers of both the elderly and of children, 
have grown rapidly. In this study, women are considered left-behind if their husbands work in 
cities and are away from home at least six months in each year (NBS, 2005b). The total 
population of left-behind women had increased from 13 million in 2000 to 47 million by 2005, 
representing nearly 28% of the total rural women in China (Yu, Fang, Wang & Wang, 2011). 
Accompanied by the rising numbers of left-behind women, China has also witnessed the 
feminization of agriculture (de Brauw, Huang, Zhang & Rozelle, 2013; Yu et al., 2011). This 
phenomenon has transformed the gendered division of labor in agriculture to one where left-
behind and other rural women engage in farm work to a much greater degree than in the past, 
thereby producing an economically structured gender divide (Short, Chen, Entwisle & Zhai, 
2002).  
																																																								
12 In this study, non-left-behind women are referred to as rural women who live with their husbands in rural areas 
three days per week for at least six months. To analyze the impact of the household structure on women’s autonomy, 
only married women are included in this study.  
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Women’s increasing engagement in agriculture does not necessarily mean that left-behind 
women’s capacity for management and decision-making has increased proportionately (de Brauw, 
Li, Liu & Rozelle & Zhang, 2008). On the contrary, many scholars argue that agricultural 
feminization has deepened the disadvantaged position of rural women by trapping them in labor-
intensive agriculture (Fan, 2003). It is also widely recognized that rural women, including those 
left-behind, still face persistent discrimination and obstacles resulting in lower literacy levels, 
family positions, and wages than men (Fan, 2003, 2004; Huang & Li, 2008). Although these 
arguments do reflect current conditions, they also treat women as passive decision-makers in 
migration and the feminization of agriculture, while ignoring women’s possible efforts to help 
guide and support their families in this shifting situation. Increasing international studies have 
shown that left-behind women are proactive actors in their lives, making and contributing to 
family decisions, with positive impacts on the well-being of their households, as well as on 
agricultural outcomes (Archambault, 2012; Jacka, 2014; McEvoy, Petrzelka, Radel & Schmook, 
2012).  
Leaving some family members behind during urbanization process may be part of a 
calculated decision undertaken by all household members wishing to improve the economic well-
being of the whole family. This geographically structured division of labor among family 
members has also been explained by economic development theorists as evidence of the New 
Economics of Labor Migration (NELM) (Stark & Bloom, 1985; Stark, 1991; Taylor, 1999). 
NELM theory’s focus on decision-making within the household implies that leaving someone 
behind is the rational choice for households attempting to diversify risks and to absorb 
unexpected economic and environmental shocks (Stark & Bloom, 1985). However, there is no 
discounting of women’s agency in the left behind strategies implied by NELM theory.  
Women’s increasing participation in agricultural sectors may afford them an opportunity 
to achieve some degree of economic autonomy. Integrating both the managerial role and the 
participation rate of women into measures of agricultural feminization, de Brauw et al. (2013) 
concluded that China’s rural women gained some autonomy and decision-making power as a 
result of their increasing engagement in agriculture. However, they remain cautious about 
women’s involvement in managerial decisions. Since they use women-headed households to 
approximate women’s managerial roles, their results may be downward-biased, excluding women 
who play a key role in operating agriculture, but are not the heads of their households.  
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Studies have shown that being left behind has provided women with empowerment 
opportunities in many developing countries (Archambault, 2010; McEvoy et al., 2012; Wouterse, 
2016). Drawing on Friedmann’s (1992) comprehensive outline of the principles informing 
people-oriented alternative development, gender equity and women’s empowerment are 
recognized here as important considerations in the Chinese context. Thus, providing a direct 
focus on women’s agency reveals that some left-behind women may be empowered during 
periods of separation from their migrant husbands. In this study, empowerment is defined as 
“expanding people’s ability to make strategic life choices, particularly in contexts in which this 
ability had been denied to them” (Kabeer, 2001).  
However, very limited research directly focuses on linking rural Chinese women with 
empowerment. Even fewer studies address left-behind women and their potential empowerment 
in agriculture (Biao, 2007; Jacka, 2014). Furthermore, due to the multidimensional and context-
specific nature of empowerment, existing methodologies for addressing women’s empowerment 
in rural China are limited either to qualitative methods or indirect measurements (Jacka & 
Sargeson, 2011; Judd, 2010; Song & Vernooy, 2010). The context-specific nature of case studies 
and the lack of systematic measurement of empowerment further limit the emergence of relevant 
research on the empowerment profiles of China’s left-behind women. Thus, research questions to 
be addressed in this study are: How might being left behind serve as a source of empowerment 
for Chinese women, if they can take advantage of new opportunities, thereby obtaining greater 
access to decision-making and income in agriculture than before? What quantifiable evidence 
might be gathered to clarify whether left-behind women are more empowered in agriculture than 
non-left-behind women in rural China, relative to their male partners?  
Answering these questions requires a verifiable method to measure the relative 
empowerment, agency, and socio-economic inclusion of left-behind women in the agricultural 
sector, in order to understand policy and practice implications that would support more inclusive 
urbanization. However, very few systematic measures were available to examine these factors 
until the International Food Policy Research Institute’s (IFPRI) introduction of the Women’s 
Empowerment in Agriculture Index (WEAI). The WEAI is concerned with women’s 
empowerment in food security and agricultural growth, and measures their involvement in 
decisions about agricultural production and use of productive resources – including time use, 
control over income use, and involvement in community leadership, as compared to men in their 
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households. This study offers the first attempt to apply the WEAI in the context of China. In 
order to produce meaningful results, it is necessary to modify the original WEAI modules and 
methods slightly to reflect the Chinese context while still replicating the WEAI protocol. 
For the purposes of this pilot study, extensive fieldwork has been conducted in three 
provinces in Northeastern China to collect first-hand data, from which the WEAI scores for both 
left-behind and non-left-behind women have been calculated. Then, a reasonable between-group 
comparison has been undertaken. The assumption is that if being left behind leads to women’s 
measurable empowerment, this could be observed through higher values of WEAI for left-behind 
than non-left-behind women, holding other factors constant. The results show that left-behind 
women in the sample are more empowered than non-left-behind women, as measured by the 
WEAI. This finding is consistent with the experiences of left-behind women in some other 
developing countries, such as Mexico, India, and Africa (Archambault, 2010; McEvoy et al., 
2012; Radel, Schmook, McEvoy, MÉNdez & Petrzelka, 2012). 
After disaggregating the WEAI results by domains and indicators, key fields that 
contribute to, or inhibit, women’s (dis) empowerment13 can be identified as sites for possible 
future development policies and social programs that could improve left-behind as well as non-
left-behind women’s empowerment in agriculture. Given a context in which it has been common 
to see left-behind women as disempowered, it is important that women and men recognize their 
agency and strategic roles in challenging conditions. Therefore, the present study fills an existing 
research gap in addressing China’s left-behind women’s possible self-recognition as agents, 
through their potentials for being empowered in agriculture. It provides evidence regarding 
women’s strategic role in migration decisions and agricultural production in order to shed light 
on China’s on-going and possible future approaches to addressing prevailing gender inequalities 
through agricultural modernization.  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a selective 
literature review of international and China’s left-behind women and their roles in agriculture, 
through which a framework for understanding the dynamics of “migration-left-behind” is built. 
Section 3 describes the data collection process, general features of the data, and the empirical 
methodology, which outlines procedures used to conduct the comparison between left-behind and 
																																																								
13 In an effort to develop informed perspectives on factors contributing to both empowerment and disempowerment, 
the two terms are used carefully to facilitate the calculation of WEAI and to produce policy implications.		
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non-left-behind women. Section 4 presents the results of the WEAI measurement and its sub-
indexes, and provides a discussion based on the results. Section 5 concludes the study and 
provides implications for current and future research and policy programs. 
 Literature review and the “migration-left-behind” nexus 3.2
This section first reviews the international literature on the relationship between labor 
migration and left-behind women, in terms of women’s roles during the feminization of 
agriculture. After describing the limitations of existing approaches to investigating women’s 
managerial roles in agriculture, it introduces empowerment indexing as an alternative 
methodology to fill the research gap. Then, the section presents the meaning, development, and 
issues informing women’s empowerment, moving toward, in particular, the challenges and latest 
innovations in measuring women’s empowerment in agriculture. After reviewing and describing 
the research gap between international practices and research on China’s left-behind women’s 
empowerment, this study develops a “migration-left-behind” framework to examine left-behind 
women’s empowerment status in agriculture as well as within their households. 
3.2.1 Labor migration, left-behind women and the feminization of agriculture 
For the last several decades, most developing countries have been experiencing massive 
rural-urban migration (Cai, 2001). This phenomenon has been examined and theorized by a wide 
range of scholars and integrates a broad spectrum of disciplines (Lewis, 1954; Harris & Todaro, 
1970). The targeted research areas and methods support analysis that can be divided into two 
broad levels of theorizing: macro and micro. Macro-level theories focus on aggregate trends in 
migration flows using more abstract explanations of evolving socio-economic phenomena arising 
from globalization and development, whereas micro-level theories investigate the individual and 
local levels of migration decision-making, as impacted by wider socioeconomic structures. 
Neoclassic development economics theories reveal the macro-level relationships between labor 
migration and economic growth, claiming that internal migration occurs as a result of income 
differences between the traditional rural agricultural sector and the urban industrial sector (Lewis, 
1954; Ranis & Fei, 1961; Harris & Todaro, 1970). Some scholars go further to investigate the 
determinants and effects of labor migration in relation to uneven regional development, exploring 
the issues from different disciplines, such as social network, human capital, and costs/benefits 
theories (Boyd, 1989; Schultz, 1961; Sjaastad, 1962).  
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By focusing on decisions made by individual members of households, New Economics of 
Labor Migration (NELM) theory goes beyond the micro-level of analysis to bridge 
understandings about conditioned choices at the meso-level of migratory planning, as influenced 
by macro-level economic factors (Stark & Bloom, 1985; Taylor, 1999). In other words, micro-
level decisions may be deemed necessary to bridge and accommodate macro-level disparities.  In 
this way, rural-urban migration patterns can be considered the outcome of what is often a split-
household strategy designed to diversify income sources and reduce risks (Stark, 1991). NELM 
explains the general mechanism of division of labor within rural families, whereby migrants 
travel to work where local markets function well, while leaving other family members behind. 
However, it does not go further to examine who are left behind based on the gendered division of 
labor within households. 
Notably, the division of labor is not always based on economic necessity; it also depends 
on social class, culture, and ideology within a society or household (Boserup, 1970; Polanyi, 
1957). Due to the vast gender inequities and prevailing male dominance in the social ideologies 
of most developing countries, gendered divisions of labor tend to produce gendered migration 
patterns. More specifically, men are more likely to engage in out-migration to urban areas, while 
leaving the women, children and elderly behind (Jacka, 2014). Accompanied by the increasing 
labor migration of men, the feminization of agriculture has emerged as a measurable effect across 
most developing countries (Singh & Meenakshi, 2004).  
On the one hand, gendered agricultural phenomena are generally considered to have 
negative impacts on women’s well-being and gender relations (Garikipati 2008; Sachs & Alston, 
2010), which in turn threatens total agricultural efficiency (Ganguly & Swapan, 2003; Deere, 
2005). On the other hand, there have been growing studies in many countries claiming that 
feminization of agriculture may have some potential to improve the relative positions of women 
(de Brauw et al., 2008, 2013). This strand of literature suggests that male out-migration leaves 
many women as de facto heads of households, with increased responsibilities for both overseeing 
and maintaining subsistence agricultural production for the family (Katz, 2003; Deere, 2005). 
Some studies go further to examine women’s participation rates as well as their managerial roles 
in the feminization of agriculture (de Brauw et al., 2008). However, due to the difficulty of 
accurately measuring women’s roles in decision-making, very limited analysis that focuses on the 
managerial side of agricultural feminization exists in the literature (Radel et al., 2012). 
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Furthermore, women’s roles in migration planning have long been viewed as associational and, 
therefore, passive in relation to decisions made by males (Jacka, 2014). This image of women 
results from assumed biased gender relations, producing an expectation of continued normative 
patriarchal gender practices. Consequently, most studies of migration and agricultural 
feminization focus on or assume that male out-migration has profound negative structural 
consequences for left-behind women, resulting in their further inferior positions to men (Deere, 
2005; Dolan & Sorby, 2003). Thus, despite the renewed interest in the agricultural sector as an 
engine of growth and development, and greater recognition of the importance of women in 
agriculture, women’s power positions relative to men and the impact of managerial feminization 
on agricultural production remain underexplored. A different methodology that directly 
investigates women’s experiences of gender relations is needed. 
3.2.2 Women’s empowerment: meaning, trend and issues 
In contrast to the limited research on managerial feminization of agriculture resulting 
from men’s migration, increasing studies have been conducted to investigate women’s 
empowerment and its impacts on development outcomes (Rowlands, 1998; Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], 2012). Women’s self-recognition of agency 
in their gender relations with men in household and community decision-making is vital to their 
empowerment and can be integrated into an examination of women’s decisional roles in 
agriculture (Kabeer, 1999; Torri & Martinez, 2014).  
Since the 1970s, the term ‘empowerment’ has been widely used in global economic and 
political discourse by organizations, feminist groups, as well as intergovernmental institutions 
such as the World Bank and the Food and Agriculture Organization of United Nations (FAO) 
(Rowlands, 1998). The term ‘empowerment’ implies a transfer or acquisition of substantive 
power to influence and change the conditions of one’s life. In this sense, empowerment is 
generally conceptualized as originating from four different kinds of power relationships, 
comprised of ‘power over’, ‘power to’, ‘power with’ and ‘power from within’ (Hartsock, 1985; 
Rowlands, 1998). The predominant meaning of power in governance is ‘power over’ or control 
of others (Dahl, 1961; Wolfinger, 1971). Unlike ‘power over,’ which often focuses on the results 
of power transfer, other forms of power address the processes of the change; ‘power to’ involves 
capacity and relative decision-making power; ‘power with’ refers to collective power; and ‘power 
from within’ identifies intrapersonal power (Rowlands, 1998, p. 12-14). According to Rowlands 
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(1998), excepting ‘power over,’ these empowerment models benefited not only the vulnerable 
and marginalized people but produced a net profit to the collective civic or national economy. 
By documenting thirty-two different definitions of empowerment that are currently in use, 
Ibriham and Alkire (2007) found that the majority of studies defined empowerment in terms of 
individual agency, with or without attention to structural conditions. Agency refers to “what a 
person is free to do and achieves in pursuit of whatever goals or values he or she regards as 
important” (Sen, 1985, p. 206). According to Sen (1992), agency constituted ‘process freedom’ in 
the interplay of individual agency and social situations. An agent is “someone who acts and 
brings about change” (Sen, 1999, p. 19). The other key concept in Sen’s (1992) capacity 
framework was the agent’s situated capability, which could be termed as ‘opportunity freedom.’ 
Kabeer (2001) defined empowerment as ‘expanding people’s ability to make strategic life 
choices, particularly in contexts in which this ability had been denied to them.’ Other than 
focusing on the individual’s freedom to act, some scholars define empowerment by emphasizing 
the preconditions required to expand individual and collective agency (Ibriham & Alkire, 2007). 
Narayan (2002) defined empowerment as “the expansion of assets and capabilities of poor people 
to participate in, negotiate with, influence, control, and hold accountable institutions that affect 
their lives” (p. 5). Alsop et al. (2006) identified individual agency and socio-political opportunity 
structures as the two most important components of empowerment. Agency is closely related to 
the agent’s capability to select from among choices available under the existing opportunity 
structures or to propose changes to them. To exert agency, members of subordinate groups must 
often overcome significant institutional and informal obstacles. As well, rules that were made to 
benefit elite groups and adopted by the wider public have to be transformed to benefit 
subordinated groups (Alsop et al., 2006). Often, this transformation requires greater 
understanding of the shared benefits that accrue to all in the context of mutual actualization, an 
issue that is becoming increasingly visible in relation to the need for women’s empowerment in 
the pursuit of both inclusion and prosperity. 
With a growing awareness of women's issues, development planners in the 1970s began to 
try to better integrate women into their projects, by linking notions of empowerment with 
women’s more formal engagement in economic production (Alosp & Heinsohn, 2005). The 
Women in Development (WID) framework was initiated to bring women into development 
planning and enable them to participate more fully and equitably in the socio-economic fields of 
	 95	
their societies. However, from the WID perspective, women were merely considered as 
instruments to enhance economic growth. Thus, very little progress has been made to improve 
gender relations under the WID framework, since its establishment.  In the late 1970s and 1980s, 
a Gender and Development (GAD) approach was pursued to tackle gender inequality in 
development (Taylor, 1999). With the GAD perspective, the power relations and institutions 
within societies that structure women’s subordination to men have been made more visible 
(Rowlands, 1995).  
The ‘empowerment of women’ has emerged and become the theme of the GAD discourse 
for the last two decades. Feminists and activists from Third World14 countries have contributed 
significantly to the theory and practices of women’s empowerment (Sen & Grown, 1988; Taylor, 
1999). Women’s empowerment was first proposed as an international strategy in the 1980s by a 
group of feminist activists from the South15 to challenge the domination of the Northern feminists 
in international discourses on women. At the 1995 World Conference on Women held in Beijing, 
women’s empowerment was recognized as a significant factor in the agenda of human 
development worldwide. In 2000, “gender equality and women’s empowerment” were 
established as the third goal of Millennium Development Goals (United Nations, 2000).  
Admittedly, promoting women’s empowerment may have positive effects on 
disempowered women. However, empowerment does not always lead to positive changes. The 
Gender and Development (GAD) literature has recognized that women could become 
disempowered as a result of development initiatives, where male-biased institutions and capitalist 
strategies have worsened women’s status relative to men (Kabeer, 1994). Furthermore, even 
though the process of empowerment is assumed to lead to better outcomes, there is no 
“straightforward cause and effect relationship between process and outcomes. Nor is it always 
clear when a change is cause and when effect, when process, and when outcome” (Kabeer, 2001, 
p. 81). In this sense, when investigating the impact of changing socio-economic and political 
processes on women’s empowerment, it is important to recognize the complexity of their situated 
agency, as well as that of the systems with which they interact. Furthermore, it is also critical to 
take socio-cultural and local contexts into account and consider the direct or indirect effects of 																																																								
13 Chandra Mohanty (2003) argues that the so-called Third World comprises two thirds of the world, and therefore 
represents the majority perspective, even though a one-third minority holds dominant economic power. 
15 After the Cold War, the North–South divide is broadly considered a socio-economic and political divide. The 
North includes North America, Western Europe and developed countries in Asia, while the South contains Africa, 
Latin America, and developing parts of Asia including parts of the Middle East.		
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these factors on changing power relations (Syed, 2008). In such dynamic and contradictory 
contexts, developing evidence-based recommendations for policy development is critical. 
3.2.3 Women’s empowerment in agriculture and its measurement 
Gender is, of course, not the only axis along which empowerment or disempowerment 
occurs. Disempowerment may be a function of social constructions of age, class, ethnicity, 
religion and many other factors. These factors, as well as the intersections among them, must also 
be taken into account. However, women’s disempowerment has an intergenerational impact on 
gender inequities, which could trap the next generations of poor women in poverty (Samman & 
Santos, 2009). In this sense, more attention and efforts are needed to promote empowerment and 
capacity-building among poor and oppressed women, who are more likely trapped in declining 
agricultural sectors.   
In low-income countries where agriculture is the dominant sector, women make up a 
substantial majority of the agricultural workforce in rural areas (Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations [FAO], International Fund for Agriculture Development 
[IFAD] & World Bank, 2008). Agriculture is not only a critical source of livelihood for women, 
but it is also considered a key way to help women out of poverty (FAO, 2011). The decreasing 
contribution of agriculture to national economies has taken its toll on the availability of 
sustainable employment in agriculture, particularly for small and marginal producers. Among 
them, women are the most vulnerable, as they do not normally have control over either 
productive resources or any kinds of assets (Jiju, 2013). While women’s empowerment and 
gender equity have been improved substantially in general, the majority of rural women in 
developing countries are still in disadvantaged positions and living in poverty to a greater extent 
than men (Hu, 2009; Malapit, Sraboni, Quisumbing & Ahmed, 2015). 
There has been growing recognition that empowering women and reducing gender 
inequity in agriculture has the potential to significantly improve agricultural productivity, and 
ensure national food security (World Bank, 2011; FAO, 2011). Closing the gender gap in 
property ownership by allowing women to own and control productive assets increases both their 
productivity and their self-esteem (Duflo & Udry, 2004). A woman who is empowered to make 
decisions regarding what to plant and what inputs to apply on her plot will be more motivated 
and productive in agriculture (Alkire et al, 2012). An empowered woman will have a positive 
impact on children’s health and nutrition, partly because she can take better care of her own 
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physical and mental well-being (Malapit, Kadiyala, Quisumbing, Cunningham & Tyagi, 2013; 
Sraboni, Malapit, Quisumbing & Ahmed, 2014). Furthermore, women’s empowerment in 
agriculture may have spillover effects on women’s power in other fields (Datta & Kornberg, 
2002; Alkire et al, 2013), and vice versa.  
According to FAO, IFAD, and the World Bank (2008), there were less than 10 percent of 
agricultural development assistance programs consider gender issues as their targets. Most 
literature on practices of women’s empowerment focus either on one specific field of agriculture 
or indirect measures related to agriculture (Malhotra, Schuler & Boender, 2002). For example, 
the common methods that are currently used to empower rural women are evaluated through 
micro-credit programs, entitlement to land rights, enhancing women’s control over productive 
assets, and integrating them into decision-making in agriculture. Most Non-Governmental 
Organizations (NGOs) have limited resources and time to invest in promoting empowerment 
(Dawson, 1998), and the benefits from investment in agriculture are low and take longer than for 
other programs. As a result, the lack of comprehensive measures for women’s empowerment in 
agriculture limits the development of policies designed to provide targeted opportunity structures. 
Accurately representing women’s empowerment requires careful measurements, though 
few systematic measures are available (Malhotra at el., 2002). The Women’s Empowerment in 
Agriculture Index (WEAI) may offer one way to produce high quality measures of women’s 
empowerment in rural settings. The index was initially developed as a tool to measure women’s 
empowerment that might result from the US government’s “Feed the Future Initiative.” In 2011, 
the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) authorized the International Food 
Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) and Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative 
(OPHDI) to design an aggregate index to monitor women’s meaningful inclusion in the 
agricultural sector, which later was developed as the WEAI (Alkire et al., 2012).  
Before WEAI, women’s empowerment and gender inequality were typically measured at 
the aggregate country level, which does not allow for heterogeneities in local, regional, national 
and international contexts. For example, the Gender Gap Index (GGI) proposed by Hausmann, 
Tyson and Zahidi (2011), although covering gender inequalities in a broader set of domains, was 
still based on aggregate indicators. Nationally representative surveys such as the China 
Household Income Projects (CHIPS) and the China National Rural Survey (CNHS) include a 
range of questions, offering a direct measure of decision-making within the household. However, 
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the domains in which decision-making are measured are typically confined to the household 
sphere (Alkire et al., 2012). Thus, each of these measures of empowerment is limited in several 
ways, as compared to WEAI. 
The WEAI builds on research that proposes domain-specific measures of empowerment 
through individual or household-level surveys (Alkire & Foster, 2011a, b). As an aggregate index, 
the WEAI includes two sub-indexes. The first is used to measure the extent to which women are 
empowered based on five domains of empowerment (5DE). The five domains are (1) decisions 
about agricultural production, (2) access to and decision-making power about productive 
resources, (3) control and use of income, (4) leadership in the community, and (5) time allocation. 
The second sub-index is the Gender Parity Index (GPI), which measures gender parity within the 
household.  
The WEAI index has been tested in Bangladesh, Uganda and Guatemala and has proven 
that it can generally assess aspects of empowerment that relate directly to agriculture, identify 
key domains where empowerment needs to be stressed, and track progress over time (Alkire et al., 
2012). While the WEAI provides a rigorous measure of women’s empowerment relevant to 
agriculture, it is subject to some limitations (Malapit et al., 2014): 
• WEAI may be upward-biased if female respondents in the WEAI survey are already 
decision makers. 
• Due to the fact that the specific focus of WEAI is agriculture, women’s empowerment in 
other fields may be overlooked.  More specifically, women who are not involved in 
agricultural decisions may appear disempowered even if they are engaged in decision-
making about non-agricultural activities. Similarly, women involved in agricultural 
decisions may appear empowered, when their decision-making capacity relative to 
women involved in non-agricultural activities remains low. 
• The WEAI may have upward biased results for single female households. This is because 
women in households that do not have a male decision-maker are more likely to be 
identified as principle decision makers. 
3.2.4 China’s left-behind women and their empowerment in agriculture 
In China, the increasing rural-urban migration has led to an enormous population, 
including women, the elderly and children, being left behind in rural areas, due at least in part to 
the hukou system. However, the problems faced by this left-behind group were rarely accorded 
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attention by policymakers or scholars, either inside or outside China, until the twenty-first 
century (Hu, 2012). This change may be partly due to China’s policy and discourse shifting from 
an economic development focus toward achieving a harmonious and inclusive society in order to 
reduce increasing social tensions (Jacka, 2014), thereby increasing more widely-shared prosperity 
in future. Since then a new scholarly literature on the suffering and lack of social welfare endured 
by the left-behind population has emerged.  
Among the left-behind population in China, women are seen to bear the brunt of burdens 
arising from men’s out-migration process, since they are most likely to carry on most of the 
agricultural production, domestic work, and caretaking for the elderly and children (Bossen, 
1994; Fan, 2004; Jacka, 2012). Generally, left-behind women are married and stay behind in the 
village when their husbands’ out-migration takes place. More precisely, for the purposes of this 
chapter, left-behind women are defined as rural women whose husbands work temporarily 
outside the home villages for at least six months during the year (NBS, 2010). Thus, for most 
women, being left behind may be not their own decisions, but undertaken to take care of the 
family as a way of supporting their husbands’ migration (Luo & Chai, 2004). Furthermore, 
studies also show that the geographically-structured gendered division of labor is based on 
unequal gender relations and patriarchal ideology deeply embedded within the society (Jacka, 
1997; Toyota, Yeoh & Nguyen, 2007). 
Chinese scholars have depicted left-behind women in a more negative and vulnerable 
position, in which they bear a heavy burden for agricultural production with strong mental 
pressures, while living a life with multiple risks for their marriages as well (Huang & Li, 2008; 
Jacka, 2014). Increasingly, left-behind women are portrayed in academic and policy discourses as 
a vulnerable group of passive decision-takers, abandoned by their families. This negative 
conceptualization of left-behind women, their welfare, health, and roles in agriculture means that 
their positions have been recognized and considered accordingly. For example, Mu and van de 
Walle (2011) found that male migration has little impact on left-behind women’s health 
conditions, but it does have negative effects on women’s well-being, overall.  
Left-behind women are considered to be secondary in family decision-making (Zheng & 
Xie, 2004; Sun, 2006) and are under the double burdens of production work and housework, as 
well as double dependencies on men for economic and emotional support (Jiang & Zhou 2007). 
Generally, left-behind women are seen to have lower educational levels than their male partners, 
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which limit their self-esteem and opportunities (Hu, 2009). Furthermore, the gendered division of 
labor also leads to much more gender segregation, where left-behind women participate in 
agriculture to a much greater degree than before (Jacka, 1997; Short et al., 2002). However, left-
behind women’s increasing participation in agriculture does not mean they have gained more 
autonomy. It is more accurate to talk about the ‘agriculturalization of females’ rather than the 
‘feminization of agriculture,’ since women are pushed into getting more involved in the 
increasingly marginalized agricultural sector by multiple structural factors (Fei, 1998; Gao, 1994).  
While most of the literature focuses on negative outcomes for left-behind women, there 
have also been attempts to address their positive potentials, under uneven economic development 
structures (Biao, 2007). Recognizing that women are pro-active agents in their own lives may 
provide more insights into this current in the literature. Negative conceptualizations of left-
behind women have the potential to undermine their self-recognition as agents, which may 
reinforce their vulnerable positions (Jacka, 2014). By focusing on older women’s agency, Jacka 
(2014) found that older women engaged actively in family affairs and made significant 
contributions. Meng (1993) argued that the absence of men provided women with the 
opportunities to play significant roles in matters that were not available to them. Li (2003) further 
confirmed that the managerial opportunities available for women in family matters were the by-
products of the out-migration of their husbands. 
To measure comprehensively the degree of women’s increasing participation in 
agriculture, de Brauw et al. (2008) developed a conceptual framework comprising two types of 
feminization of agriculture: labor feminization and managerial feminization. Labor feminization 
happens when women have increasingly high participation rates in agricultural production, while 
managerial feminization measures women’s increasing power in decision-making and greater 
access to the use of income (de Brauw et al., 2008). Relative to the feminization of labor, 
managerial feminization is much more difficult to measure. Due to a lack of available data, they 
use female-headed households as a proxy measure of women’s participation in decision-making. 
They also do not consider the supervision of others’ labor, either from within the household or of 
hired workers, as a critical facet of farm management. Due to the imperfect measurement of 
management feminization, de Brauw et al. (2008) conditionally concluded that managerial 
feminization did not emerge, while labor feminization had occurred, definitively. In their most 
recent study, de Brauw et al. (2013) stated that agricultural feminization had clearly emerged in 
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rural China, but they were still very cautious about drawing conclusions on managerial 
feminization.  
Rather than approximate managerial feminization, focusing on women’s empowerment in 
agricultural decision-making may shed new light on left-behind women’s adaptive experience 
during family shocks, such as separations arising from economically motivated migration 
patterns. Even though there is growing interest in women’s empowerment in agriculture, 
internationally and domestically, few studies have been done specifically to address China’s left-
behind women’s empowerment in agriculture, due to long-existing patriarchal institutional biases 
and measurement challenges (Zuo, 2004). Song and Vernooy (2010) were among the first to 
claim that rural women’s self-organization and autonomous capabilities were important to 
empowering participants in the mainstreaming process. Based on mostly qualitative data, Jacka 
(2014) argued that older left-behind women could extend their agency by fulfilling their domestic 
responsibilities within families. Hu (2009) urged that it was necessary to take advantage of the 
new opportunities brought by globalization to hasten the progress of empowering Chinese rural 
women. Among these studies, most are based on either qualitative methods or indirect 
measurements of women’s empowerment. The lack of systematic methods that can directly 
measure empowerment further constrains the growth and generalization of this strand of research, 
leaving left-behind women’s experiences of extended separation from their husbands unanswered. 
3.2.5 Theoretical framework of the “migration-left-behind” nexus 
As presented in the literature review, the expansive literature on migration is primarily 
focused on its impacts on national development as well as possible aggregate effects on 
households; however, comparatively, much of the dominant literature generally neglects the 
experience of the left-behind population. The most influential migration literature that links 
migration and the left behind is the New Economic of Labor Migration (NELM) or so-called 
Household Strategy Theory (Stark & Bloom, 1985). However, literature in this strand attempts to 
reveal the intra-household decision-making mechanisms prior to or during the migration (e.g. 
Stark, 1991; Taylor, 1999), which means it is unable to explain the consequences of migration 
and its impact on the left behind. Even when studies have specifically addressed the problems 
facing the left behind population, they mainly focus on the economic welfare, health and well-
being of the left-behind, while overlooking the adaptive experience of the left-behind in coping 
with issues arising in the wake of any absent household members (Nguyen, Brenda & Toyota, 
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2007; Toyota, Yeoh & Nguyen, 2007). Taking into full account the dynamic interplay between 
migration and the left behind, Toyota, Yeoh and Nguyen (2007) proposed a framework engaging 
the ‘migration–left-behind nexus’ to guide migration studies, thus obtaining new insights into the 
stretched relationships that characterize migration and their effects on broader social change. 
 While Toyota, Yeoh and Nguyen’s (2007) ‘migration-left-behind” framework provides an 
integrated way of researching migration by bringing the left-behind to the center stage of 
migration studies, it neglects the gendered division of labor within the household. However, 
increasing research on left-behind women has shown that women are most likely to be left behind 
and become the main caretakers of both the elderly and of children (Jacka, 1997; 2014). Thus, by 
focusing on the relationship between left-behind women and their male partners, the ‘migration-
left-behind nexus’ can shed more light on women’s adaptive experiences, as well as changes in 
gender relations during periods of temporary migration. 
This is especially true in the context of China. Due partly to the combination of hukou 
and land tenure systems, discussed in depth in the previous chapter, China’s labor migration is 
primarily characterized by men wandering between rural and urban areas, for work.  This practice 
makes women after marriage more likely to stay behind to take care of their families and 
agricultural businesses. Constrained by the traditional values and patriarchal cultural norms 
embedded in the society, Chinese left-behind women are normally depicted as a group of passive 
decision-takers within their households and communities, even when this may not always be the 
case.  This paper challenges this predominant assumption of rural female passivity by shifting the 
focus from left-behind women’s vulnerability to their agency, and by considering the extent to 
which they may be empowered to gain a degree of economic autonomy and social well-being. 
For the purpose of this study, the ‘migration-left-behind nexus’ refers to the interplay between 
migrant husbands and left-behind wives specifically in agricultural households.  
As defined earlier, left-behind women are normally married women, whose husbands 
engage in rural-urban migration for more than half of the year (NBS, 2005b). This implies that 
left-behind women and male migrants are paired through marriage at the household level. In this 
sense, labor migration and staying behind could also be considered a macro manifestation of the 
outcome of a gendered division of labor within the family. Hence, to capture how left-behind 
women experience and adapt to the absence of their husbands and vice versa, the perspective of 
their migrant husbands is also integrated into the analysis. As Kabeer (2001) argued, men did not 
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only play important roles in causing women’s disempowerment, but could also have the lifting 
effects of increasing women’s empowerment. Thanks to WEAI, which requires interviewing both 
women and their husbands separately, this study is able to investigate women’s empowerment 
and to compare and integrate the gendered perspectives of both men and women, separately and 
together, for the analysis.  
Guided by the “migration-left-behind” nexus, left-behind women’s agency, empowerment 
and gender relations within the household are carefully examined from the perspective of both 
left-behind women and their male partners, in order to document net household shift toward a 
greater recognition of female agency.   
 Data and empirical methodology 3.3
 This section first provides an explanation of the rationale for data collection methods and 
a thorough description of data attributes at both household and individual levels. Then, it presents 
the methodology of calculating 5DE, GPI, and WEAI, followed by a general introduction to the 
matching method used before the comparison between left-behind and non-left-behind 
households.  
3.3.1 Description of data 
The WEAI survey was conducted in the Northeastern region of China, including Jilin, 
Liaoning and Heilongjiang provinces, in February 2015. The primary reason for choosing this 
region is because the data used to build the Women’s Empowerment in Agriculture Index 
(WEAI) has to be collected at either a national or regional level (Alkire et al, 2013). Due to 
limited resources and budget, this study focuses on building a regional WEAI in the three 
provinces comprising China’s Northeast region. The Northeast area is China’s key agricultural 
zone with a relatively large rural population engaging in the agricultural sector, which makes the 
region very suitable for the purposes of the study. In 2011, Jilin had the highest proportion of 
rural population at 46.6% while holding the least total population of 27.5 million among the three 
provinces (NBS, 2012). In the same year, Heilongjiang had the second highest rural population 
ratio at 43.5% with a total population of 38.5 million, while Liaoning has a total population at 
43.8 million, and the lowest rural population ratio of 36.0% (NBS, 2012).  
Fieldwork was conducted during China’s Spring Festival season, for several reasons. First, 
as required by the WEAI survey procedure, the primary male and female members of households 
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should be interviewed separately and simultaneously, to better capture their independent opinions 
on questions at the time of the interviews (Alkire et al, 2012). Since migrant workers are most 
likely to return home during either the harvest or the Spring Festival seasons (Fan, 2003), 
planning for this study takes that temporal structure into account. Secondly, the choice of the 
winter holidays was made to facilitate the sampling and data collection processes. As Wu & Ye 
(2016) noted, it is difficult to select randomly and differentiate left-behind from non-left-behind 
households, due to the lack of relevant official statistics in survey areas. Rather than conducting 
pilot interviews in each village to obtain information on household types (Wu & Ye, 2016), this 
study recruited university students from Northeastern rural regions, to conduct surveys in their 
home villages. After being trained, student enumerators were able to pre-select and to interview 
left-behind and non-left-behind households in their villages.  
Consequently, however, the sampling procedure may produce selection bias. Since 
sampled households are not randomly chosen from the region, their selection is tightly linked 
with the community-based knowledge of student enumerators. Furthermore, students may have 
chosen households based on their connections and social networks, which may result in biased 
sample selection at the village level. However, this method does not necessarily lead to biased 
outcomes at the regional scale when pooling all households together. Even though the sample 
selection process is not perfectly random, it could be considered as approximately random by 
first pooling all sampled villages across the three provinces. Secondly, the sampled villages are 
relatively independent from each other, since the recruitment of students is mainly based on 
provincial factors rather than place-specific considerations. As shown in Figure 3.1, the sampled 
villages are distributed broadly, thus approximately representing the Northeastern region.  
In total, 25 students with diverse majors ranging from geography to sociology were 
recruited from six local universities in Jilin province. Consequently, 200 left-behind and non-left-
behind households were selected from 25 villages across the Northeastern region for analysis. 
More specifically, 94, 55 and 51 households were selected from Jilin, Heilongjiang, and Liaoning 
provinces, respectively. Since the WEAI only measures activities related to agriculture, rural 
women who engage in wage employment and non-agricultural sectors were dropped from the 
sample, even though these other forms of employment may contribute to their empowerment. 
Finally, 151 out of 200 fully completed WEAI-eligible questionnaires were selected from 21 
villages, comprising 58 left-behind and 93 non-left-behind households, respectively.  
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Figure 3.1 Distribution of villages across provinces 
 
Source: Each “*” represents a sampled village from the study 
At the village level, the distances between specific villages and nearby low-tier towns and 
high-tier cities were measured as external factors. As shown in Figure3.2, the distances to nearest 
towns between the two types of households are not perfectly coincident. More specifically, the 
peak value of distance to towns for left-behind households is much greater than the non-left-
behind households. However, the share of non-left-behind families is greater than left-behind 
households when the distance is between 30 to 50 kilometers and the share of both families 
coincides to a much higher level when the distance is greater than 50 kilometers.  
The distances to the nearest towns between the two types of households could be 
considered approximately coincident. Consequently, this pattern demonstrates that left-behind 
and non-left-behind households may face similar driving forces, such as commuting time and 
distance to local labor markets, in terms of working temporarily in nearby towns. However, other 
factors, such as education, employment opportunities and social networks, may contribute to 
different decisions among women and men from both groups on whether family members may 
benefit from working in high-tier cities or not. As shown in Figure 3.3, the two curves of distance 
to high-tier cities between the two groups are not coincident. 
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Figure 3.2 Distribution of the distance between villages and low-tier towns 
Source: derived from the sample 
 
Figure 3.3 Distribution of the distance between villages and high-tier cities 
 
Source: derived from the sample 
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In each village, data were collected at both household and individual levels. All men and 
women in the sample were paired within their respective households as husbands and wives. As 
shown in Table 3.1, at the household level, left-behind couples have slightly bigger family sizes 
than non-left-behind couples, with an average value of 3.5 and 3.3 individuals, respectively. Left-
behind households also possess more farmland than their counterparts, with an average of 4.7 and 
3.9 land tracts, respectively. Notably, the left-behind households in the sample have lower 
average educational levels than non-left-behind households, with 1.8 and 2.0 out of a total 6 
levels, respectively. This education gap means non-left-behind households are more likely to 
finish junior high school education than left-behind families (level 2 represents completion of 
middle school education). Despite the low educational attainment of left-behind households, on 
average, they have earned approximately 15,141 Yuan for the last six months, which is higher 
than for the non-left-behind families, with an average earning of 13,479 Yuan for the same period. 
Furthermore, left-behind families are slightly younger than non-left-behind ones, when summing 
up the average age of both husbands and wives, with an average age of 45.3 and 46 years, 
respectively. 
 
Table 3.1 Data description at household and individual level 
Characteristics Left-behind Household  Non-left-behind Household 
 Mean  Standard Deviation 
(SD)  
Mean  Standard Deviation 
(SD) 
Household Level        
Family Size 3.5  1.1  3.3  0.9  
Education* 1.8  0.9  2.0  1.1  
Farmland 4.7  5.1  3.9  5.9  
Total Income 15141  14911  13478  16325  
Age 45.3  6.6  46.0  6.2  
Characteristics Women Men  Women Men  
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Individual Level        
Age 44.8 6.7 45.8 6.5 45.3 6.1 46.6 6.3 
Education 1.7 1.1 1.8 0.9 1.8 1.0 2.0 1.1 
Subjective Well-
being 
4.1 0.7 3.7 0.6 3.5 0.7 3.4 0.6 
Debt Situation 0.3 0.3** 0.2 0.2** 0.2 0.2** 0.2 0.2** 
Source: Calculated by author       
*Men’s average education is used to represent household level achievements, as they have higher levels than 
women within families.                                             
**The confidence interval is calculated instead of standard deviation for the respective debt situations. 
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At the individual level, men are older, obtain higher education, and earn higher average 
incomes than women in the sample. As shown in Table 3.1, left-behind women, on average, are 
younger, have lower education levels, are committed to higher debt rates, and report higher 
subjective well-being than non-left-behind women. Even though the gap of average educational 
achievements between women and men is not very significant, individual women or men’s 
achievements in each level present a very different pattern, as shown in Table 3.2. While more 
than half of the men from both types of families have finished their primary education, with 
56.9% and 54.8% in left behind and non-left behind households respectively, less than 50% of 
both sets of women have completed junior high school. However, women’s higher educational 
achievements in junior high school may be offset by their smaller share in both categories of 
individuals achieving less than primary or primary school than men, thus leading to their 
relatively lower average educational achievements than men. More specifically, within the 
women’s groups, the share of left-behind women with less than primary education is much 
greater than the non-left-behind women, with 13.8% and 4.3%, respectively. The average age of 
left-behind women is 44.8, which is slightly younger than the average of 45.3 years for the non-
left-behind women.  
 
Table 3.2 Women and men’s educational achievements 
Education Left-behind Household Non-left-behind Household 
 Women Men Women Men 
Cumulative Percentage    
Less than primary 13.8% 27.6% 4.3% 24.7% 
Primary 27.6% 56.9% 30.1% 54.8% 
Junior high 41.4% 13.8% 47.3% 16.1% 
Senior high 13.8% 0.0% 15.1% 0.0% 
Polytechnic school 3.4% 1.7% 2.2% 1.1% 
University and above 0.0% 0.0% 1.1% 3.2% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Source: calculated by author 
Both left-behind women and their husbands report higher than average subjective well-
being, with average scores of 4.1 and 3.7, respectively, versus 3.5 and 3.4 among non-left-behind 
women and husbands, respectively. In general, women also claim higher values of subjective 
well-being than their male counterparts, overall, suggesting that women may have higher 
adaptive capacities than men during unexpected structural life shocks. As shown in the literature 
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on women’s role during natural disasters, women’s higher subjective well-being normally 
transfers to their better adaptation after natural disasters than their male partners (Peacock, 
Morrow & Gladwin, 1999; Forthergil, 2004). However, it is also possible that women’s higher 
subjective well-being status is because they have already adapted to the changing environment. 
As to the debt status of both groups, 29.3% of left-behind women and 21.7% of non-left-
behind women report that they had debt in the previous year. For their husbands, 20.7% of both 
male groups report that they borrowed money or equivalent-value materials from sources where 
return on value is expected. The similar percentage of men and women from non-left-behind 
households reporting family debts may reflect that these couples are well aware of their debt 
situations due to their co-presence at home most times of the year. Following the same logic, a 
plausible explanation for the differences between left-behind women and their husbands may be 
that migrant husbands do not always know the exact financial situations of the family due to their 
long-term separation from home. Given a higher proportion of left-behind women than their 
husbands reporting that they owe debts of some sort, the actual debt situation for left-behind 
households may be accorded to women’s claims. In any case, left-behind households borrow 
more than non-left-behind ones.  
Lower educational attainment is more likely to lead migrant men to engage in lower-
ranked professions than their left-behind male counterparts, according to human capital theory 
(Shultz, 1961). As shown in Table 3.3, 85% of the total migrant men engage in labor work 
whereas only 40% of men from non-left-behind households work in the same category. More 
specifically, within the labor work classification, 23 out of 48, or nearly 48% of the total migrant 
males are construction workers, while only 5 of 32, or about 16% of men from non-left-behind 
households, engage in that same category of labor. Furthermore, only 8% of migrant workers 
participate in the skill-demand category of earth-moving equipment worker, while 22% of their 
non-migrant fellow members engage in the same category. Even mostly working in lower-ranked 
jobs, migrant workers still managed to earn higher incomes than their left-behind counterparts, 
with average incomes of 21,727 Yuan and 16,345 Yuan, respectively.  
This finding, together with other factors such as bigger family size, higher debt rates, and 
more farmland possession, suggests that migrant husbands may be forced by the heavier family 
debt burden to engage in longer-term migrant work. Consequently, women may be left behind to 
take care of the family and agricultural production as part of a split-household strategy. 
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Table 3.3 Men’s vocational category  
Category Men from   Men from  
 left-behind household non-left-behind household 
General category     
1. Labor work 48 85% 32 40% 
2. Salary work 2 4% 4 5% 
3. Freelance work 3 5% 11 14% 
4. Production 2 4% 3 4% 
5. Business 0 0% 1 1% 
6. Agriculture activity  1 2% 30 36% 
Total number 56 100% 81 100% 
     
Within labor work      
1. Construction worker 23 48% 5 16% 
2. Earth worker 4 8% 7 22% 
3. Agriculture worker 0 0% 10 31% 
Total number 27 56% 22 69% 
     
Source: Calculated by the author    
3.3.2 Calculation of Women’s Empowerment in Agriculture Index (WEAI)  
The Women’s Empowerment in Agriculture index (WEAI) contains two sub-indexes: 
Five Domains of Empowerment (5DE) and the Gender Parity Index (GPI). The five domains 
denoted by the 5DE are: agricultural production, resources, income, leadership, and time, and 
these are comprised of ten indicators in total. Each indicator is designed to measure whether each 
individual reached a certain threshold or has adequate achievement with respect to each indicator. 
The 5DE are measured using 10 indicators with their corresponding weights calculated according 
to their composition within each domain. A woman is defined as empowered in 5DE if she has 
adequate achievements in four of the five domains or is empowered in some combination of the 
weighted indicators beyond the 80th percentile. On the flip side, since the sum of the five domains 
of empowerment and disempowerment is equal to one (Alkire et al., 2013), a woman is defined 
as disempowered if her inadequacy achievements are less in four domains, or the sum of 
weighted indicators is less than the 80th percentile. The GPI measures gender parity within 
surveyed households, which also reflects the percentage of women who are equally empowered 
as the men in their households. 
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To identify the areas that contribute the most to disempowerment for women and men and 
to facilitate the interpretation of the 5 domains of disempowerment (M0), the disempowered 
headcount ratio (Hp), the average inadequacy score of disempowered individuals (Ap), the 
percentage of women who are without gender parity (Hw), and the average empowerment gap 
between women and men (Rp) are calculated; the positive terms are also presented accordingly. 
Notably, it is critical to understand that the sub-indexes and their components can be presented 
and interpreted both in terms of empowerment and disempowerment, in order to reflect the 
relativity between the two terms (Alkire et al., 2012). Consequently, empowerment and 
disempowerment are both used to facilitate the between-group comparison in this study. 
3.3.2.1 Five domains of empowerment (5DE)  
Although 5DE is used to measure women’s empowerment in certain domains, it is useful 
to construct 5DE in such a way that disempowerment is also identified and analyzed as the two 
terms, empowerment and disempowerment, are bonded and interrelated with each other (Alkire 
et al., 2012; Kabeer, 2001). In this way, the critical domains as well as indicators that contribute 
to women’s disempowerment can be identified and integrated into policy-making. Thus, the 5 
domains of disempowerment (M0) are calculated first; then the 5DE can be obtained by (1- M0).  
M0 composes two parts of information: the disempowered headcount ratio (Hp) and the average 
inadequacy score of disempowered individuals (Ap). The disempowered headcount (Hp) is 
defined as the ratio between individuals whose inadequate achievements in the five domains of 
disempowerment are beyond the cut-off inadequacy percentile (k) within a given population. The 
average inadequacy score of disempowered individuals (Ap) is calculated based on the average 
proportion of weighted inadequate achievements identifying disempowered people. In this sense, 
Hp can be further denoted as Hp = q/n, where q is the number of disempowered individuals, and n 
is the total population; Ap can be shown as Ap = 
!!(!)!!!!!  , where ci(k) is the “censored 
inadequacy score”16 of individual i and q is the number of disempowered individuals. Thus, by 
																																																								
16 The disempowerment cut-off is the share of (weighted) inadequacies a woman must have to be considered 
disempowered, and is denoted as “k.” The notation ci(k) is the censored inadequacy score which is different from the 
original inadequacy score “k.” Note that when ci > k, then ci(k) = ci, but if ci ≤k, then ci(k) = 0. Thus, for women 
whose inadequacy score is less than or equal to the disempowerment cut-off, even if it is not 0, their score is replaced 
by 0, and any existing inadequacies are not considered in the “censored headcounts.” 	
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definition, 5 domains of disempowerment are expressed as M0 = Hp x Ap. Finally, 5DE can also 
be obtained:  
5DE= 1- M0 = 1- (Hp x Ap) 
3.3.2.2 Gender parity index (GPI)  
The Gender Parity Index (GPI) is a relative measure that reflects the inequality in 5DE 
profiles between the primary adult male and female in each household. Men’s inadequacy scores 
are calculated in the same way as women’s. The “censored inadequacy score” also applies here. 
Based on the inadequacy cut-off threshold, each dual-adult family is either categorized as having 
gender parity or not. A family is classified as having gender parity if the woman is empowered 
according to her adequacy achievements, or, in the case that she is not empowered and her 
censored inadequacy score is lower than her husband’s (Alkire et al., 2013). Thus, to calculate the 
GPI score, two pieces of information need to be aggregated in a similar way as the 5DE 
calculation. The two components are the percentage of women who are without gender parity, 
denoted as Hw, and the average empowerment gap between women and men, depicted as Rp. 
Thus, by definition, the GPI can be expressed as:  
GPI = 1- (Hw x Rp).  
3.3.2.3 Women’s empowerment in agriculture index (WEAI) 
The WEAI is aggregated by 90% of the 5DE sub-index and 10% of the mean GPI value. 
The principle of calculating the final WEAI is explained above; however, it is quite time-
consuming and sophisticated to substitute and aggregate all the data to obtain the 5DE, GPI and 
WEAI, respectively. To simplify the calculation process and to guarantee the consistent 
application of the WEAI method, the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) WEAI 
resource center provides two STATA.do files for the calculation of WEAI. The first do file is 
programed to convert all answers from the questionnaires to either sub-datasets or aggregated 
indicators that are ready for further calculation. The second do file is written with commands that 
substitute data and indicators for the calculation of 5DE, GPI and WEAI.  
In this study, the original STATA do files are mainly refined from multiple-national level 
to single nation level to allow replication of pilot results from other countries in the “Feed the 
Future Zone” while also reflecting local contexts in China. Since WEAI has never been applied 
or tested in China, preliminary results can be obtained first in relative parity with calculations 
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undertaken for other countries. Then, the results can be also used to check if they are compatible 
with results from other countries.  
3.3.3 Justifications before between-group comparison 
The purpose of this WEAI pilot study is to test whether being left behind enables women 
to be empowered in their agricultural activities. To test the case, this study is designed to 
compare the empowerment status between left-behind and non-left-behind women, as measured 
by the WEAI. If left-behind women achieve a higher WEAI score than non-left-behind women, it 
would be reasonable to claim that being left behind contributes to left-behind women’s relative 
increased empowerment, if everything else between the two groups is identical.  
Covariate matching is a matching method that is often used to tackle selection bias, since 
matching all the covariates, by its definition, can remove the difference of characteristics between 
the treatment and comparison groups. However, if selection bias is not merely due to observables, 
the covariate matching method cannot be performed. Given the fact that the selection bias of the 
data collection is due to factors other than observable variables, covariate matching is not adopted 
in this study.  
Notably, a number of studies have been carried out to examine whether and under what 
circumstances non-experimental comparison-group methods, like the approach used in this study, 
can replicate the results of well-conducted randomized controlled trials (Bloom, Michalopoulous 
& Hill, 2005; Cook, Shadish & Wong, 2008). In these ‘design-replication’ studies, researchers 
run experiments between the same treatment group and different comparison groups for two 
times. The comparison groups are selected by either randomized or non-randomized methods, 
respectively. By comparing the results from the two tests, researchers examine whether the 
comparison-group estimates replicate the benchmark estimates from the fully randomized design.  
As noted by these studies, if remarkable differences, such as demographics, motivations, 
and ability, exist between treatment and comparison groups, the study is still unable to produce 
valid results (Cook, Shadish & Wong, 2008; Glazerman, Levy, and Myers, 2003). However, 
some common elements that improve the validity of any comparison-group studies are identified: 
first, the two groups should have very similar pre-treatment characteristics, such as demographic 
attributes, pre-treatment measurement of potential outcomes, and geographic locations; second, 
data should be collected in the same way for both groups; third, participants in the two groups 
	 114	
should have similar motivations for participation; fourth, statistical methods are used to adjust 
minor pre-treatment differences between the two groups.  
As shown in data description section, the left-behind and non-left-behind household 
samples satisfy most of the terms mentioned above, except that no data was available from before 
the husbands’ migration. Constrained by the availability of data, both sets of households are 
assumed to present similar patterns before the cut-off line of migration. This assumption is partly 
supported by the fact that both types of households can be mostly paired in the same villages and 
were interviewed by the same procedures. In this sense, the between-group comparison in this 
study may be considered as providing similar results as totally randomized samples.   
To further produce valid between-group comparisons, other endogenous as well as 
exogenous factors that may influence the results should be also considered and confined.  
According to relevant studies, age cohorts are normally selected as the matching estimator 
to reduce differences between the treatment and comparison groups (Wu & Ye, 2016). In this 
study, age is also an appropriate differentiator between the groups.  
First, as shown in Figure 3.4, while the majority of individuals fall into the -3 standard 
deviation and +3 standard deviation, people aged beyond 70 are outliers in the right tail of the age 
distribution. Thus, if omitting the oldest non-left-behind participants from the sample, individuals 
are distributed more evenly and symmetrically along the mean. Consequently, the histograms of 
both left-behind and non-left-behind households also share a very similar shape, where the 
majority of people from both groups are concentrated in the cohort from 40 to 50, as shown in 
Figure 3.5.  
Secondly, it is meaningless to include only one oldest non-left-behind family in the 
comparison. From the sample, one non-left-behind couple aged between 70 and 80 is the oldest 
family across the two groups, whereas the oldest left-behind women and men fall primarily in the 
61-70 years of age cohorts. Moreover, as most literature on left-behind women shows, the age of 
affected women ranges from 30 to 60, while women aged 70 or beyond are normally categorized 
as old women rather than old left-behind women (Fan, 2003; Hu, 2009).  
Lastly, the finite sample size before and after the matching process needs to be considered. 
As Bryson, Dorsett and Purdon (2002) noted, if the number of lost individuals was small relative 
to the total sample, this lack of information may not pose any serious problems. However, if the 
proportion of missing data is significant or the total sample size is relatively small, the estimated 
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effects on the remaining individuals may be problematic and biased. Since the sample size of this 
study is already very limited, maintaining a sufficient sample for making valid and typical 
comparisons needs to be carefully considered.  
 
Figure 3.4 Age distribution of total sample 
 
Source: derived from the sample 
 
Figure 3.5 Age distribution between left-behind households and non-left-behind households 
 
Source: derived from the sample 
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Hence, left-behind and non-left-behind households are matched by excluding the oldest 
non-left-behind family in the sample. In each village, the left-behind and non-left-behind 
households were selected and interviewed by the same enumerator, using the same procedure. 
Furthermore, as shown in Figure 3.2, the distribution of distance between the two groups’ 
villages and the closest cities also approximately coincides. Thus, it may be reasonable to assume 
that the two groups are under similar exogenous environments. There may be other 
socioeconomic factors that contribute to gender relations within participating households. 
However, given the limited sample size and available internal and external factors, an 
approximately reasonable comparison between left-behind and non-left-behind households can be 
achieved. 
 Results and discussion 3.4
After matching left-behind and non-left-behind households on their age, the 5DE, GPI 
and WEAI for both sets of women, as well as for all women have been calculated. The WEAI for 
all women in the sample was calculated and used to provide a reference point for the results from 
the three pilot regions. To identify which indicators of 5DE contribute to disempowerment, the 
5DE for both types of households are also disaggregated. Furthermore, the possible associations 
between women’s empowerment in agriculture and their education, age and subjective well-being 
have also been presented. 
3.4.1 Results of 5DE, GPI and WEAI  
After matching the left-behind and non-left-behind households by their overlapping age 
ranges, the 5DE, GPI and WEAI were calculated for both groups. As shown in Table 3.4, the 
5DE, GPI, and WEAI for left-behind and non-left-behind women are 0.882, 0.970, 0.891 and 
0.803, 0.919, 0.814, respectively. This shows that the absolute empowerment scores of left-
behind households are higher than non-left-behind households in all three categories. 
As defined earlier, a woman is defined as empowered in 5DE if she has adequate 
achievements in four of the five domains or is empowered in some combination of the weighted 
indicators beyond the 80th percentile. Based on left-behind women’s 5DE shown in Table 3.4, 
60.5% of women are empowered while 39.5% of women, who are not empowered, have average 
inadequacy achievements in 29.8% of the five domains of disempowerment. Whereas 42% of 
non-left-behind women are empowered, the rest of the women who are disempowered have, on 
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average, inadequate achievements in 34% of the domains of disempowerment. This shows that 
more non-left-behind women are disempowered than their counterparts. The non-left-behind 
women who are disempowered also achieve less adequate scores across all domains than the left-
behind women. Hence, left-behind women are not only more empowered than non-left-behind 
women as measured by the aggregated WEAI scores they also present higher proportions of 
empowered headcounts and adequacy achievements than non-left-behind women. 
 
Table 3.4 Results of 5DE, GPI and WEAI 
Indexes Left-behind Households Non-left-behind Households 
 Women Men Women Men 
Disempowered Headcount (H) 39.53% 30.23% 57.97% 24.64% 
Average Inadequacy Score (A) 29.80% 33.08% 34.00% 32.55% 
Disempowerment Index (Mo) 11.78% 10.00% 19.71% 8.02% 
5DE (1-Mo) 0.882 0.900 0.803 0.920 
     
% of women with no gender parity 
(HGPI) 
26.83%  48.44%  
Average Empowerment Gap (IGPI) 11.01%  16.79%  
GPI 0.970  0.919  
     
WEAI 0.891  0.814  
Source: Calculated by author     
Further decomposition of the domains of disempowerment is needed to examine which 
and how specific indicators contribute differently to women’s empowerment and 
disempowerment. However, before decomposing the 5DE for further analysis, it is necessary to 
examine whether the WEAI gap between the two groups of left-behind and non-left-behind 
women is sufficiently large so that further examination of the two types of households is 
meaningful. One possible way is to conduct an international comparison among countries that 
have conducted WEAI surveys. The three pilot studies in Bangladesh, Guatemala and Uganda 
were also conducted at the regional level (Alkire et al., 2013). This study adopts compatible 
WEAI questionnaires provided by International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), and 
builds regional WEAI based on data from Northeastern China. Thus, the WEAI obtained in this 
study is comparable with the three pilot nations. 
According to Table 3.5, the WEAI scores of China, Uganda, Bangladesh and Guatemala 
are 0.841, 0.800, 0.762, and 0.702 respectively. Notably, China has the highest WEAI score, 
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which is consistent with current literature on China’s feminization of agriculture, where rural 
women are more likely to engage in managerial roles than women in other developing countries 
(de Brauw et al., 2008; 2012). Among the three other countries used in this comparison, Uganda 
has the second highest score of 0.800, which is almost 0.1 points higher than the lowest score of 
0.702 in Guatemala. Guatamala’s score is 0.06 less than Bangladesh, which has the third highest 
score of 0.762. Among Bangladesh, Guatemala and Uganda, the average difference in WEAI is 
0.067, with a maximum value of 0.1 and a minimum of 0.04 in variation. On the other hand, the 
WEAI gap between China’s left-behind and non-left-behind women is nearly 0.08, which is less 
than 0.1 but greater than the average WEAI gap among the other three nations, at 0.067. Hence, it 
is reasonable to state that the gap of WEAI between the left-behind and non-left-behind groups 
identified in this study is relatively large, as it falls into the higher percentile of the WEAI scores 
among the four countries. 
 
Table 3.5 International Comparison of WEA 
Country China Bangladesh Guatemala Uganda 
Year 2015 2011 2011 2011 
WEAI 0.841 0.762 0.702 0.800 
5DE 0.829 0.746 0.690 0.789 
GPI 0.946 0.899 0.813 0.898 
% of women with no gender 
parity 
38.2% 40.2% 64.2% 45.6% 
Average Empowerment Gap  14.3% 25.2% 29.1% 22.4% 
Source: Author's calculations and results from Alkire et al., (2013) 
 
To identify which factors contribute to the different WEAI scores among countries, some 
national macro attributes are included in the comparison, such as GDP, GDP per capita, GDP 
growth rate and the Democracy Index. However, even though China’s relatively high GDP and 
GDP per capita may contribute to its high WEAI score, no consistent relationship patterns exist 
among the other three countries. Further decomposition of the regional 5DE may shed light on 
the causes for different WEAI patterns. However, conducting a decomposition of the two sub-
indexes for all countries is beyond the scope of this study. For the purpose of this study, only the 
decomposition of the 5DE between left-behind and non-left-behind women in Northeastern 
China has been conducted. 
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3.4.2 Decomposition of women and men’s disempowerment scores  
 A key feature of the 5DE is that once the disempowered have been identified, one can 
decompose the five domains of disempowerment M0 (1-5DE), as well as related indicators to 
reveal how people are disempowered. To decompose by indicators, the censored head-count ratio 
in each indicator,17 the percentage contribution and weighted contribution of each indicator to 
overall disempowerment are calculated. Based on the results obtained, domains and indicators 
that contribute to both left-behind and non-left-behind women’s disempowerment are first 
compared and discussed. Then, men’s disempowerment decomposed by indicators is also 
integrated into the analysis to facilitate a comparison between and within the two types of 
households.  
To reveal which and how domains or indicators contribute to women’s disempowerment, 
this section includes the relative and absolute contribution of each factor to overall 
disempowerment, through which a direct and intuitive comparison between left-behind and non-
left-behind women can be realized. Table A.1 and Table B.1 with full results of the censored 
headcount ratio, the percentage contribution, and absolute contribution of each indicator are 
attached in the Appendix.  
As shown in Figures 3.6 and 3.7, domains for the left-behind sample that contribute the 
most to women’s disempowerment are weak leadership (35%) and time poverty (27%), whereas 
weak leadership (30%) and ownership of resources (25%) contribute most to the 
disempowerment of non-left-behind women. The ownership of resources has almost similar 
effects on both groups’ disempowerment, with the same score of 25%. Leadership and time 
poverty together contribute more than 50% to both left-behind and non-left-behind women’s 
disempowerment, with left-behind women being more affected by the two domains than non-left-
behind women.  
Notably, decision-making on production and control of income, which accounts for a very 
small percentage of disempowerment for both teams, have substantially different impacts on left-
behind and non-left-behind women. These two managerial domains pose nearly two times the 
effect on the disempowerment of non-left-behind women, at 12% and 11%, respectively, as 																																																								
17 The censored headcount ratio in each indicator refers to the number of disempowered people who are deprived 
based on that indicator, divided by the total population. More specifically, to count only the disempowered numbers, 
people, whose inadequacy scores are more than the cut-off threshold, are included. People whose inadequacy scores 
are less or equal to the threshold, are excluded as well as “censored” since they are considered as empowered based 
on their scores. 
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compared to the left-behind women, at 7% and 6%. Admittedly, these two domains may cause 
the differences in disempowerment between the two groups. However, conclusions should be 
made in caution, considering the relatively small weights of these two domains to others.  
While women’s domains of disempowerment present an intuitive demonstration of what 
factors may contribute to the disempowerment gap between the two groups of women, further 
decomposition of the 5DE at the indicator level may reveal specific factors involved in the 
different disempowerment status obtained between left-behind and non-left-behind women. 
 
Figure 3.6 Contributions to left-behind women’s disempowerment 
 
Source: Author’s calculation 
 
Figure 3.7 Contributions to non-left-behind women’s disempowerment 
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Source: Author’s calculation 
In Figure 3.8, the absolute and weighted contributions of ten indicators of 
disempowerment for women as well as men are stacked and presented. In other words, more 
achievement in indicators means more empowerment and less disempowerment, as the totalling 
of five domains as well as ten indicators of disempowerment and empowerment is equal to one. 
Thus, an increase of empowerment indicates a comparable decrease of disempowerment for the 
same group simultaneously.  
Figure 3.8 shows that men are generally more empowered than both groups of women as 
measured by their achievement in all indicators, with men from non-left-behind households as 
most empowered and their female partners as least empowered. More specifically, non-left-
behind women are about twice as disempowered as their husbands, whereas left-behind women 
and their husbands have nearly equal achievement in total indicators. This finding is consistent 
with Wouterse’s (2016) study on the impact of women’s empowerment on agricultural 
production in Nigeria, where women in dual-adult households are the least empowered and are 
also much less empowered compared with their counterparts in female–only households.  
The indicators that make a significant contribution to both sets of women’s measures of 
disempowerment are access to and decisions on credit, membership in any collective groups, and 
workload. Additionally, while control over use of income affects non-left-behind women’s 
disempowerment substantially, it also causes a great gap between the two groups of women, with 
values of 0.023 for left-behind and 0.008 for non-left-behind women, respectively. This 
difference may be due mainly to the fact that left-behind women play major roles in managing 
the remittances from their migrant husbands, combined with other income from agricultural 
production. According to the “household strategy theory” (Stark & Bloom, 1985), migration is 
part of a strategic family decision to diversify risks, with the remittances from migrants as the 
major economic tie between affected family members. However, there are no such opportunities 
to help manage household funds for non-left-behind women.  
Surprisingly, the presence of non-left-behind women’s husbands may not necessarily lead 
to their relatively inferior positions compared to their husbands in controlling agricultural 
revenue. As shown in Figure 3.8, the control over income makes the most contribution to the 
disempowerment of men from non-left-behind households as well, with a value of 0.024 slightly 
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higher than their wives’ 0.023. Furthermore, migrant husbands follow a similar pattern, showing 
lower achievement than their female partners in this indicator.  
 
Figure 3.8 Absolute contributions of indicators to disempowerment between men and women 
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membership within the community that results in substantial disempowerment across all women 
and men. This consistent pattern implies that farmer’s organizations in any form are not well 
developed in the sampled region, or it may be difficult for farmers to join any kind of collective 
organizations. Consequently, the price for agricultural products may be almost exclusively 
determined by large agricultural corporations, thus limiting both men and women’s achievement 
of control over their incomes, with left-behind households better off than non-left-behind ones. 
On the one hand, earnings from agriculture constitute major revenues for the non-left-
behind households; thus, lack of power in negotiating sale prices within the market leads to 
disempowerment for the whole household, especially for the husbands as the heads of their 
families. On the other hand, through migration, left-behind households are able to diversify their 
revenue sources; thus, lack of control of income in agriculture has less impact on the 
disempowerment of migrant husbands. However, men from left-behind households may be more 
constrained by the difficulty of getting their salary than their wives, as unpaid salary to migrant 
workers is a common phenomenon in urban China (Cai, 2011; Fan, 2008).  
The different empowerment opportunity windows facing both sets of women in this case 
study become more evident when taking specific economic empowerment indicators, including 
input into production decisions, autonomy in production, and purchase, sale, or transfer of assets, 
into account. These indicators present the greatest disempowerment gap between the two groups 
of women, with left-behind women’s achievement in all indicators much higher than non-left-
behind women’s. For left-behind women, their migrant husbands are away for most of the year 
and may return only during the harvest season or for the major holidays (Yu et al., 2011). There 
are not many choices for the family other than leaving the women to be in charge of what to grow 
and how to plant. This, in turn, leads them to control the income that originates from their 
purchase, sale or transfer of agricultural products and assets, as compared with non-left-behind 
women. If the husband is present at home, he is responsible for most of the agricultural decision-
making and related activities, due to the old cultural ideology “men for planting, women for 
weaving” (Jacka, 2014). Hence, being away from their migrant husbands enables rural women to 
gain decision-making power in agriculture that was once denied to them.  
Another indicator exhibiting the greatest gap in disempowerment between the two female 
groups is leisure time within the time poverty domain, where left-behind women have five times 
more leisure time than non-left-behind women, at 0.002 versus 0.01, respectively. Notably, while 
	 124	
left-behind women perform better in leisure time than their non-left-behind female counterparts, 
they are more constrained in workload than non-left-behind women, which has substantial effects 
on both women’s disempowerment, as presented above.  
Unlike other indicators, including leisure time and control of income, the workload 
indicator enters the WEAI negatively by its construction. It describes whether a woman, who is 
burdened by paid and unpaid work, is disempowered (Alkire et al., 2013). Moreover, the 
workload may present a nonlinear pattern in empowerment, since workload may initially increase, 
accompanied by empowerment, before reaching a critical threshold; when passing that point, the 
impact of workload on empowerment may decrease and move toward disempowerment, creating 
time poverty through additional time spent and an overburden of workload (Malapit et al, 2013). 
In this sense, the significant value of workload for both groups of women reflects that both are 
subject to an excess of agricultural and domestic work, with left-behind women having more 
workload than non-left-behind women.  
This finding is partially consistent with most literature on left-behind women, stating that 
a heavy work burden and little free time together reduce left-behind women’s well-being (Mu & 
van de Walle, 2011). However, it is problematic to state that left-behind women are worse off by 
focusing only on workload, since left-behind women do self-report more leisure time than non-
left-behind women, as shown in Figure 3.8. The different perception of leisure time between the 
two types of women may be due to the fact that non-left-behind women have to do more 
housework for their husbands than left-behind women, resulting in less leisure time for 
themselves. Another reason may be that left-behind women’s relatively greater empowerment in 
production and income than non-left-behind women enables them to achieve greater self-esteem, 
to some extent. Thus, even though they may have limited leisure time, they may still feel less 
affected and therefore, more empowered than non-left-behind women. Furthermore, by 
differentiating workload and leisure time within the time poverty domain, it makes women’s 
overloaded domestic work more visible, revealing the substantial gender inequalities facing 
women within the different types of households.  
Interestingly, ownership of assets contributes the least to women’s disempowerment and 
also has a consistent impact on men’s disempowerment showing a zero value. An explanation 
may be that farmland is collectively owned in rural China, as defined by the land tenure system. 
Consequently, no individual can act using the full property rights of land. Unless there is a 
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change in the land tenure institution, land ownership does not affect people’s empowerment 
whatsoever. Furthermore, due to the fact that men are commonly household heads, the titles of 
asset possessions, including use of farmland, homestead sites and other resources, are usually 
under their names, which makes them de facto owner of family assets. This, in turn, may lead to 
asset ownership providing zero contribution to men’s disempowerment.  
However, the explanation for women is somewhat different from men’s. While men are 
the nominal and actual owner of household assets, women rarely own any form of family 
property. In this sense, women’s exclusion from owning assets, whether men are present or not, 
causes no obvious difference between sets of women. Traditional patterns of asset ownership 
confirm that male-centered gender relations operate within both types of households.  
In sum, it becomes clear that the absence of their male partners leads left-behind women 
to be more empowered in taking control of the family income, managing agricultural production, 
purchasing, sale and transfer of assets, and managing to have more leisure time than the non-left-
behind women. While being left behind may lead to women’s empowerment in agriculture, 
gender inequality is still present within and beyond households both through men’s absolute 
control in ownership of assets and non-left-behind women’s lack of leisure time, owing to their 
overburden of unpaid domestic work. Lastly, the lack of group membership, access to credit, and 
men’s control of their income across both types of households reveals that farmers face extensive 
socioeconomic discrimination and exploitation in both the urban and agricultural sectors, a 
ubiquitous condition of rural families that impacts all members of all households.  
3.4.3 Women’s empowerment and gender inequality 
Intra-household gender relations can be revealed by decomposition of the Gender Parity 
Index (GPI). As shown in Table 3.4, more than 73% of left-behind women enjoy gender parity 
within their households, whereas only 52% of their non-left-behind counterparts have gender 
parity with their husbands. For the 27% of left-behind women who are less empowered, the 
gendered empowerment gap with their husbands is around 11%. The average gender 
empowerment gap for women, who are not empowered and constitute nearly 50% of the total 
non-left-behind women, is 17%. It can be seen that the empowerment gaps for the two groups are 
relatively small compared to 25%, 29% and 22% in Bangladesh, Guatemala and Uganda, 
respectively (Alkire et al., 2013). Furthermore, at the regional level, 62% of Chinese women have 
gender parity within their households (as shown in Table 8) while 59%, 36%, and 54% of women 
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from the three pilot countries enjoy gender parity. This means China’s women in the sample 
region not only achieve more empowerment, but also enjoy more gender equality within their 
families than their counterparts in the other three developing countries where WEAI has been 
tested. 
Notably, the difference in the gendered power gap between the two types of households is 
relatively large at 6%, given that the average difference in empowerment gaps among the three 
pilot countries is only 4.7%. This may reflect that power relations within both sets of Chinese 
women’s households are quite different due to the absence or presence of their husbands. It also 
implies that left-behind women’s greater empowerment in agriculture may also improve gender 
equality within the household.  
 Conclusion and policy implications 3.5
Increasing numbers of studies on left-behind women’s well-being and their roles in 
agriculture have emerged and drawn wide attention from the government, academia and the 
public. However, the common ground through which these parties address the issues and make 
claims still reflects an old paradigm rooted in patriarchal society. Under this patriarchal ideology, 
left-behind women are generally depicted as a vulnerable group of passive decision-takers. 
Consequently, most studies address the negative impacts of male-dominated migration patterns 
on their lives while leaving the key question—how left-behind women adapt and cope with the 
absence of their husbands—unanswered.  
This chapter first aims to tackle the question from the perspective of women’s agency and 
opportunities for empowerment in agriculture. It assumes women can make strategic life 
decisions and positive changes through the agency available to them, and can build wider spheres 
of influence, and further, that this agency can be affected positively by being left-behind. Based 
on fieldwork conducted in rural Northeastern China, using the Women’s Empowerment in 
Agriculture Index (WEAI), the present study shows that women who are separated from their 
husbands can gain greater access to decision-making in agriculture, a condition that is impossible 
for non-left-behind women, whose male partners are present in their households. In other words, 
staying behind in rural areas may empower left-behind women through their adoption of a degree 
of economic autonomy in agriculture, relative to women who stay with their husbands in rural 
areas. While increasing women’s empowerment may have a strong impact on shifting gender 
inequality to some extent in individual households, as the results of the GPI have shown, both 
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groups of women still face extensive and substantial gender inequality within and beyond their 
households. Given the fact that gender inequality presents itself in a wider socioeconomic context, 
it is critical to recognize the importance of women’s agency while also understanding women in 
relation to the micro and macro systems in which they interact, in order to propose policy 
initiatives that ultimately reduce gender inequality. 
An important aim of this chapter is to point the way toward an empirically richer 
understanding of left-behind women’s agency and well-being, by measuring their empowerment 
directly and quantitatively. The pilot application of WEAI, which was designed exclusively to 
measure the empowerment, agency, and inclusion of women in the agricultural sector among 
“Feed the Future” countries, has significant implications for policy and practice in China. 
Comparing results with the other three countries in which WEAI has been tested shows that the 
empowerment gap between China’s left-behind and non-left-behind women is relatively sizable; 
it also reveals that the results are compatible with the other countries tested, which further 
validates the eligible and effective application of WEAI in China and other countries where a 
large population remains involved in agriculture. The present study advances our understanding 
of left-behind women’s adaptive experiences during the absence of their husbands. Left-behind 
women’s actualization through self-empowerment in agriculture may have spill-over or 
transferable effects on rural women in general, if they can be provided with supportive policy 
measures to address areas contributing to their disempowerment. Recognizing women’s agency 
in agricultural production may have long-term positive impacts on China’s agricultural outcomes, 
as confirmed by studies on women’s empowerment in agriculture in the global context (Alkire et 
al., 2013; World Bank, 2011).   
As this study is the first attempt to apply WEAI in the context of China, some limitations 
need to be stressed: 
• The survey area is not nationally representative; hence, conclusions on women’s 
situations may be different in other regions 
• Due to the design of WEAI, women who are engaged in non-agricultural activities may 
appear disempowered and are excluded from the sample; this further limits the total 
sample size (to 151 households), compared to the average size of the overall sample from 
the three pilot provinces (383 households) 
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• The focus on agriculture may not capture other domains of empowerment that may have 
significant impacts on transforming gendered power relations, especially when migrant 
husbands and left-behind wives finally reunite and live in cities, if they ever do. 
Future studies that attempt to build an alternative index measuring women’s 
empowerment in wider public or market spheres through a national survey with randomized and 
adequate samples of both left-behind and non-left-behind households may advance the results of 
this study. 
This study also has several policy implications. Even though the results are not nationally 
representative, policies and social programs could be better informed by tracking changes in 
empowerment over time, particularly for the same individuals and households, to see whether 
there is an improvement or deterioration of women’s status in agriculture.  Furthermore, one of 
the greatest contributions of WEAI is to make it possible to identify and highlight specific 
domains of empowerment and disempowerment, as well as to show how multidimensional 
indicators can be aggregated and disaggregated to provide a comprehensive analysis of women’s 
empowerment in agriculture. This information can enhance the gender mainstreaming of 
agricultural development programs, addressing relevant domains for constructive policy and 
practice intervention. More specifically, by further unpacking the five domains of 
disempowerment as measured by WEAI, this study confirms that heavy workloads, as one of the 
indicators, contribute significantly to left-behind women’s disempowerment. However, they are 
still considered relatively empowered, compared to non-left-behind women, as their overall 
adequacy achievement in other domains surpasses the cut-off threshold. Policies designed to 
improve left-behind women’s well-being also need to integrate possible ways of empowering 
their decision-making capacities in order to improve their overall capacities and achievements.  
The study has also shown that lack of wider group membership has persistent impacts on 
the disempowerment of all women and men in the research region. Thus, policies designed to 
promote the development of collective organizations, such as rural farmer’s co-operatives or 
agricultural production teams, may have profound effects on increasing women’s as well as 
men’s empowerment in agricultural co-operatives, not only increasing the market negotiating 
power of farmers in general, but also enabling women to raise their self-esteem through 
interactive learning with each other (Song & Vernooy, 2010). 
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Against the widely accepted negative conceptualization of left-behind women in policy 
and public discourse, this study shows that left-behind women may well adapt to new 
opportunities and help to make positive changes for themselves and their families by managing 
family income and making decisions on agricultural production. Thus, social support programs 
need to be designed in a way that facilitates the extension of their agency, rather than relying 
merely on the basis of first-aid support. Admittedly, being left behind does provide women the 
opportunity to be empowered in some ways; however, it is irrational and impractical to keep 
wives and husbands separated from each other as a long-term strategy to enhance women’s 
empowerment. Ultimately, to significantly improve the overall well-being and gender parity for 
both rural women and their male partners would entail steadfast commitment to improvement in 
all aspects of farming families’ actualization of their human capital through the enhancement of 
social and economic infrastructure in the countryside on one hand, and to incorporating 
meaningful ways to integrate migrant families into urban society and China’s developing 
economy on the other. 
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CHAPTER 4                                                                                      
CONCLUSION 
This chapter summarizes and concludes the dissertation by synthesizing results and 
insights from the two preceding chapters. The section following the summary presents theoretical 
and policy implications in relation to China’s capacity to undertake alternative urbanization 
approaches. Finally, future studies that can address the limitations of the present study are also 
considered. 
 Summary 4.1
After more than three decades of rapid economic growth, China’s urbanization has come 
to a place where farmers and their families, as well as migrant workers, are all being left outside 
mainstream development policy platforms, while farmland is becoming the main subject of urban 
expansion. Consequently, China’s current urbanization pattern features an under-urbanization of 
farmers while over-urbanizing its farmland. Institutions and state policies promoting economic 
development contribute to this land-biased pattern. Meanwhile, gender inequality coupled with 
other social factors affect intra-household and inter-household gendered divisions of labor, 
leading to male-dominated migration that leaves female farmers even further behind. Given 
China’s deepening integration in global economic systems and the challenges it faces in 
achieving inclusive and sustained development, it becomes apparent that excluding farmers and 
rural women from sharing in the prosperity cannot be sustained. An alternative pathway for an 
inclusive, sustainable, and gender equitable urbanization is needed.  
Given that China’s current land-biased urbanization is the outcome of its growth-
maximizing approaches, alternative development theory that originates from the extensive 
failures of mainstream economic development in alleviating global poverty in the 1960s may 
shed new light into alternative models of economic growth featuring a more inclusive approach 
to urbanization in China. More specifically, Friedmann’s (1992) alternative development 
framework, which adopts a holistic approach to describe peasant farmers’ empowerment during 
the transformation from traditional rural sectors to modern urban sectors, is applied to guide the 
terms of analysis in this dissertation, which bear significant implications for urbanization in 
China, overall. In this way, the motives, behavior and interaction among all participants, 
including the state, market, private corporations, and rural laborers, can be explored. Building on 
	 131	
Friedmann’s (1992) work on alternative development, inclusion, sustainability and gender 
equality are proposed as important features of more people-oriented urbanization in China. 
To seek empirical evidence on whether such alternative pathways are compatible with 
China’s context and to provide insights into China’s current and future capacity for more 
inclusive and sustainable urbanization patterns, two independent but linked investigations, 
emphasizing empowerment and choice, as guided by the alternative urbanization framework, 
have been conducted. 
Chapter two examines Chongqing’s farmer-oriented urbanization model, and integrates its 
results with the World Bank’s empowerment framework in order to propose possibilities for 
transforming China’s approaches to development and growth from land-centered toward more 
people-oriented urbanization policies. The proposed policy suite and revised World Bank 
empowerment framework are built on the idea of empowering the disempowered and adapting 
alternative development approaches to the socialist context of China. In this way, farmers and 
migrant workers, who are normally excluded and disempowered during urbanization processes, 
could be integrated and empowered as the main subjects of alternative urbanization in China. 
The proposed policy framework is first evaluated in comparison with China’s historical 
and current urbanization patterns. Then, to provide a thorough examination and seek empirical 
evidence for the potential application of such a framework in China’s current practices, a case 
study of Chongqing was conducted. As shown in that case study, Chongqing’s municipal policies, 
including its public housing, land voucher program and comprehensive hukou reform, have 
generated a new opportunity structure that enables farmers’ to make strategic choices between 
rural and urban settlement, while also offering them opportunities to integrate more fully into 
urban life. Furthermore, as one of the pioneers in experimenting with rural-urban integrated 
development, Chongqing has been able to go beyond the top-down mode of policy design and 
implementation to further decentralize its policy to reflect the interests and needs of farmers as 
well as migrant workers. More specifically, Chongqing’s practice is centered on developing 
public appreciation of land value-added revenue, while mainstreaming farmers in the 
urbanization process. As a central municipality that is under the direct control of the national 
government, Chongqing’s practice illuminates a possible direction for China’s future 
urbanization policy. 
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The third chapter investigates the impact of the absence of husbands on left-behind 
women’s adaption from the perspective of women’s agency and opportunities for empowerment 
in agriculture. To answer the question of relative empowerment between left-behind and non-left-
behind women, the study first adapts the Women’s Empowerment in Agriculture Index (WEAI) 
for the Chinese context. Based on the results of the WEAI, the study shows that being left behind 
in rural areas may empower women in terms of agricultural decisions and production, both of 
which are commonly controlled by men, if they stay at home. While the focus of the study is on 
left-behind women’s empowerment in agriculture, it also reveals intra-household gender relations 
based on decomposition of the Gender Parity Index (GPI). Against conventional assumptions that 
left-behind women are passive decision-takers during urbanization, the essay shows that left 
behind women are not only empowered in agriculture; they also achieve higher gender equality 
than their rural counterparts within non-left-behind households, as measured by WEAI.  
 Based on the results of the two case studies, there is evidence that possible alternative 
pathways to urbanization could evolve from China’s current context in ways that are compatible 
with its current version of state capitalism, while moving toward its socialist ideology of a market 
economy. However, a significant gap exists between achieving people-oriented urbanization and 
China’s prevailing policies and practices. Taken together, the two chapters that comprise this 
dissertation advance an argument for rebalancing China’s land-oriented urban development 
toward more farmer-oriented urbanization policies and practices through adapting and integrating 
international theoretical frameworks into the Chinese context. 
 Theoretical significance  4.2
By borrowing ideas from alternative development studies in general, and Friedmann’s 
(1992) alternative framework, in particular, this thesis attempts to offer new perspectives on 
societal and economic transition in China, drawing from, but also adapting mainstream 
economics theories, by attending to specific opportunities that already exist for improved 
outcomes. Adapting Friedmann’s alternative development framework to guide policy analysis 
rather than advocating political transformation makes it applicable to China as well as other 
developing countries. More studies informed by Friedmann’s framework, in turn, keep it relevant 
to current policy discourses and research in alternative development and urbanization.  
Based on the case study of Chongqing’s equitable urbanization model, which enables 
members of the rural population to enjoy the benefits of economic growth and integrate into an 
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urban livelihood if they choose, a combined pattern of capitalist and socialist policy elements is 
proposed. A primary benefit is that this model resists the hegemonic binary between capitalism 
and socialism claimed by Western economists, such as Hayek (1948) and Kornai (1994). While 
they suggest that a mix of the two systems can only lead to “incoherence” and disturbances that 
bring high social costs to the transition, Chongqing’s case proves that prosperity can be enhanced 
and shared by socialist commitments to the well-being of people making the transition from rural 
to urban livelihoods. Furthermore, if China follows more farmer-friendly, people-oriented pattern 
of urbanization, as informed by Chongqing’s case, a return of China’s political economy from 
state capitalism to a socialist market economy could be affirmed, thus addressing on-going 
debates about China’s possible future political transformation. 
In the case of left-behind women’s empowerment in agriculture, even though they are 
more empowered than their non-left-behind counterparts, they still face substantial gender 
inequality both inside and outside of their families, as shown through careful analysis of a pilot 
application of the WEAI in Northeastern China. On one hand, by focusing on rural women’s 
agency, this chapter fills a research gap by revealing left-behind women’s proactive coping 
strategies in the absence of their husbands, while transforming an existing negative 
conceptualization of them to a more positive one. On the other hand, based on the gendered 
division of labor within the household, women are more likely to be left behind in the agricultural 
sector, which has lower economic returns than urban sectors. Furthermore, the fact that being left 
behind enables women to gain autonomy in agriculture proves women’s inferior positions to men 
within their households. However, it is clear from the WEAI results that, if provided with 
enabling policy settings or positive opportunity structures, rural women are more likely to 
become proactive agents who make strategic choices in agriculture, as well as for their own and 
family livelihoods.  
Ultimately, given that urbanization is promoted nationally and will continue to be a 
necessary pathway for China to achieve higher economic performance, inclusive urbanization 
cannot be sustained by separating family members between rural and urban areas. China needs to 
improve opportunities for gender equality and integrate rural women into the urbanization 
process, an issue which is still too-often overlooked in mainstream literature. Furthermore, this 
study also provides an analytical framework to promote and evaluate possible empowerment of 
farmers and to initiate inclusive and sustainable urbanization that also integrates gender 
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empowerment into it, identifying potential opportunities to support women’s empowerment 
under current conditions, an approach which is often overlooked in existing studies on inclusive 
and sustainable urbanization.   
 Policy implications 4.3
In view of the analyses above, the following policy implications apply.  
To begin with, the national government may consider setting alternative urbanization 
objectives, including supporting opportunities for social, economic and intergenerational 
integration in its long-term policy agenda. In this way, it may generate a more inclusive and open 
policy environment, under which local states could be encouraged to decentralize power in 
greater cooperation with farmers, and farming households could be empowered to realize their 
self-autonomy by making use of state policy programs. Given that the emergence and benefits of 
the Household Contract Responsibility System (HCRS) were due to the openness of policy 
environment at that time, it may also be expected that an inclusive policy mood at the national 
level is the first step for promoting China’s capacity for people-oriented urbanization.  
Second, considering the complexity of steering China’s land-driven urbanization in a 
more people-oriented direction, governments may need to recognize the value in applying holistic 
and systematic approaches to their policy design and implementation. The rationale lies in an 
alternative urbanization policy framework that systemically claims inclusive development, 
sustained growth, gender equity, and actively supports women’s empowerment. Without a more 
systematic approach to alternative urbanization in China, female farmers may be subjected to 
further marginalization through structural gender inequalities that remain unaddressed. Without 
full integration of farmers and specific attention to the empowerment of women in urbanization, 
the benefits of inclusive development cannot be achieved. As shown in the case study of 
Chongqing, an umbrella of coordinated policies designed to promote hukou and land tenure 
reform in the context of greater commitment to social integration of migrants and farmers has 
proven stronger in securing sustainable prosperity than the common practice in other provinces 
and cities. The systematic approach adopted in Chongqing requires local governments to have a 
more comprehensive understanding of the policy issues and the needs of all stakeholders 
involved, developing greater accountabilities to more people, particularly farming families, and 
developing pragmatic mechanisms for achieving inclusive and sustainable development. 
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Third, given that the state continues to play a strong role in China’s urbanization, policy 
designed to facilitate farmers’ integration into their urban destinations rather than enforcement of 
rural/urban boundaries through administrative orders, may help sustain overall economic growth. 
As shown in Chapters two and three, farmers, including left-behind women in particular, can 
become their own agents and adapt well to new conditions during socioeconomic transformation. 
Policies that address and support the needs of farmers, both men and women, are more likely to 
lead to positive policy outcomes as shown in previous policy cases, such as HCRS and relaxation 
of hukou constraints in 1984.  
Lastly, non-governmental organizations can provide useful supplementary methods to 
governmental action and can play key roles in promoting gender equality and facilitating 
women’s empowerment. The All-China Women’s Federation (ACWF) is the most influential 
arms-length governmental organization that focuses exclusively on improving women’s well-
being and welfare across China. Compared to the state, the ACWF is more responsive and 
accountable to women’s affairs, due to its mission, harmonizing agenda and organizational 
structure. The ACWF can help bridge greater understanding across national, provincial, 
institutional and public contexts by holding conferences, seminars, and workshops in cooperation 
with academics and community leaders to emphasize the benefits of gender equity in 
development. Clearly, this will require mobilization of intersectional gender equity training in 
academic and school environments as well. In this way, gender equality has a better chance to be 
integrated into public and policy discourses, thus producing positive changes toward all women 
and those left-behind in particular. Furthermore, considering ACWF’s legitimate political 
positioning and its vast networks at all levels of administrative districts, it is a good vehicle to 
provide social programs, training sessions and other forms of supportive programming to raise 
women’s self-recognition as agents in the context of China’s ongoing development.  
 Limitations and future research 4.4
This dissertation highlights empowerment as a central component of an alternative policy 
structure for urbanization in China. Hence, several limitations also apply. Future studies that 
integrate an alternative urbanization framework may address these limitations.  
First, the construction of this study is guided by Friedmann’s (1992) framework of 
alternative development; thus some limitations of that framework are also present in the current 
study. More specifically, Friedmann’s (1992) framework offers a synthesis of claims advocating 
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alternative development centered on empowerment of people as a departure from mainstream 
economic ideologies. The arguments he developed are built on case studies in Latin America, 
thus limiting its wider application in other contexts. Consequently, Friedmann’s (1992) claims 
are more like a set of over-arching objectives rather than a site-specific road map to achieving 
alternative development. This study borrows key ideas from Friedman’s framework, developing 
empirical evidence that supports empowerment as a viable model for urbanization and 
development in China. However, the supporting evidence is constrained by limited study size and 
data availability. More in-depth empirical studies in China or other Asian countries are also 
needed to confirm the validity and relevance of Friedman’s alternative urbanization framework in 
different political and social contexts. 
Second, due to the constraints of available resources and data, the results of the two 
chapters need to be interpreted cautiously. The second chapter applies the case study research 
method. As a research approach, case studies face challenges of selection bias and lack of 
generalization. The unique position of Chongqing makes the case study even more context-
specific, thus weakening its capacity to shed light on practices in other regions. To remedy this 
disadvantage, more case studies of China’s pilot reforms in hukou and land systems, such as at 
Shenzhen and Beijing, should be conducted and compared with Chongqing’s case.  Meanwhile, 
in the case of Chongqing, a large scale survey, investigating farmers’ decisions and associated 
responses to institutional reforms, could be conducted to test Chongqing’s implicit empowerment 
structure in quantitative and qualitative terms.  
The results from Chapter three are not nationally representative and the sample size is 
small relative to practices and results in other countries. Thus, the conclusions may be 
inconsistent with results from other regions within China. Meanwhile, due to the lack of 
longitudinal data and documents, other factors that may cause left-behind women’s (dis) 
empowerment cannot be examined. Thus, whether left-behind women’s current empowerment is 
a process of development in other areas is missing. A national survey with random and sufficient 
samples is needed to verify the evidence generated in this study. Furthermore, due to the 
exclusive focus on women’s roles in agriculture necessitated by using the WEAI, biased 
conclusions may arise by excluding women in other occupations. Thus, if possible, an alternative 
index measuring women’s empowerment in other fields, such as specific labor markets, should 
be built.  
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Third, even though a greater understanding of left-behind women’s empowerment in 
agriculture may be transferable to other vulnerable groups of farmers, enabling them to be 
empowered also, there is a disconnection between China’s inclusive urbanization and female 
farmers’ experiences during the urbanization process. This is due to the fact that most of the 
policy documentation and surveys are imagined to be gender blind, which makes it difficult to 
measure women’s agency and capacity for adaptation during China’s processes of urbanization, 
directly. Following Chongqing’s case, future studies focusing on female farmers’ experiences 
during the current urbanization process may provide insights into how gender relations within the 
household affect women’s adaptation to urbanization relative to men. Furthermore, given that the 
All-China Women Federation has close connections with all levels of governments and directly 
addresses women’s needs and welfare, a study that examines the impact of ACWF’s programs on 
left-behind women’s empowerment in agriculture, as measured by WEAI, may provide other 
non-governmental organizations, as well as governments, with guidance. 
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TABLE A.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Income
Input	in	
productive	
decisions
Autonomy	in	
production
Ownership	of	
assets
Purchase,	sale,	
or	transfer	of	
assets
Access	to	and	
decisions	on	
credit
Control	over	
use	of	income
Group	member
Speaking	in	
public
Work	burden Leisure	time
WOMEN
Censored	Headcount/Population 0.057 0.038 0.019 0.057 0.396 0.038 0.302 0.132 0.321 0.019
%	Contribution 4.50% 3.00% 1.00% 3.00% 21.00% 6.00% 24.00% 10.50% 25.50% 1.50%
Contribution 0.006 0.004 0.001 0.004 0.026 0.008 0.030 0.013 0.032 0.002
%	Contr.	by	dimension 6.0%
MEN
Censored	Headcount/Population 0.173 0.077 0.000 0.038 0.288 0.058 0.308 0.077 0.058 0.058
%	Contribution 15.98% 7.10% 0.000 2.37% 17.75% 10.65% 28.40% 7.10% 5.33% 5.33%
Contribution 0.017 0.008 0.000 0.003 0.019 0.012 0.031 0.008 0.006 0.006
%	Contr.	by	dimension 10.7%
7.5% 25.0% 34.5% 27.0%
23.1% 20.1% 35.5% 10.7%
Time
Table	A.1:	Disempowerment	Decomposed	by	Dimension	and	Indicator	(Left-behind	household)
Statistics
Production Resources Leadership
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TABLE B.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Income
Input	in	
productive	
decisions
Autonomy	in	
production
Ownership	of	
assets
Purchase,	sale,	
or	transfer	of	
assets
Access	to	and	
decisions	on	
credit
Control	over	
use	of	income
Group	member
Speaking	in	
public
Work	burden Leisure	time
WOMEN
Censord	Headcount/Population 0.099 0.148 0.000 0.160 0.580 0.111 0.432 0.160 0.321 0.111
%	Contribution 4.97% 7.45% 0.000 5.38% 19.46% 11.18% 21.74% 8.07% 16.15% 5.59%
Contribution 0.012 0.016 0.000 0.013 0.037 0.023 0.044 0.015 0.029 0.010
%	Contr.	by	dimension 11.2%
MEN
Censored	Headcount/Population 0.000 0.071 0.000 0.024 0.224 0.118 0.200 0.047 0.035 0.047
%	Contribution 0.000 8.82% 0.000 1.96% 18.63% 29.41% 25.00% 5.88% 4.41% 5.88%
Contribution 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.002 0.015 0.024 0.020 0.005 0.004 0.005
%	Contr.	by	dimension 29.4%
21.7%
8.8% 20.6% 30.9% 10.3%
Statistics
Production Resources Leadership
12.4% 24.8% 29.8%
Time
Table	B.1:	Disempowerment	Decomposed	by	Dimension	and	Indicator	(Non-left-behind	household)
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